The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987–1997

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Foreword

The end of the Cold War initiated major changes in the global security environment that the United States could not ignore. These changes affected security requirements, forces, and missions that had guided the country since the end of World War II. Another "New Look" was needed, one that recognized the uncertainty inherent in the absence of a single rival power. Domestic pressures for a "peace dividend" provided additional impetus for a comprehensive restructuring of the nation's defenses. Army leaders responded almost immediately, agreeing that a more flexible, more technology-capable ground force was needed, one able to react to a much broader variety of threats and contingencies. But deciding how that goal could be best realized would prove illusive.

Dr. Mark Sherry's *The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987–1997*, examines this tumultuous period in depth. The author relates how the efforts of Army leaders to develop options for change were soon overtaken by actions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Army size, structure, and missions. Strengthened by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act, the Joint Chiefs led the way, exerting an unprecedented degree of power in reshaping Defense Department policies and postures. Sherry first considers the Army's studies and recommendations before tackling the higher level initiatives that followed, culminating in the Bottom-up Review and finally the first Quadrennial Defense Review. These Defense Department studies quickly overshadowed all Army reshaping efforts and seized the initiative for defense transformation. One result was the reduction by 1997 of the Army's active duty strength by over one-third with few substantive changes in its missions or structure. Another was the greatly reduced size and authority of the Army Staff and Secretariat, undermining their ability to define the size, shape, and nature of the ground forces that they were expected to provide to the combatant commanders.

Ten years later, these measures remain controversial. Whether the Army's ground forces are large enough and properly structured to address the full range of strategic requirements is still a question mark. So, too, is the size and shape of its generating base—its schools, installations, and administrative commands—and the Pentagon-based "Army Command Post" that oversees the entire effort. This work is thus not intended to end what is likely to be a continuing debate over national

strategy and how best to implement it, especially from the viewpoint of land forces and the senior service. Instead, *The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping* is meant to clarify that debate and better prepare those who are taking part in it and who in the end will determine the future of the Army, the soldiers, and their ability to accomplish the tasks they are assigned to fulfill.

Washington, D.C.
20 February 2008

JEFFREY J. CLARKE
Chief of Military History

Preface

Like all successful organizations that survive over time, the U.S. Army has had to adapt at numerous points in its history to changing requirements. *The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987–1997*, assesses the impact of the most recent period of transformation, which involved organizations, force levels, and commitments. It concludes that in many instances, often unwillingly, Army leaders surrendered control over their institution's destiny to joint decisions made by higher echelons in the Defense Department. By the end of the period, however, they had begun to participate in a major way in such studies as the first Quadrennial Defense Review and were able to directly influence the outcome of that undertaking.

The impetus for this work came from a 1993 chief of staff requirement for a short monograph that examined how Headquarters, Department of the Army, served as the Army command post for the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers. That study became the genesis for this expanded effort looking at how Army endeavors over the decade were integrated into the larger transformation of the armed forces. By the end of the time span covered in the monograph, some might well argue whether the Army's headquarters was still credibly considered its command post or whether those functions were now shared with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and several unified commands, especially the Joint Forces Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

In many respects, the tide of organizational reform launched by the Goldwater-Nichols Act is still ongoing. Trends in management manifest during the decade following the act's implementation appear headed toward increased "jointness" and "interdependence" of service components. Despite almost universal praise among defense intellectuals of the merits of increased unification of the Defense Department, discrete recommendations for organizational consolidations or modifications, as well as alterations to existing roles, missions, and functions, remain lightning rods for controversy. Hopefully, this study will help illuminate the way for those who will address the challenges of revamping the nation's forces in the twenty-first century.

A publication of this nature requires considerable assistance to reach fruition. Over the years that this volume has been in preparation, I accumulated a considerable number of debts to those who made it

possible. My former branch chief, Lt. Col. Steve E. Dietrich, assigned to me the first shorter study and provided unflagging encouragement, critical appraisal, and support. His successor, Lt. Col. James J. Carafano, converted what might have been simply a tour as the U.S. Army Center of Military History's representative to the Army's Quadrennial Defense Review cell into a proposal to expand my earlier work into a full-length monograph. Similarly, Brig. Gens. Harold W. Nelson and John W. Mountcastle approved the project at several points and supported it when times got rough. Brig. Gen. John S. Brown read an early version of the manuscript and rendered valuable oversight to ensure that it did not get completely submerged in the wake of an internal reorganization and competing priorities. Jeffrey J. Clarke, in his past role as chief historian, carefully reviewed several drafts and contributed a wealth of constructive suggestions accompanied by a continuous and patient dialogue.

Other acknowledgments have to go to the myriad readers who supplied advice and recommendations. Four readers, Col. (Ret.) James L. Adams, Col. (Ret.) Jack A. LeCuyer, Lt. Col. Timothy S. Muchmore, and Col. Mark J. Redlinger, first looked at the classified draft and offered invaluable comments. The review panel, chaired by Jeffrey J. Clarke and consisting of Gerald Abbott, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) David A. Armstrong, James J. Carafano, John W. Elsberg, and Edgar F. Raines, Jr., also generated worthwhile recommendations. Other readers who made suggestions include Terrence J. Gough, Richard W. Stewart, and James L. Yarrison.

My appreciation must also extend to those who helped convert curiosity and rough concepts into a completed historical study. From the research end of the project, librarians and archivists at the Center, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the Pentagon library furnished a consistent high level of support. To single out individuals worthy of special mention is hard, although I would be remiss in not noting the years of assistance that Pamela Cheney, David Keogh, James Knight, and Richard J. Sommers have provided. At the opposite end of the production cycle, Marie France carefully edited the manuscript. Diane Sedore Arms carried the project through to publication, while Gene Snyder prepared the charts, the page layout, and the cover. Anne Venzon created the index.

But this study would never have gotten off the ground without the support and assistance of the scores of participants in the decision-making process who allowed access to their deliberations. Many of them are cited in the select bibliography, from presidential appointees and general officers to action officers who consented to being interviewed "on the record." Others, including defense intellectuals and contractors in addition to government officials, offered informal insights and key

documents. Throughout my research and writing, these individuals selflessly took time out from hectic schedules to help fill gaps or clarify complex and often hazy issues.

Finally, a debt is certainly owed to my colleagues. Over the years, I have never ceased to be impressed by the depth and breadth of knowledge demonstrated by the historians at the Center, the Military History Institute, and elsewhere in the Defense Department's historical community. This professional competence has been matched by a willingness to cheerfully share individual expertise and provide encouragement. It has been a pleasure to work under the same roof with the largest body of U.S. Army historians in the world.

As always, the author alone retains full responsibility for all matters of interpretation as well as for any errors or omissions of fact.

Washington, D.C.
20 February 2008

MARK D. SHERRY

The Author

Mark D. Sherry received his Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University. He joined the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1986. He is the author of the World War II commemorative campaign brochure *China Defensive*. While at the Center, Sherry has specialized in institutional history and has served as the Center's representative to several study groups seeking ways to reorganize the Army in the wake of sweeping changes following the end of the Cold War. He is currently working on studies of innovation in the U.S. Army and small-unit tactical operations in Iraq.

The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987–1997

Chapter 1
Introduction

The U.S. Army underwent a decade of significant transformation between 1987 and 1997. The changes that occurred affected strategy, force requirements, structure, basing requirements, and a variety of lesser elements. The Army's leadership directed and controlled some of these changes. Others, such as changes in national strategy, were dictated by the secretary of defense based on the changing national and international landscape. Still others were dictated by Congress, particularly regarding budgets, end strengths, and even organization.

This study focuses on the changes that the Army experienced from the last years of the Cold War through the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The period started with the changes in process and organization mandated by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, popularly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As implemented, the act directly affected how the nation's defense establishment would devise its military strategies, apportion its existing military forces, and develop future forces. The act sparked further changes that strengthened the authority of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders over both operational and administrative issues. Most occurred at the expense of the service secretaries and the individual service chiefs and their staffs.

More than any other factor, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s provided the initial impetus for defense reshaping and drove the pace and depth of change. At the same time, the reduced threat posed by the Soviet Union led to the anticipation of a major "peace dividend" in Congress, which fueled precipitously declining defense budgets. The Defense Department responded primarily through reductions in forces and installations and also through deferred procurement of the next generation of military equipment. The broad reductions overlapped, however, with efforts to restructure the Army from a Cold War footing to a force better adapted to the diverse challenges of a new global security environment. Whether Army leaders could both restructure and reduce, even as they fulfilled a growing variety of unanticipated overseas commitments, was a question.

The Situation Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act

The strategic, institutional, and political dynamics that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act had been building for nearly a century. All manner of military reformers had sought to restructure the nation's armed forces to achieve a level of coherence commensurate with the requirements of a world power. Since World War II, many of the recommendations had centered on the greater unification of the armed forces. Political inertia and the lack of clear strategic needs, however, hindered implementation of such concepts and plans for reform. Indeed, many feared that increased efficiency through unification might actually undermine military effectiveness. Nevertheless, the National Security Act of 1947 began an evolutionary process toward unification, and the Defense Department undertook several modest subsequent reorganizations in the decades thereafter. The political consensus that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act represented a significant milestone in that effort.

By the mid-eighties the structure of the Department of Defense had been relatively stable for a decade and a half (*Chart 1*). At the top of the hierarchy were the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Although the 1947 act and subsequent reorganizations had moved toward the type of unified defense establishment envisioned in the War Department's proposed Marshall-Collins Plan to merge the War and Navy departments into an integrated Department of National Defense, the results made for a less than streamlined and cohesive department (*Chart 2*).[1] Immediately subordinate to the secretary,

[1] Although detailed discussion of a century of defense unification plans is beyond the purview of this study, the Marshall-Collins Plan stands out as a beacon, toward which subsequent reform efforts have been ploddingly moving. The plan's supporters intended that one, unified department would apply its institutional energies to future national security needs, rather than merely preserve existing service doctrines and forces. Such a department would integrate ground, naval, and air strategic doctrines and plans and emerge with one unifying strategy and vision. The department would also be strong enough to ensure that the services developed compatible doctrines, organizations, and cultures. With perhaps uncanny prescience, the Marshall-Collins Plan deliberately eschewed placing political appointees at the head of each service, as such placements would likely politicize the department and "perpetuate service partisanship and delay the achievement of eventual loyalty to the armed forces organization as a whole." See Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., "Unification of the Armed Forces," 1958, Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C., p. 309. For background on post–World War II defense unification efforts, see also C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996); James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, Special Studies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975); Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1: The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (Washington, D.C.:

OSD served as the secretary's "general staff," having grown to 1,896 personnel with 2 under secretaries, 11 assistant secretaries, and a general counsel by 1983. Forty-one agencies and individuals reported directly to the secretary of defense, including eighteen statutory "presidential appointees" in OSD. Not surprisingly, the system had proved somewhat unwieldy, often stretching the span of control that the defense secretary personally exercised beyond its limits. As for the expanded staff, which he relied on to help integrate service plans and programs, the political appointees at the top levels of OSD had a high rate of turnover—members served an average term of less than three years. Thus the department's overall effectiveness was continually frustrated, critics claimed.[2]

Precluded by statute and policy from assuming all or part of the secretary's "general staff" duties, the JCS focused on strategic planning. Having grown to more than fourteen hundred personnel by 1983, the Joint Staff continued to suffer from a lack of responsiveness to the chairman, as well as from a propensity to "logroll" issues—reducing them to the lowest common denominator acceptable to all of the Joint Chiefs.[3]

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); Robert J. Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,* vol. 4, *Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997); Edgar F. Raines, Jr., and David R. Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942–1985*, Historical Analysis Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986); Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); and Paolo E. Coletta, *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), for background on post–World War II defense unification efforts.

[2] See Col Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of a Conference with the President," 18 May 1956, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, vol. 19, *National Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1990), pp. 303–305, for Eisenhower's recommendation to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to strengthen his de facto "general staff" to help him control the services.

[3] U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee (SASC), *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 16 October 1985, pp. 57–61, 87–98, 158–187. In contrast, staff officer strengths for the War Department General Staff that performed similar functions during World War II, on 1 April 1942, were G–1, 13; G–2, 16; G–3, 14; G–4, 12; and Operations Division, 107. The general staff did expand modestly during the war, and the number of special staff sections reporting to the chief of staff and secretary increased from three to eight by the end of 1944. Otherwise, the headquarters retained its basic organization and size throughout the war. See Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), pp. 107–119, 178–180, 195–202. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 327–328, 389–392, 467–470; Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department

Chart 2—The Marshall-Collins Plan for a Unified Department of the Armed Forces, 19 October 1945



Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, *Department of Armed Forces/Department of Military Security, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs*, 17 October–17 December 1945, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington D.C.: 1945), p. 156.

Directly beneath that level, the Department of the Army remained administratively independent but bound to both OSD and the JCS by department management processes (*Chart 3*). Participation in major OSD programming and budgeting functions directly affected Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), organization and internal functions. HQDA included the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff, both located in the Pentagon. Within HQDA, the Army Secretariat comprised 368 members in 1985, including a service secretary, an under secretary, five assistant secretaries, and a general counsel. Directly below the service secretariat, the Army Staff had 3,211 members, organized into functional sections and each headed by a general officer. There were also more than fifty thousand personnel in approximately 122 field operating agencies (FOAs) and staff support agencies (SSAs), smaller specialized organizations that either supported or were directly supervised by HQDA.[4] In principle, the Army Secretariat was responsible for making policy for the Army, the Army Staff took care of planning, and the Army's major commands (MACOMs) managed execution.[5]

When Goldwater-Nichols was passed, most Army military and civilian personnel served in the Army's sixteen MACOMs. Their number and type had evolved over nearly four decades in reaction to changing national strategy and other requirements. Although each was unique in terms of size, missions, and structure, there were essentially two main kinds of MACOMs: functional commands and service commands. The functional MACOMs, such as the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), focused on running the Army's training installations and schools, managing its research and development agencies, and training its forces for deployment for wartime missions. The Army's service component commands, such as U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), provided administrative oversight and support to Army units that were assigned to a geographic or regional combatant commander (formerly referred to as commander in chief [CINC] of a unified or specified command).

The relationships among OSD, HQDA, and the other service headquarters were complex. The most powerful day-to-day management tool that the secretary of defense used to exercise his authority over the services was the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),

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Reorganization," August 1941–March 1942, *Military Affairs* 16 (Spring 1952): 12–29 and (Autumn 1952): 97–114.

[4] In contrast, the World War II Army Ground Forces headquarters comprised some 250 officers and 750 enlisted personnel. See Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, United States Army, 1947), pp. 219, 359–360.

[5] Ibid., pp. 391–414.

often described as the department's "overarching management tool." Responding in part to criticisms that, during the decade following the Korean War, the United States "wasted fully 25 percent of what it spent on national security," Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had seized on PPBS in the early 1960s to wrest control over the department. In doing so, he relied more on the reform of management processes than on structural reorganization.[6] Responding to service critics and their allies in Congress, however, the Defense Department changed its PPBS processes in the late 1960s to incorporate a stronger service role in the programming arena. Under the new "participatory" approach, OSD provided financial programming guidance, and the services each submitted a Program Objective Memorandum (POM)—a draft budget proposal—biennially for review by OSD and integration into the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Enhanced service participation in FYDP development further elongated the PPBS processes and expanded manpower requirements of both OSD and the services, which rapidly increased their staffs to eclipse the OSD manpower devoted to PPBS. Critics argued that enhanced service participation in fact unintentionally shifted the balance of power in FYDP development back to the services, jeopardizing the secretary's ability to develop a balanced and integrated program.[7]

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[6] One key component of PPBS, the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), is the Secretary of Defense's mechanism for integrating and analyzing programs across the defense establishment. Prepared biennially, the FYDP projects programs for materiel, forces, personnel, and all other major department expenditures over a six-year period. Prepared initially by OSD, the FYDP permitted the secretary to develop his own integrated programs and budgets, rather than respond to service demands on an annual basis, as well as provided stability for multiyear programs and opportunities for detailed comparison of forces and requirements across the services. Critics argued, among other things, that OSD's rigorous "cost-benefit analysis," intended to balance strategy, forces, and costs, favored programs that emphasized perceived *efficiencies* but reflected little credible analysis of military *effectiveness*. Another criticism was that, in many ways, PPBS exacerbated interservice competition as the services sought to advocate and defend competing programs within the arena of OSD's elaborate management and review processes. See Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 17–24; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 35–53; Peter T. Tarpgaard, "McNamara and the Rise of Analysis in Defense Planning: A Retrospective," *Naval War College Review* 48 (Autumn 1995): 67–73.

[7] Carl W. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 10–11; Interv, Alfred Goldberg and Ronald Landa with Dr. Harold Brown, 4 Mar 1994, OSD Historical Office, Washington, D.C.; Caroline F. Ziemke, "Rethinking the 'Mistakes' of the Past: History's Message to the Clinton Defense Department," *Washington Quarterly* 16 (Spring 1993): 49–50.

Army leaders had seized this opportunity to participate more effectively in PPBS, expanding and reorganizing HQDA to better focus on management and resource issues.[8] By the mid-1980s, the Army had completely integrated its core force management processes with PPBS. In their annual budget requests, the MACOMs submitted their needs to HQDA for such requirements as military construction and training. The Army service component commands and the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM) also submitted requirements for military forces and equipment to support contingency plans of the regional combatant commands. When it came to designing operational forces and developing requirements for future materiel, TRADOC conducted most of the detailed planning, which it submitted to HQDA for review and incorporation into the Army's POM submission. Once OSD received the POM, it subjected all Army programs to review. Although it could recommend modification or even outright cancellation of a program, OSD rarely modified the Army's POM significantly before incorporating the Army's input into the department's FYDP. In fact, the sheer size of these submissions ensured that OSD officials could not challenge them in detail within the time that the process allowed.

Although the Army leadership was relatively satisfied with defense organization during the Reagan administration's defense buildup, powerful forces in Congress compelled change. In the early 1980s, critics had begun pointing to structural problems affecting the Defense Department and the Army. For example, the failure of the April 1980 mission to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran focused attention on flaws in the operational command of the armed forces and the lack of interoperability among service components. In 1982, Air Force General David C. Jones, chairman of the JCS, called for reform of joint command and control.

[8] In 1967, the Army established an assistant vice chief of staff to coordinate and integrate the Army's input to OSD on PPBS issues, especially the development of the Army's POM. After 1974, the Army's director, program analysis and evaluation, had assumed most of these responsibilities. By then, almost all of the Army Staff had become involved either directly or indirectly in PPBS, and several Army special staff officers, such as the chief of engineers, subsequently emerged from subordination to a deputy chief of staff and thus became "principal members" of the Army Staff. Consequently, rather than streamlining the Defense Department and reducing overlaps between services, McNamara's management reforms expanded the focus and scale of both OSD and service headquarters. See Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell, and Jane Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead?: Senior Leadership in the United States Army* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), pp. 115–117; Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, eds., *Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), pp. 119–120, 171–174; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Lt Gen Richard D. Lawrence, U.S. Army, Ret., 3 Sep 1996, Alexandria, Va., Oral History Activity, CMH.

Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer elaborated, arguing that the services still retained too much authority both in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and elsewhere within the Defense Department. Noting that the Joint Chiefs had proven themselves more zealous advocates for their parochial service interests than joint interests, he recommended replacing them with an advisory council of general officers who would be ineligible to return to their services. Meyer argued that OSD, as it had during the McNamara era, and the Joint Staff should dominate major decisions on forces and military requirements.[9]

Appalled by reports of continued interoperability problems in the 1983 U.S. operation in Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY, both Senate and House Armed Services committees held hearings that highlighted the dire need for a Defense Department overhaul. The hearings highlighted ample evidence that the Defense Department was still only "quasi-unified." Service component commanders in the field were usually more responsive to their services than to their regional combatant commanders. Similarly, combatant commanders found that critical differences in doctrine, equipment, communications, and logistical systems still limited interoperability among units from different services. They had yet to develop an adequate degree of synergistic interdependence among service components. Issues that arose among service elements in the field still required resolution in the Pentagon. Finally, a 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee staff study concluded ruefully that structural weaknesses in both OSD and the JCS allowed the services to continue to dominate the Defense Department by default.[10]

Despite the rising tide of criticism, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger resisted reorganization as potentially detrimental to his arms buildup. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr., also feared that any significant defense reorganization that strengthened joint authority risked diluting the chief of staff's authority over Army programs and the Army's role in strategic planning. He argued in particular against any reorganization that would diminish to any significant degree the Army chief of staff's role in the joint arena and within the Army. Wickham also

[9] Meyer, Ancell, and Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead?*, pp. 150–153, 177–180; Raines and Campbell, *Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 154–165.

[10] Vincent Davis, "The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management," in *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, ed. Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), pp. 158–163. See James F. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), for a definitive account of the congressional efforts that culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Army Chief of Staff General Wickham and Defense Secretary Weinberger

feared proposals that would enhance the JCS chairman's authority at the expense of the service chiefs of staff. He argued that such proposals not only would eliminate the authority of the service chiefs over the Joint Staff, but also threatened to distance them from decision making during a crisis. Instead of being "actively involved" during contingencies that employed troops from their services, service chiefs might find themselves "informed" of the secretary's decisions by the JCS chairman. The more limited staffs of the JCS and those of the even less experienced and always somewhat politicized OSD would thus replace all of the expertise and experience contained in the highly capable service staffs. Their very opposition to change, however, foreclosed any opportunity that Weinberger and Wickham might have had to influence the legislation, and Congress enacted its own reorganization on 1 October 1986.[11]

[11] Barry M. Goldwater, *Goldwater* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 341–357; Major Greg H. Parlier, U.S. Army, "The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: Resurgence

The Goldwater-Nichols Act prescribed specific corrections for problems in materiel acquisition, command and control of operational forces, joint strategic planning, and the secretary of defense's limited control of the services.[12] Congress outlined discrete goals for the act, including strengthening civilian authority, improving military advice, clarifying responsibilities of combatant commanders for accomplishing their assigned missions, ensuring that combatant commanders had authority commensurate with their responsibilities, improving strategy formulation and contingency planning, improving efficiencies in the use of resources, and enhancing joint management of officers. The legislation incorporated some recommendations of the 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, the "Packard Commission," for changes in national security planning and budgeting procedures, the military chain of command, and defense acquisition procedures. Yet the law eclipsed the Packard Commission's recommendations in both scope and application. The act strengthened joint planning and operations by streamlining command relationships among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the unified commands.[13] Toward this end the act created the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman rather than to the Joint Chiefs, authorized expansion of the Joint Staff from about 1,400 to 1,627 members, and led to the staff's reorganization from five to eight directorates.[14] Goldwater-Nichols also revised materiel acquisition authority within the Defense Department. Other changes affected the service departments. The act's Title V directed a reorganization of the military department headquarters, reducing HQDA from 3,653 personnel to a maximum of 3,105. The same section directed the reorganization of the respective service headquarters, mandating the transfer of several functions, including research, development, and acquisition, from the service staffs to the service secretariats. Finally, in Title IV the act moved to improve joint

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of Defense Reform and the Legacy of Eisenhower" (Student thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1989), pp. 73–85; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Report to Congress: Army Implementation of Title V, DoD Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Apr 1987).

[12] The Department of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-143).

[13] Interv, Mark Sherry with Honorable James R. Locher III, 6 Oct 1997, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH; President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, "A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President," Jun 1986; Mark Perry, *Four Stars* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), pp. 329–339; Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, pp. 437–438.

[14] See Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1989* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1989), pp. 63–68, for details concerning the Joint Staff reorganization.

officer management by ensuring the development of "joint specialty officers" and setting statutory requirements for the promotion of "joint-qualified" officers.

Army Secretary Marsh

Although Congress and OSD delegated to the Army the final design of its headquarters, Title V's specific language restricted options for the Army's implementation. Furthermore, Army Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr., directed that the Army's restructuring efforts comply with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.[15] Lacking real recourse, Wickham dutifully implemented the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization and then objected to Congress concerning its impact on HQDA just before retiring in June 1987. He argued that those provisions which directed the consolidation of responsibilities for acquisition, research and development, auditing, comptroller, information management, inspector general, legislative affairs, and public affairs functions in the Army Secretariat compromised the chief of staff's effectiveness. Although the chief represented the Army in the joint arena, he no longer controlled major HQDA staffs and agencies involved directly with sustainment and procurement issues critical to joint warfighting. The transfer of these functions to the Army Secretariat created an unwieldy, top-heavy bureaucratic structure. Moreover, these functions were now directly under individuals lacking responsibility for operational planning and execution and the development of joint military doctrine. Unlike in the past, the Army chief of staff could not commit the Army during JCS meetings to courses of action in areas of responsibility now delegated to the service secretariat. This bureaucratic restructuring meant that the

[15] Interv, Mark Sherry with Maj Gen Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., 14 Dec 1992, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Memo, Maj C. Kenneth Allard, DACS-ZBAS, 8 Jan 1987, sub: An Inside Perspective on the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986; Discussion, Mark Sherry with Col C. Kenneth Allard, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 5 Jul 1994; Goldwater, *Goldwater*, pp. 337–338. See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1986), for an assessment of Goldwater-Nichols' impact on Defense Department management processes.

General Wickham passes the Army flag to Secretary Marsh during change-of-stewardship ceremonies.

chief of staff and the secretary of the Army had to coordinate what previously had been purely military decisions.[16]

In that respect, the impact of Goldwater-Nichols arguably was to create a less focused Army headquarters. The reorganization actually complicated command and control within both the Army and the Defense Department. Whether transferring oversight of Army sustainment and acquisition prerogatives from the chief of staff to political appointees in the Army Secretariat enhanced civilian control was questionable.[17] As General Wickham argued, the reorganization threatened to hamper Army participation in the joint arena. Besides requiring sometimes time-consuming negotiations to coordinate even minor issues within HQDA, the reorganization further diminished the Joint Chiefs' influence over major planning and programming issues. Key provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act were intended to strengthen joint influence over service programs. With the new reorganization, however, service chiefs of staff could not make commitments within the joint arena on program and weapons acquisition issues over which they lacked authority.[18]

[16] HQDA, *Report to the Congress*, pp. 31–36.

[17] Brown's *Thinking About National Security*, pp. 207–214, offers a persuasive case for a comprehensive reorganization to improve unified command and control of the Defense Department. For a contrary view, see Archie D. Barrett, *Reappraising Defense Organization: An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977–1980* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983).

[18] During the decade and a half following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JCS chairmen have acted to address problems concerning joint oversight of acquisition and other program issues. For example, see Admiral William A. Owens, "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly* 5 (Summer 1994): 55–57; U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Roles and Missions, 1995), pp. 4-23 through 4-25.

While the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization made significant structural changes to both HQDA and the Defense Department, it left intact the Army chief of staff's role as the service's senior uniformed leader. The chief continued serving as the soldier's proponent within the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff for programs and issues relevant to the present and future Army, including strategic sealift and air transport. His continuing challenge was to ensure that Army capabilities and programs supported joint plans while dovetailing with the capabilities and programs of the other services.[19]

Although resisted by the secretary of defense as well as the Army, the Goldwater-Nichols Act that Congress passed encouraged those who supported further defense integration. The act significantly altered the organizational and functional relationships among HQDA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands. The legislation limited HQDA's participation in operational matters and mandated changes to its structure. As previously indicated, the most significant internal changes to take place within Army headquarters were the transfer of responsibilities for oversight of information management, the Army budget, and research, development, and acquisition, as well as the inspector general, from the Army Staff to the Army Secretariat. The act also reduced HQDA manpower by 15 percent. Of equal consequence, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the chairman's authority over the Joint Staff and its influence on Defense Department management processes. Finally, the legislation buttressed the secretary of defense's authority over all functions throughout the department. Meanwhile, the Army focused on modernization, training, and readiness, in preparation for at least what the immediate future would bring. The end of the Cold War, however, would soon force a major reevaluation of all its endeavors.

[19] Interv, Mark Sherry with Gen John W. Foss, U.S. Army, Ret., 1 Mar 1994, Williamsburg, Va., Oral History Activity, CMH.

Chapter 2
Antaeus and the New Paradigm, 1987–1989

The Goldwater-Nichols Act arrived during the final months of the Cold War. The legislation sparked restructuring of OSD, the Joint Staff, and HQDA. It also directly affected the interrelationships among the three headquarters. Finally, the act set in motion a revision of Defense Department management processes that would also affect all three. The interaction between organizations and processes would determine how the Defense Department would adapt to the post–Cold War era.

Supporters of the Goldwater-Nichols Act saw the legislation as more a step along an evolutionary path toward a more unified department, than a comprehensive solution to then-current problems. To meet the expectations of its authors, the act would have to overcome decades of bureaucratic inertia and transform the balance of power among OSD, the Joint Staff, and the service headquarters. Specifically, the Defense Department would have to refocus its management processes for strategic and program planning. It would have to succeed in this endeavor even as it fended off interests that intended to deflect or even derail reform. Fortunately for the reformers, the timing for such a transformation was propitious. The services were reaping the benefits of more than half a decade of sustained arms buildup that addressed many of their shortfalls in forces and equipment. Proponents envisioned that the test of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms would be how well they enabled the secretary of defense to blend the benefits of that buildup into more integrated and effective armed forces. The end of the Cold War, however, would provide the Defense Department and the Army with a far more comprehensive challenge than only the improvement of joint aspects of existing forces and programs.

Although the Army's leaders had championed improvements to joint operations since World War II, they had opposed major provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, and they remained wary of the legislation's impact on the land service. In June 1987, Wickham's successor, General Carl E. Vuono, inherited an HQDA that had realigned functionally as mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. Major responsibilities had transferred from the chief of staff's oversight to that of the service secretary's for such functions as research and development, acquisition, budget, and information management, among others. Vuono attempted to integrate the residual activities of



Army Chief of Staff
General Vuono

the Army Staff through the vice chief of staff, who was to run the staff on a day-to-day basis. He also confirmed the vice chief of staff's responsibility for coordinating programs and other resource management functions across the Army Staff. The director of the Army Staff (DAS) would in turn be responsible for coordination between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat. The vice chief of staff and under secretary of the Army would decide issues impossible to resolve at the DAS' level, especially program and budget issues.

Vuono would also serve as the Army's proponent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, he would support the secretary of the Army in dealings with OSD and the secretary of defense. In these roles, one of his major objectives was to ensure that the unfolding Goldwater-Nichols reforms of Defense Department management processes did not undermine the Army's capabilities. Soon, however, Vuono and his successors had to react to great changes in the national security environment as well.

The Strategic Setting After the Goldwater-Nichols Act

One of the major objectives behind the Goldwater-Nichols' reorganization was to strengthen the strategic planning roles of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders (then called commanders in chief, or CINCs). At the same time that Congress debated the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it placed new emphasis on special operations and low-intensity conflict. In October 1986, the FY 1987 National Defense Authorization Act directed that the Defense Department establish the position of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (ASD [SO/LIC]) and establish the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a unified command. One other provision of the legislation had a profound effect on the Army and the other services: the provision for a new Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11) that gave SOCOM its own POM and budget. The impact on the Army

was immediate, as responsibility shifted from HQDA to SOCOM for resource planning for Army special operations forces soon after the new command's activation on 1 June 1987. The Army also found itself sharing responsibility with SOCOM for doctrine and force developments for low-intensity conflict and operations other than war.[1]

Beyond mandating changes in the strategic planning process, both the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the legislation that established SOCOM left existing national military strategy and contingency plans unaffected. These contingency plans, in turn, reflected a strategic posture honed by the four decades of the Cold War. Their primary objective was national survival through strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union. Although the Air Force and the Navy provided most of the nation's capabilities for strategic deterrence, the Army, with ongoing research and development in the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, retained an interest in related missile defense. Moreover, the Strategic Defense Initiative had recently rejuvenated the Army's role in the development of ground-based antimissile systems.[2]

The Army's basic purpose remained to meet the nation's requirements for conventional land forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment to defend against a conventional ground attack by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe was the second U.S. strategic priority, following strategic deterrence. U.S. Army forces had served this commitment in Europe since 1950. Later alliances and agreements promised corps-sized Army forces to support contingency plans both in northeast Asia and in the Persian Gulf region. In addition, one division was forward-deployed in Korea to serve as a tangible bulwark to the United Nations (UN) command located there. Two U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contingency plans mandated the deployment of Army troops to the Middle East, including one for military operations in Iran in response to a Soviet invasion.[3]

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[1] U.S. Special Operations Command Historical Office, *United States Special Operations Command History: Fifteenth Anniversary* (MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., 2002), pp. 3–10.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Guidance: FY 1988–1992 (DG 1988–1992)* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 31 Dec 1985), pp. 20–21; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture: FY 1986* (Washington, D.C.: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp. 8–9; Richard Halloran, *To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America's Endangered Defenses* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 307–314; Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 136–138, 154–163.

[3] *DG 1988–1992*, pp. 6–10, 23–26; NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14 Apr 1950, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of*

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Army's force requirements were daunting. For example, intelligence estimates credited the Soviet Army with more than two hundred divisions, eighty of which were manned at more than 50 percent strength and ready for operations with minimal mobilization and training.[4] To address this kind of threat, the JCS developed a "Minimum-Risk Force" intended for a "high assurance of success" general war. In 1987, this force required 66 Army divisions: 40 for assignment to the European Command (EUCOM), 10 for the Central Command, 12 for the Pacific Command (PACOM), 2 for the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and 2 for defense of the continental United States (CONUS). Lacking the resources required to provide U.S. troops to all contingencies simultaneously, the Joint Staff reduced force levels to those of a "Planning Force," which could meet U.S. strategic objectives with "reasonable risk." Planning Force requirements were 36 Army divisions in 1987: 26 EUCOM, 6 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS. The Army's actual "Current Force" for that year was somewhat smaller: 18 active divisions (5 of which had reserve component "round-out" brigades) and 10 Army National Guard divisions. This "Current Force" obviously accepted increased risk, especially in lower priority theaters. Based on risk analysis and political priorities, it apportioned the twenty-eight existing Army divisions to the regional combatant commands as follows: 19 EUCOM, 5 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS.[5]

The national military strategy reflected both forward deployments of active forces and contingency plan assignments. In Europe, Army forces undergirded U.S. support for NATO. NATO "worst-case" contingency planning addressed a no-warning, Soviet conventional onslaught in Central Europe. The United States had committed itself in 1978 to meet such an invasion with ten Army divisions deployed in Central Europe within ten days after beginning deployment (M+10). In addition to the

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the United States, 1950, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1977), pp. 283–285.

[4] The actual balance of power between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe during the late 1980s remains controversial. The U.S. Department of Defense, in *Soviet Military Power, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 71–72, credits the Soviet Union with 211 active divisions. Conversely, Malcolm Chambers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988): 5–49, contends that NATO intelligence credited the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact with more tank and mechanized divisions than they had modern tanks to equip.

[5] Briefing Materials, "Army FY 89 Program Strategic Impacts," 17 Dec 1987, Secret File 87-00035, Carl E. Vuono Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

four and one-third divisions already forward-deployed in Germany, the Army committed five and two-thirds CONUS divisions to reinforce these units by means of a rapid air deployment to Europe. The ten divisions composed the "M+10 Force." Two other active Army divisions were to follow immediately, one to the Denmark area and the other to Turkey.

The five and two-thirds CONUS-based M+10 divisions would join up in Europe with POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) stocks. First established in the late 1960s to permit the redeployment of a U.S. Army division from Europe to CONUS, the POMCUS sets comprised unit equipment and supplies kept in a high state of readiness in Europe. A unit based in the United States could quickly move to Europe by air with most of its heavy equipment already there. Initial plans had called for the Army to completely fill these stocks by 1982 in addition to maintaining theater war reserve, ammunition, and other materiel requirements. The Army never met this requirement for two reasons. Continuing modernization of Army equipment made maintenance of exact duplicate sets for each CONUS-based division both unaffordable and unrealistic. The other major problem was a shortfall of 421 out of the required 910 controlled-humidity warehouses, funded by NATO, for POMCUS storage in Germany and the Netherlands.

Consequently, the Army Staff estimated in February 1989 that there was a shortfall of 469,000 short tons of unit equipment, worth $15 billion, in the NATO Central Region. Materiel to meet the M+10 shortfall would have to be shipped from CONUS. Shortages of U.S. strategic airlift, however, limited air tonnage to 100,000 tons within ten days, about 20 percent of what was needed. Fast sealift was unavailable to carry the remaining tonnage. These deficiencies meant that the final "M+10" division could not arrive in Europe until M+22, with its final required combat service support units and equipment arriving ten days later. The 1990–1991 defense budget only narrowed the gap by providing for eight divisions in ten days, with the tenth closing at M+15 and the last support unit at M+22. In short, the gap was never closed.[6]

The remaining six active U.S. Army divisions had other major theater or contingency commitments. The 2d Infantry Division was forward-deployed in Korea. The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska would fight in the Pacific in a general war. The XVIII Airborne Corps, including the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 7th Infantry Division, constituted the Army's contingency force, intended to deploy rapidly to any theater

[6] "Secretary of Defense Report on the Status of POMCUS," Feb 1989, File 89-00118, Vuono Papers, MHI.

of operations in the world. The XVIII Airborne Corps' priority was to support two U.S. Central Command contingency plans, although the corps also planned to deploy forces to support lesser operations.[7]

The second major non-European contingency plan requiring a corps-level Army commitment augmented the forward-deployed 2d Infantry Division in Korea in the event of localized hostilities there. This plan called for the 25th Infantry Division, the 7th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), an Army National Guard mechanized infantry division, and four Army National Guard independent infantry brigades to fight in Korea.[8] Even without simultaneous operations in all theaters, Army commitments exceeded available forces.[9]

Readiness and Force Modernization Issues

Although national strategic priorities mandated additional Army forces, other Defense Department programs enjoyed higher priorities. Rather than expand Army force levels, Secretary of Defense Weinberger preferred to rely on mobilization plans to meet wartime requirements. His resource priorities for conventional forces were readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure expansion, in that order. Consequently, Army program planning emphasized readiness and force improvements, including purchases of new equipment and modifications of existing materiel (like the M109 howitzer). General Carl E. Vuono, the new Army chief of staff who had replaced Wickham in June 1987, endorsed Weinberger's emphasis on readiness and implemented a standard for training of an "operational tempo" of 910 average miles of vehicle use, or 16.0 monthly flight hours, per year as the minimal level for fully trained units.[10] For force modernization, a few costly procurement programs, such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

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[7] Maj Joseph Collins, Summary and Highlights: 1987 JCS Net Assessment, Aug 1987, Military Net Assessment Secret File 88-00204, Vuono Papers, MHI. The 24th Infantry Division also had contingency assignments to the XVIII Airborne Corps in support of the U.S. Central Command in the event of a local war, as opposed to a general war with the Soviet Union.

[8] The 7th Infantry Division and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) also had concurrent contingency commitments to other regions.

[9] Military History Office, U.S. Forces Command, *Annual Historical Review: U.S. Forces Command, 1 October 1986–30 September 1987* (Fort McPherson, Ga.: Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command, 1987), p. 286.

[10] This Army training standard provided a benchmark for resourcing decisions. It should not be confused with the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) measurement, which the Joint Staff developed and the Defense Department later adopted, that calculates actual unit deployments from home station in days per year.

and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), brought sophisticated weapons to field units and supplemented the new armor and aviation equipment developed earlier. Although expensive, these weapons significantly improved the Army's battlefield firepower.[11]

Army modernization programs were running full-stride in 1987. Continued production of the M1A1 tank, upgrades to the M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and development of the XM8 armored gun system and the Armored Systems Modernization program remained key to the heavy forces. Artillery modernization programs included upgrades to the M109-series howitzers, further purchases of the MLRS, and production of the ATACMS. Continued production of the UH–60 medium-transport helicopter complemented the Army's ambitious aviation modernization program, which included the "Longbow" modification to the AH–64D Apache attack helicopter and the development of the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX/RAH–66). Money for less glamorous systems, including a new generation of trucks and new antitank missile systems, rounded out the Army's modernization budget.

By 1988, however, several senior Army leaders questioned the Army's force modernization program, because they believed that it was unrealistically expensive. For example, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) Lt. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf warned that cost projections for the LHX helicopter and Armored Family of Vehicles in particular exceeded the Army's projected force modernization budgets over the next five years. Rather than sacrifice readiness or force levels to purchase new hardware, he and like-minded officers preferred either to end some programs or to extend production, thereby stretching costs over longer periods. Thus, even before major budget reductions began, key Army leaders were working to reduce major procurement programs. Pressures to curtail such programs would only increase over the next several years.[12]

Catalysts for Change

Even as HQDA adapted its internal procedures to the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization, it had to respond to a rapidly evolving international environment and stagnant, then declining, defense budgets. These dramatic changes accompanying the Cold War's demise converged to eclipse preoccupation with headquarters redesign. The first catalyst to

[11] *DG 1988–1992*, pp. 5, 10–11.

[12] Interv, Sherry with Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, Ret., 13 Jan 1994, CMH.

transform U.S. national security plans and programs was the diminishing Soviet posture in Europe. General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev's "Perestroika" reform movement, launched in early 1986, reversed his predecessor's military buildup in order to finance needed domestic economic reform. Gorbachev's plan began an accelerating chain of events that transformed both the Soviet Union and the global balance of power. Its final outcome, however, would take several years to occur.[13]

U.S.-Soviet arms agreements, heretofore believed improbable, dramatically affected the strategic balance in Europe and Army forces. For instance, the 8 December 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, which eliminated the Pershing II missile from the Army's inventory, provided impetus for a fresh approach to the decade-old Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. The United States intended that CFE would impel balanced NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional force reductions in units and major items of military hardware stationed between the Atlantic and the Urals. U.S. negotiators desired some level of "parity" in NATO/Warsaw Pact capabilities at "lower levels than NATO currently maintains."[14]

Because it banned an entire category of intermediate-range, surface-to-surface missiles that included the Pershing II, the INF Treaty required the Army to undertake one immediate force structure adjustment. Anticipating the treaty, the Army's leaders had planned to transfer the 56th Field Artillery Command's Pershing personnel to other units in Germany. The Defense Department had endorsed this plan. After the signing of the treaty, however, DoD cut the Army's end strength in numbers equivalent to the Pershing crews.[15] The pattern was to repeat itself in the years to come.

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[13] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 17–25, 55–59, 218–225; Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 278–281, 312–346; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Why Did the Cold War Arise, and Why Did It End?" in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 130–131.

[14] U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance: FY 1992–1997* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 January 1990), pp. 14–15; MccGwire, *Perestroika*, pp. 269–272, 371–372. The *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)* replaced the *Defense Guidance* (*DG*).

[15] See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987*, book 2, *July 4 to December 31, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1989), pp. 1456–1485, for the text and accompanying protocols of the INF Treaty.

The changing national security environment accelerated growing erosion of congressional support for U.S. national security programs. After seven straight years of major annual defense budget increases, the 1987 defense budget augured a period of stagnation and decline for service programs and budgets. Pressures from within the Defense Department to contain budget growth converged with mounting congressional demands for greater efficiencies in procurement and reductions in costs of forward-deployed forces and "infrastructure," including bases.[16]

The White House directed the Defense Department in late 1987 to reduce its 1989 budget by as much as $9 billion. The Defense Department in turn instructed the Army, whose share of the defense budget was 27 percent, to reduce its $81.9 billion budget submission by at least $1 billion. The Army already had a $2.5 billion shortfall in critical readiness, modernization, and sustainment accounts. Because the service normally spent more than one-third (36 percent) of its budget on military personnel, the highest allocation among all of the services, the Army's leadership determined that it had to reduce active military strength in order to maintain readiness in the face of this unanticipated cut.

In addition to the Defense Department's budget reductions, Congress also directed specific force reductions. Noting that the Army planned to transfer crewmen from Pershing II units in the 56th Field Artillery Command scheduled for inactivation to other units in Europe, it directed a reduction of the active Army's 781,000 personnel by 10,000 spaces, approximately the level scheduled for reassignment. Existing NATO commitments and ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations precluded the Army from taking this reduction in Europe, however. Although it eliminated the 56th Field Artillery Command, the HQDA did reassign these personnel elsewhere in Europe. To meet the 10,000-personnel reduction, the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans recommended inactivating one active maneuver brigade each from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) in the United States. Army National Guard "round-out" brigades replaced the active-duty brigades, allowing the Army to retain divisions, albeit at a reduced-readiness level. This instance was the first, but not the last, time that the quest by Congress and the Defense

[16] Since the early 1970s, an influential minority in Congress had pressed for increased "burden-sharing" by European members in NATO. One of this group's recurrent recommendations was to reduce forward-deployed Army forces in Germany. Amos A. Jordan et al., *American National Security: Policy and Process* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 164–165; Andrew J. Birtle, "Fiscal Year 1990 Budget Revisions and the Army," Jul 1989, Research and Analysis Division, CMH, pp. 1–3, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Department for quick budget savings would deprive Army leaders of what they believed were the flexibility and resources essential for reshaping their forces.[17]

The next year brought no reprieve from external pressures for immediate and unplanned force reductions. Efforts by OSD to balance declining budgets with force reductions generally preceded completion of both Joint Staff and Army strategic reviews. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) Dr. David S. C. Chu offered proposals in late March 1989 for reducing U.S. forces in the Pacific. Highlighting overlaps between Army and Fleet Marine Force capabilities in that region, Chu presented a number of options for reductions that would remove or reduce active Army units there. Citing the Army's ongoing reshaping study, General Vuono forestalled reductions to I Corps, the 25th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), and the 2d Infantry Division. Chu's study, however, portended both major force reductions and disputes over service roles and functions.[18]

Antaeus

Quickly it became HQDA's primary task to respond to accelerating changes in national military strategy. As the Army's director of program analysis and evaluation noted, rapidly changing military requirements forced the service on the defensive early during its reshaping. Because the Army was an integral part of the Defense Department, many subordinate Army organizations, such as the Military Traffic Management Command, supported the requirements of other services. (The same was true, of course, of the Navy and Air Force.) Consequently, HQDA needed detailed direction from higher authority for major reorganizations and could not unilaterally reduce or divest Army organizations and functions that it might consider of lesser priority. Instead it was forced to integrate its reorganization plans with other Defense Department studies that would impose their own momentum on the Army, forcing HQDA to react to dictated change.[19]

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[17] Briefing Materials, "Discussion with DEPSECDEF, 24 December 1987," Briefing FY 1989 Budget (Dec 87), File 87-00036, Vuono Papers, MHI.

[18] Memo, Col Raoul Henri Alcala, CSA's Assessment and Initiatives Group, for Gen Vuono, 30 Mar 1989, sub: Force Structure Issues for Meeting with Dr Chu; Memo, Col Alcala for Gen Vuono, 2 Apr 1989, sub: CSA's Strategy for Pacific Force Structure Issues, both CSA's Strategy for Force Structure Issues file, File 89-00194, Vuono Papers, MHI.

[19] Interv, Dwight Oland with Lt Gen William H. Reno, U.S. Army, Ret., 5 Jan 1993, Washington, D.C., Oral History Activity, CMH.

Within these constraints, Army leaders spent most of 1988 and 1989 attempting to chart a course that would shape the service's destiny while it entered an era of increasing strategic uncertainty and declining budgets. Despite reductions of two active maneuver brigades, the Army retained eighteen active and ten Army National Guard divisions. Critical force modernization programs continued, including M1A1, M2/M3A2, UH–60, and AH–64 production. Training and readiness levels remained high, with fifteen active divisions rated at C-2 readiness or higher in April 1988. Partly because of shortages of modern equipment, Army National Guard readiness lagged slightly, with four divisions reporting lower (C-3) readiness during the same month. But Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) forecasts were discouraging. They projected that the Army would obtain only a 27–28 percent share of the defense budget's total obligation authority (TOA) over the next five years, forcing it to make major force reductions unless its leaders could successfully argue for a budget allocation closer to the Air Force's 33 percent or the Navy's 34 percent. Such an expansion of the Army's budget was unlikely, however, without a revised national military strategy that assigned a higher priority to Army capabilities and forces.[20]

The inertia of four decades of Cold War and the still-indistinct consequences of a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations augured against either OSD or the Joint Staff undertaking a comprehensive strategic review, or any major changes in defense policy and strategy. Indeed, the Defense Department's strategic guidance in March 1988 emphasized the same strategic threats posed by the Soviet Union as it had in 1985. In such an environment, Army leaders were constrained from suggesting any radical change of their organization.[21]

Led by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Lt. Gen. John W. Foss, HQDA sought to overcome this vacuum in strategic planning and provide the Army more options as it adapted to a new national security environment. The key to a larger slice of the declining defense budget was to anticipate future national security requirements and position the Army to better address them. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with HQDA's DCSOPS, had already begun a major reevaluation of Army organization and doctrine, initiating

[20] Msg, SECDEF to AIG 8798, 090042Z Jan 89, sub: DoD News Briefing: FY 1990/FY 1991 Department of Defense Budget Introduction, Fiscal Guidance/CSA Guidance-FY90 Budget, Secret File 89-00198, and Chief of Staff Monthly Readiness Review, Jun 1988, File 88-00102, both Vuono Papers, MHI.

[21] U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Guidance: FY 1990–1994* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 29 Mar 1998), pp. 25–34.

"AirLand Battle-Future" studies in September 1987. These analyses aimed to combine possible doctrinal changes for the battlefield of the next decade with a comprehensive tactical force redesign.[22]

General Foss as commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (1989–1991)

The Antaeus study was HQDA's tool for gaining the initiative in reshaping the Army. General Foss intended that Antaeus enable the Army to meet changes in strategy with timely adaptations in Army capabilities and forces. At the very least, the study would enable the Army's leaders to take the initiative in larger Defense Department reshaping efforts, rather than simply react to dictated force reductions. Organized in late November 1988, the Antaeus study group comprised 16 colonel-level representatives (7 from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 2 from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and 1 each from the National Guard Bureau; the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; the Director, Army Budget; the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency; and the Office of the Chief, Army Public Affairs). The group also had a representative from the Rand Arroyo Center. Headed by the chief of the DCSOPS' War Plans Division, this small working group met quietly over the next year, considering restructuring options.[23]

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[22] John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), pp. 123–124; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command: 1988 Annual Historical Review* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1989), pp. 71–73; U.S. Army Combined Arms Center History Office, *U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: 1988 Annual Historical Review* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 1989), pp. 325–335.

[23] Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, Oral History Activity, CMH; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Michael V. Harper, 30 Mar 1994, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH. The Antaeus group derived its name from one of the victories of the mythological Greek hero Heracles. For a chronological listing of major defense reshaping initiatives, see *Appendix B*.

The U.S. Navy had undertaken a similar service-specific strategic review in 1985, published early the next year as the "Maritime Strategy." Its new Maritime Strategy sought to shift the national military strategy to more aggressively employ naval forces offensively in a U.S.-Soviet conflict. It also undergirded the Navy's objective of expanding to a 600-ship fleet by the end of the decade. Although the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined to adopt the Navy proposals as a pillar of the national military strategy, in 1988 the Defense Department did accept certain elements of the plan, such as to "seek out and destroy enemy forces in high threat areas." But the Navy's initiative had been taken too early to incorporate the changing security requirements resulting from the rapid decline of the Soviet threat.[24]

Compared with the Maritime Strategy, which sought to supplant fundamental elements of the extant national military strategy, the HQDA study's goals were modest. The Antaeus study group initially sought to test the existing national military strategy against likely threats during the next several years. Lacking detailed guidance from the JCS or OSD in the form of an approved strategy, the group developed its own strategic forecast based on the best information available from Army and joint sources. Instead of attempting to justify force expansion, as did the Maritime Strategy, Antaeus analyzed alternatives for Army forces in light of likely future national strategic requirements and reduced budgets. It focused on the capabilities and contributions of present and projected Army forces on the future battlefield.[25]

By May 1989, the Antaeus study group had developed a vision of the Army's role in the near future. Centered on conventional ground forces, the study projected that the Army would decline to a minimum of fifteen active component divisions by the end of the next decade, with fewer units forward-based overseas. Consequently, active forces based in the United States had to become more flexible and capable of rapid deployment for "contingency" operations, roughly defined as responses to unanticipated global threats of a limited nature to U.S. interests.

Despite its focus on Cold War conventional capabilities, the Army had already developed a number of military forces primarily for contingency

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[24] Maritime Strategy section, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1986); F. J. West, Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1987): 40–49; *DG: 1990–1994*, p. 44.

[25] Interv, Maj William Epley with Brig Gen Daniel W. Christman (DAMO-SS), 19 Dec 1989, Pentagon, and Interv, Maj William Epley with Maj Gen Jerome H. Granrud (DAMO-FD), 20 Dec 1989, Pentagon, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Briefing Materials, Project ANTAEUS: Analyzing the Army in Evolving U.S. Strategy, 8 Dec 1988, SSW Files (Copies) Nov–Dec 1988, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

operations. Prior to the Vietnam War, Air Force jet transports had given Army airborne units an intercontinental response capability. Post–Vietnam War force programs, including development of light and motorized infantry divisions, reinforced rapid-deployment capabilities. By the late 1980s, the Army's leaders had tailored the XVIII Airborne Corps specifically for contingency operations, with airborne, mechanized, airmobile, and light infantry units. Reinforcement by special operations, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, or other specialized or combat units provided the XVIII Airborne Corps with rapid-response capabilities for a wide range of contingencies.[26]

The Antaeus study group completed its blueprint for reorienting the Army in October 1989. Despite continued wariness of Soviet military capabilities, the working group recommended the adoption of more balanced strategic priorities between Army forces assigned to NATO and those intended for contingency operations elsewhere. Anticipating Soviet military reductions in Central Europe and a declining U.S. defense budget, the study also assumed that the Defense Department or Congress would force Army reductions over the next decade. As a result, the group made three major recommendations: first, reduce Army active forces from 5 corps and 18 divisions to a "floor" of 4 corps and 15 divisions, and 640,000 active military personnel. Second, retain all ten Army National Guard divisions and upgrade their readiness. Third, convert three National Guard divisions from infantry divisions to heavy divisions by transferring equipment from inactivated active Army units. The declining prospects of a conflict, with short warning, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe would allow HQDA to reduce active heavy divisions. Although National Guard divisions would take longer to train and deploy to Europe in the event of a general conflict, longer warning times resulting from a reduced Warsaw Pact threat made this option feasible. The Defense Department could implement these changes either when the Soviet threat to Europe abated or when declining budgets forced reductions.[27]

The study group examined options for a comprehensive redesign of tactical forces. A number of influential Army officers believed that an immediate reorganization was essential to provide the flexibility to tailor forces for diverse contingency operations. Most redesign concepts thus advocated changes to the Army's divisions to improve flexibility so that

[26] Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[27] Briefing Materials, Antaeus Information Briefing for Chief of Staff, 13 Oct 1989; Briefing Materials, Antaeus Information Briefing for Fall Commanders' Conference, 18 Oct 1989, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

a division headquarters could command and control flexible numbers and types of brigade-sized subordinate units. The recommended modifications would permit the division to adapt rapidly for different missions. TRADOC's AirLand Battle-Future studies had already developed models for more flexible division command and control. If implemented, this "modular" approach to division design could prove the basis for more versatile tactical forces.[28]

AirLand Battle-Future force redesign proposals pointed to overhauling the existing centralized division structure to one that achieved greater flexibility through modularity, employing interchangeable brigades. The proposed division would have headquarters and signal units for the command and control of two to five subordinate brigades. Corps would control combat support and combat service support above brigade level and would assign brigades of various types (e.g., light infantry, mechanized) to subordinate divisions for specific missions. Brigades deploying from different installations could more readily serve in division-sized task forces, or even serve independently in certain low-threat scenarios.[29] The proposed reorganization would answer those who argued that the Army's centralized divisions were unwieldy and lacked flexibility in organizing and deploying subordinate units for contingency operations. Similarly, more flexible divisions would refute critics of specialized divisions, notably the light infantry division.[30] Linked to tactical force redesign were studies that recommended consolidating combat service support branches to give officers a more generalized background essential for leading units in a more decentralized tactical environment.[31]

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[28] Briefing Materials for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, "The Army as a Strategic Force: A Vision for the Twenty-first Century," 19 May 1989, ANTAEUS II Brief for DCSOPS File, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[29] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command: Annual Command History, 1 January to 31 December 1989* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Jun 1990), pp. 37–38, 42–43, 54–56.

[30] Schwarzkopf interv, 13 Jan 1994, and Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, both Oral History Activity, CMH. See James L. George and Christopher Jehn, eds., *The U.S. Marine Corps: The View from the Late 1980s* (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1988), pp. 32–34, for a comparison between capabilities of the light infantry division and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), to the detriment of the former. See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), pp. III-35 to III-37, for a discussion of roles and functional overlaps between light infantry divisions and Fleet Marine Force capabilities.

[31] Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, Oral History Activity, CMH.

Decentralization of combat service support to maneuver brigades in the form of forward support battalions (FSBs) fueled a controversy concerning the Army's combat service support branch structure. FSBs required officers capable of rotating through a variety of leadership and staff positions involving most or all of the battalion's functional areas, such as truck transportation. Critics of the existing branch structure argued that it reflected a nineteenth-century approach to combat service support, with discrete quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, finance, and adjutant general branch specialization. Such career patterns inhibited decentralized decision making and flexibility.[32]

Tactical redesign studies could have been the keystone of Army reshaping, but General Vuono rejected a major tactical force overhaul during his tour as chief of staff, believing that programmed force and manpower cuts would prove disruptive enough to the Army without a self-imposed tactical reorganization. He did, however, endorse continuation of the redesign studies to address future Army needs.[33]

Vuono focused the Army Staff instead on problems with the Army's projected readiness levels for 1991. Despite the Army's training standard (training operational tempo) of 910 miles per year and 16.0 flight hours per month (910/16.0) for fully trained units, the active Army's 1989 training goal was only 850/15.5. For active force training, HQDA was willing to accept an operational tempo of 800/15.0 during the next two years, the minimum necessary to maintain units at a fully trained (C-1) level. Anticipated budget reductions threatened to reduce the training tempo to 700/14.0. Rather than accept this decline, Vuono directed reductions in the Army's modernization budget to maintain readiness at what he hoped would be a short-term cost. Consequently, by early 1989, Vuono demonstrated that he preferred maintaining

[32] Critics of Army officer career developments reinforced many of the arguments against overspecialized officer professional development. Highlighting the "grade creep" and expansion of the officer corps since World War II, they recommended a return to a smaller officer corps with more generalized career paths. This approach, they argued, would prove more cost-effective and produce greater cohesion within a refocused and more selective officer corps. Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 185–203, and Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), are key studies in a protracted debate concerning the deleterious costs of an expanded post–World War II officer corps in the U.S. armed forces. See also Thomas Lawson, "Officer Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer and Military Effectiveness" (paper, Project on Military Procurement, revised, October 1987).

[33] Interv, James Yarrison with Gen Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army, Ret., 24 Mar 1993, Alexandria, Va., Oral History Activity, CMH.

readiness to preserving force levels and modernizing or reorganizing the force.[34]

Increasing the Army's share of the declining defense budget remained problematical. The Army's leadership was well aware that a budget share larger than its recent 27–28 percent could come only at the expense of the other services. Unless OSD and the Joint Staff were to revise strategic priorities to put a premium on Army capabilities, the other services would view any Army advocacy for a higher budget as an unjustifiable resource grab. Goldwater-Nichols mandated two processes, however, that offered the Army hope. The act directed that the secretary of defense produce annual guidance containing "national security objectives and policies." The act also required the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a triennial review of roles, missions, and functions. With the first review due in 1989, the timing was propitious for a comprehensive reevaluation of Defense Department priorities.[35] Many Army leaders believed that such a review would benefit their own service, as future threats posed by conventional, technologically proficient foes seemed to be declining.

Countervailing needs undermined such hopes and beliefs. The soldier's dependence on the other services for battlefield support discouraged Army leaders from recommending any changes that would reduce their programs. As the most dependent service, the Army was also vulnerable to reductions anywhere else in the defense establishment. Without unqualified support by the secretary of defense, the other services might reduce support for programs in their respective budgets that were essential to the soldier. For example, programmed increases to Air Force airlift by 1994 would meet only 54.2 million ton miles per day (MTM/day) of the 66 MTM/day requirement in existing contingency plans for deploying units and equipment to Europe and other theaters. Even to reach the 54.2 MTM/day intermediate goal required the Air Force to buy 210 C–17 aircraft by the year 2000 and improve readiness levels of existing aircraft. A CONUS-based Army would only increase Army reliance on Air Force lift capabilities in the future. Although DoD-directed reductions in other Air Force programs might well free funds for Army programs, such reductions could in turn lead the Air Force to realign its decreased budgets at the expense of items of direct Army

[34] CAIG Action Book, Defense Resources Board, CINC Issues, 5–7 Apr 1989, Defense Resources Board: CINC Issues Secret File 89-00195, Vuono Papers, MHI.

[35] Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1986), pp. 16–19, 50–51.

interest, such as C–17 procurement.[36] Sea transportation obviously forced identical constraints.

The ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations also complicated the Army's reshaping plans. After unilateral Soviet arms reductions in 1988, President George Bush in July 1989 proposed additional, mutual reductions. Accepting Soviet recommendations for limitations on both tactical aircraft and personnel based in Europe, he challenged Moscow to conclude an agreement by the end of 1990.[37]

One of Bush's initiatives, securing major withdrawals of conventional U.S. forces from Western Europe in exchange for Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, directly affected HQDA force planning. Although they conformed to growing congressional pressures to bring costly forward-deployed troops home from Europe, Bush's proposals froze options for reductions of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), forces, pending the outcome of withdrawal talks with the Soviet Union. Although Antaeus had outlined a plan for the reduction of active Army units to match anticipated changes in strategy and budgets, HQDA could thus not cut units in Europe. The lack of certainty about future Army force levels in Europe also hampered CONUS base closure efforts because of the potential need to house returning USAREUR units in the United States. Until units were actually inactivated, the housing requirement remained. As many as seventeen USAREUR brigade-sized ground units might redeploy to the United States, with some or all remaining in the active force.[38]

Contingency Operations

As the Cold War began to thaw, Army units participated in an increasing number of contingency operations. These endeavors underscored the Antaeus study group's recommendations on the need to refocus the Army. Although Goldwater-Nichols completed a process begun in 1958 to transfer peacetime control of deployable units from service to unified commanders, Army participation in contingencies continued to require HQDA's active support. The secretary of the Army

[36] "Defense Resources Board Execution Review (CINC Topics)," 22–23 Jun 1989, File 89-00201, Vuono Papers, MHI.

[37] "Testimony of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Armed Services Committee," 1 Jun 1989, Historian's Background Files, CMH; McGwire, *Perestroika*, pp. 371–373.

[38] Antaeus, "Force Structure Options Briefing for Army Chief of Staff," 15 Mar 1989, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

still had statutory responsibilities for organizing, training, mobilizing, demobilizing, deploying, equipping, and sustaining Army personnel and units. He also remained the Defense Department "executive agent" for functions such as domestic disturbances and disaster relief. The Army's headquarters thus continued to coordinate the mobilization of individual reservists and units with the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Joint Staff. HQDA also supervised logistical support for larger contingency operations requiring actions such as redistribution of unit equipment or ammunition to augment theater stocks. Although excluded from direct involvement in tactical operations, HQDA continued to coordinate closely with the Joint Staff on a wide range of administrative and logistical support requirements associated with such commitments.[39]

The first test of the post–Goldwater-Nichols operational command and control system was a contingency operation that began on 16 March 1988. Following several shallow incursions by Nicaraguan troops, President Ronald Reagan approved a request from the Honduran government for a U.S. show of force in the border area. The Joint Chiefs approved a training operation, code-named GOLDEN PHEASANT, that sent an airborne brigade to Honduras to warn the Nicaraguan regime against further hostile border activities.[40]

Although Goldwater-Nichols excluded service chiefs from selecting tactical units for such operations, General Vuono exercised his role as both a member of the Joint Chiefs and as the Army's chief of staff to directly influence these decisions. For example, he persuaded the FORSCOM commander, Army General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., to select two light infantry battalions from the 7th Infantry Division and two airborne battalions and the brigade headquarters from the 82d Airborne Division for the task force. Although all the units could have come from the 82d, Vuono wanted to demonstrate both the capabilities of light infantry units and the Army's ability to task-organize units from different divisions and duty stations for a rapid-response operation. Deploying via two C–5A and fifty-eight C–141B aircraft, the task force of 2,943 soldiers arrived at Palmerola airfield in Honduras on 17 and 18 March, via a simulated airborne assault. Training with Honduran and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

[39] Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, Oral History Activity, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col William Foster (DAMO-SS), 25 Feb 1994, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[40] Jonathan M. House, "Golden Pheasant: The U.S. Army in a Show of Force: March 1988" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989), pp. 24–26, 36–43.

forces over the next ten days, the task force completed its show of force and redeployed to home bases from 28 to 30 March.[41]

GOLDEN PHEASANT hardly strained Army resources. The designated units deployed rapidly and without incident and trained in an area that had recently seen small skirmishes. But the XVIII Airborne Corps and FORSCOM demonstrated the flexibility and interoperability of Army units by building an ad hoc brigade task force. Because the secretary of defense did not mobilize reserve units, and the operation required no major sustainment effort, HQDA simply monitored the situation with a Crisis Response Cell (CRC) in the Pentagon's Army Operations Center (AOC), without disrupting normal staff operations. The CRC in this operation served primarily as a backup, should GOLDEN PHEASANT escalate into a larger effort.[42]

Army units deployed again to support SOUTHCOM a year later. Operation NIMROD DANCER responded to escalating harassment of U.S. citizens in Panama by General Manuel Noriega and his supporters. On 11 May 1989, the secretary of defense ordered deployment of a brigade task force to Central America. FORSCOM and SOUTHCOM selected a headquarters and a light infantry battalion from the 7th Infantry Division, a mechanized infantry battalion from the 5th Infantry Division, and a military police battalion. Unlike the brief GOLDEN PHEASANT operation, NIMROD DANCER continued for several months. Parent units in CONUS had to provide replacement units late in the summer when the secretary of defense determined that two maneuver battalions would remain in Panama, pending relaxation of tension. HQDA again established a CRC that helped to coordinate logistical support for the operation and the unit rotations, and assisted the under secretary of the Army in his role as chairman of the Panama Canal Commission. Without reserve mobilization or major logistical support responsibilities, HQDA again simply observed the operation and provided update briefings for interested staff personnel.[43]

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[41] House, "Golden Pheasant," pp. 46–58, 81–82, 106–107; Schwarzkopf interv, 13 Jan 1994, and Foss interv, 1 Mar 1994, both Oral History Activity, CMH.

[42] William Joe Webb, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), pp. 46–47.

[43] Memo, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, for CINC U.S. Southern Command, sub: First Impressions Report Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) "Operation JUST CAUSE," 20 Dec 89–12 Jan 90; Msg, CDRUSARSO to HQDA (DAMO-ODO), 151500Z May 1989, sub: SITREP; Memo, Gen Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for Distribution, 28 Jun 1989, sub: Report of Visit to U.S. Forces in Panama, 5–6 Jun 1989; and Memo, Brig Gen Robert B. Rosenkranz, Deputy Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, for DCSOPS, 5 Jul 1989, sub: HQDA Panama Crisis Response Cell—Action Memorandum, all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv with Gen

The crisis in Panama reached its climax on 20 December 1989 when U.S. troops, in Operation JUST CAUSE, intervened to protect the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama and U.S. bases there. The commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Maxwell Thurman, designated FORSCOM's XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Carl W. Stiner, as the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander of all assault units in Panama. Stiner's main ground force, composed of Rangers and units from the 82d Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions, was air-delivered in 148 sorties by Military Airlift Command aircraft. These elements joined a brigade group from the 7th Infantry Division, deployed the preceding May, and the 193d Infantry Brigade, stationed in Panama.[44]

JUST CAUSE was a success, despite being what Stiner termed "the most complex contingency deployment and employment U.S. forces have undertaken since World War II." More extensive than GOLDEN PHEASANT, it was the first combat operation to occur under the Goldwater-Nichols modifications to joint command and control. Despite the great distance between Panama and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the staffs of the U.S. Southern Command and the XVIII Airborne Corps coordinated detailed operational planning effectively. The arrangements, however, meant that HQDA was informed, rather than consulted, about the operational plans. The chief of staff and the Army's deputy chief of staff for operations and plans were able to monitor the planning phase of the operation in their joint capacities, but the chief's approval of the plan was unnecessary.[45] In fact, after operations began, the Joint Staff became preoccupied with operational details and failed to provide timely responses to HQDA inquiries for current information. Despite activation of the Army's CRC, most Army Staff members had little idea of what was transpiring in the field and found it difficult to anticipate future needs. Problems arose, in fact, when it became necessary to deploy military police and civil affairs units to Panama during the poorly planned post-hostilities, "nation-building" phase. Nevertheless, because of their small scale and short duration, Operations GOLDEN PHEASANT, NIMROD DANCER, and JUST CAUSE succeeded

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John W. Foss, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 25 Oct 1989, Oral History Activity, CMH; Vincent H. Demma, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 87–90.

[44] Theresa L. Kraus, "The United States Army Staff and Operation JUST CAUSE," 29 Nov 1990; and Interv, Theresa Kraus with Gen Maxwell Thurman, 9 Jan 1991, Arlington, Va., both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[45] Since the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947, the operations deputies of the military services, representing their service chiefs, have met regularly to review joint plans, programs, and policies.

without major HQDA involvement. A more comprehensive trial of the new operational command and control system would occur within the year.[46]

Antaeus had given HQDA a head start on and a framework for major organizational changes by the time the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, portending the Warsaw Pact's demise. Army leaders had reevaluated the service's global priorities and their relationship to national interests. The accelerating pace of change, however, left national military strategy mired in the past, still focused on containment of possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact military expansion in Europe. In short, the existing strategy did not address the changing world situation. Instead of conflict in Central Europe, the Army and the other services faced increasing prospects elsewhere in the world that would require them to deploy forces in contingency operations.

Despite the strategic uncertainties, Congress and the White House sought ways to reduce the growing federal budget deficit. Both looked for ways to shift federal fiscal priorities, increasing pressures for reduced defense spending over the near term. These pressures resulted in OSD-mandated budget cuts that in turn forced hasty decisions by HQDA on force levels and readiness. Although requirements in existing contingency plans exceeded Army forces, the Army's leadership responded to reduced budgets by sacrificing selected active units in order to protect funds for readiness and continued modernization of the remaining forces. Reflecting General Vuono's priorities, HQDA desired to maintain a careful balance between near-term readiness and long-term modernization when facing declining, yet increasingly uncertain, threats to U.S. interests worldwide.

[46] Memo, Lt Col Patricia B. Wise, Acting Chief, Research and Analysis Division, CMH, for the Chief of Staff, 10 Aug 1990, sub: Problems Faced by the Army Staff During Operation JUST CAUSE; Thurman interv, 9 Jan 1991; and Kraus, "The United States Army Staff and Operation JUST CAUSE," pp. 28–38, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Chapter 3
The Cold War Ends, 1989–1990

As the Antaeus study group was concluding its work in late 1989, the outgoing JCS Chairman, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., produced a new national military strategy with specific objectives and priorities. Rather than offer a vision for a major realignment of military priorities, the new strategy only began a process of change. Crowe argued that the world was moving from a "bipolar" (U.S./Soviet) strategic posture to one more "multipolar." Emerging threats to U.S. and allied interests were more likely to come from countries not formally allied with the Soviet Union, although OSD and the Joint Staff still identified the Soviet capability to threaten U.S. interests globally as the focal point for U.S. military strategy. Nevertheless, noting recent unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe and progress in the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations, OSD anticipated a prompt agreement and directed that the Defense Department plan for sequential U.S. force reductions in Europe. Key to this plan was "reversibility." If the thaw were to end and U.S./Soviet relations refroze, the United States must be able to quickly reconstitute inactivated forces and perhaps restore U.S. forces in Europe to Cold War levels.[1]

Although neither the Joint Staff nor OSD provided detailed guidance for major transformations in U.S. military capabilities, the new JCS chairman, Army General Colin L. Powell, had his own ideas. Prior to assuming his duties in November 1989, Powell had already developed his own framework for force reductions for the 1992–1999 Future Years Defense Program. In one of his first acts as chairman, Powell briefed his concept to the secretary of defense. Powell's "A View to the 90s" noted that the likelihood of an agreement on mutual European force withdrawals had already created expectations within the Defense Department of a 6 to 7 percent budget reduction for 1991. He believed

[1] Memo, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Secretary of Defense, CM-2145-89, 25 Aug 1989, sub: National Military Strategy, Historian's Background Files, CMH; U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance: FY 1992–1997 (DPG 1992–1997)* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 Jan 1990), Appendix A.

that a cut of this magnitude would be reminiscent of "the worst year of the post-Vietnam reduction in force." Instead of a series of piecemeal force cuts driven by annual budget reductions, Powell sought a program of integrated, sequential reductions. He hoped that such an approach would minimize the danger of significantly weakening all parts of the defense establishment simultaneously. Although it was an outline plan more than a completed program, Powell's vision called for military manpower reductions of 11 to 17 percent by 1994. The main burden of his cuts would fall on the Army, which would lose three active and two National Guard divisions and decline from 760,000 active personnel to 630,000, a 17 percent reduction. Powell stressed that these reductions had to be reversible and partly offset by strengthening mobilization capabilities and maintaining a "warm base" industrial capability for rapid expansion. He essentially accepted the Antaeus Army force reductions, but his vision would implement them over five years rather than a decade.[2]

Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Crowe

Quicksilver

Both the Joint Staff and OSD concurred that HQDA's Antaeus study was moving the Army in the right direction. Both signaled increased interest in assuming control over defense reshaping. This situation suggested that Antaeus would provide HQDA a fleeting opportunity, at best, for rebuilding the Army for a new era. Even before the study group had completed its work, on 13 November 1989, OSD directed reductions to projected Army budgets of 4.3 percent for 1991, 4.4 percent for 1992, 5.9 percent for 1993, and 3.2 percent for 1994. OSD had accepted Powell's concept in essence for Army force reductions, although it left the implementation details to the Army. HQDA answered these budget

[2] Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "A View to the 90s," undated, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

cuts with the Quicksilver I reduction plan. The Army's director, program analysis and evaluation (DPA&E), Maj. Gen. William H. Reno, coordinated the study. Lacking detailed program guidance from OSD, Quicksilver I operated with notional budget figures. It put these anticipated fiscal cutbacks into the 1992–1997 Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM), HQDA's input for the 1992–1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) was still used to program the allocation of resources for forces, manpower, force modernization, and other requirements.[3]

Joint Chiefs Chairman General Powell

Quicksilver I thus transformed Antaeus force-level recommendations into a specific program of sequential reductions of the Army through 1997. The proposals would reduce the Army from 18 to 15 active divisions and also consolidate the 10 Army National Guard divisions into 8. Quicksilver would realize most of its projected $40 billion in savings over six years from manpower reductions. To reach these savings also required reducing active military personnel from 764,000 to 629,000 through 1994. Although one implementation option called for making these reductions as rapidly as possible, Vuono insisted on holding active personnel reductions to 35,000 a year in order to minimize disruption to the Army.[4]

Fiscal guidance that was even more pessimistic arrived from OSD in early 1990. With further reductions forecast for the later FYDP years, 1995–1997, the secretary of the Army convened a Quicksilver II study to prepare options for more Army reductions. The Army's response reduced active personnel to only 580,000 by the end of 1996

[3] Information Paper, Maj William Epley, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 17 Jan 1990, sub: History of Quicksilver, Program Adjustments FY91–94, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[4] Interv, Lt Col Gary Bounds with Lt Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 4 Dec 1989, Pentagon; Briefing Materials, Quicksilver: CSA Brief, 18 Nov 1989; Interv, Dwight Oland with Lt Gen William H. Reno, U.S. Army, Ret., 5 Jan 1993, Washington, D.C.; and Office of the CSA, *Weekly Summary* 40, no. 14 (6 Apr 1990): 19–20, all in Historian's Background Files, CMH.

and eliminated another active division, leaving only fourteen. Quicksilver II preserved readiness levels, however, with a budgeted operational tempo for training of 800 miles/14.5 flight hours (active component), 288 miles/9 hours (Army National Guard), and 200 miles/8.1 hours (Army Reserve). Once again, the HQDA response to budget cuts was to pay for continued readiness and modernization programs with force reductions.[5]

Army Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation General Reno (Photo taken in August 1986.)

During the Quicksilver II deliberations, the Army's leaders recommended that two of the active divisions scheduled for inactivation should be units forward-based in Europe. Successful negotiations for withdrawal of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, along with approved Soviet withdrawal agreements in Poland, nullified the surprise-attack scenario, which underpinned NATO war plans and the need for sizable U.S. forward-deployed ground forces in Europe. The Joint Staff accepted the Army's planned reduction from 217,000 soldiers in Europe to 158,500 as part of the provisions of the anticipated mutual withdrawals. The timing of implementation, however, had to await the signing and ratifying of a formal agreement. As a consequence, HQDA first had to inactivate two divisions in the United States, anticipating a favorable political situation in Europe in time to effect cuts there.[6]

The authors of the Quicksilver studies were able to rely on analyses of force levels and strategic risk in structuring force reductions to the

[5] Briefing Materials, Winter Senior Commander's Conference, 2 Mar 1990, Historian's Background Files, CMH; HQDA, *The Army POM FY92–97: A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond*, vol. 1, *Executive Summary* (Washington, D.C.: Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 30 Apr 1990), pp. 4–7, File 90-00153, Vuono Papers, MHI.

[6] Briefing, Maj Gen William H. Reno, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, for the Project Vanguard Task Force, 18 May 1990; HQ USAREUR Briefing on Conventional Force Reductions in Europe for the Project Vanguard Task Force, 24 May 1990, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Army's tactical side (organized by table of organization and equipment [TO&E]). The Army's assistant deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, Maj. Gen. John R. Greenway, noted, however, that the Army lacked similar methodologies to meet the Quicksilver II goal of eliminating 40,000 military and 57,000 civilian spaces from the Army's nontactical side. Commonly referred to as the Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) Army, this force included training installations and schools, a variety of administrative commands, research and development agencies, and other nondeployable organizations. Unlike TO&E units, each TDA organization, from major command (MACOM) headquarters to field operating agency (FOA), was unique. Each was designed to serve a specific function. Rather than assign arbitrary manpower and budget cuts to each MACOM or agency, the Army leadership opted for another study group to recommend integrated reductions across the TDA force.[7]

Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans General Greenway

Vanguard

Chartered by the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff, Project Vanguard operated from May to December 1990. The group evaluated all TDA organizations and provided a series of restructuring options for the smaller Army of the future. The Vanguard task force capitalized on the data assembled by the 1988 "Robust" study group, which had examined the TDA Army extensively. The Robust study had made fifty-seven recommendations, ranging from reducing Reserve Officers Training Corps units to reorganizing the Army Materiel Command. These recommendations

[7] Interv, Mark Sherry with Maj Gen John R. Greenway, Director, Project Vanguard, 31 Aug 1990, Fort Belvoir, Va.; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Col W. A. Whittle, Chief, Project Vanguard Concepts Team, 28 Jun 1990, Fort Belvoir, Va., both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

aimed to enhance efficiency of the TDA force and wartime support for the regional combatant commanders. Army leaders deferred action on the Robust study recommendations because of the highly controversial nature of several of them, such as one that would subordinate the U.S. Army, Japan, and the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea to a consolidated U.S. Army, Pacific. By 1990, however, rapidly declining Army budgets encouraged the Vanguard group to either endorse these recommendations or find comparable sources of manpower and budget savings.[8]

Vanguard undertook the first comprehensive Army TDA reorganization since the 1973 STEADFAST reorganization, which had broken up the Continental Army Command (CONARC) into several "functional" major commands.[9] Greenway, as the appointed Vanguard study group director, conducted an initial concepts phase to determine, among other issues, which of the sixteen MACOM headquarters the Army would require in the future. One early option, later rejected as too disruptive, re-created a CONARC with six functional major subordinate commands (*Chart 4*). After analyzing four, final options, which ranged from keeping all of the existing MACOMs to consolidating them into seven, Greenway recommended consolidating them into ten. (*See Appendix A*.)

The resulting "Vanguard Vision" sought an enhanced "functional alignment" between MACOMs and HQDA. Its other key features included the consolidation of base operations in CONUS under one MACOM and an internal reorganization of the remaining MACOMs. Finally, the Vanguard Vision would result in either the consolidation of as many as possible of the approximately 122 FOAs and SSAs, or their transfer to a major command.[10]

During Vanguard's next phase of analysis, the task force developed at least one alternative for each TDA organization. Unlike Antaeus and other previous reorganization study groups, the Vanguard group conducted an open dialogue with affected organizations as it prepared

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[8] Charter of the Project Vanguard Study Group, 2 May 1990, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Final Report: Redistribution of BASOPS/Unit Structure Within TDA*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 Dec 1988), pp. EX-1 through EX-B-10, CMH.

[9] CONARC commanded most Army schools and forces in CONUS. The functional MACOMs replacing it were TRADOC, FORSCOM, and the U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC). See Jean R. Moenk, *Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Continental Army Command (1972–1973)* (Fort McPherson, Ga.: U.S. Army Forces Command, 1974), and James A. Bowden, "Operation STEADFAST: The United States Army Reorganizes Itself" (Thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1 April 1985).

[10] Briefing, Vanguard Task Force for General Officer Steering Committee, 27 Jul 1990, Fort Belvoir, Va., Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Chart 4—Conceptual Organization of a Reestablished Continental Army Command



its recommendations. Though laborious and at times contentious, this process offered the advantage of using the widest possible expertise in developing options. Although certain agencies used the dialogue to obstruct Vanguard proposals, others found consensus on options for restructuring that could offer the Army significant manpower and cost reductions.[11]

The results of Vanguard were not immediately apparent. The extensive coordination requirements had delayed agreement, and, after 2 August 1990, HQDA and field commands quickly became preoccupied by Operation DESERT SHIELD, the U.S. buildup in Saudi Arabia in response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Except for the few initiatives mutually acceptable to the task force, the affected organization, and HQDA proponents, most Vanguard proposals remained unresolved at the chief of staff's 14 December 1990 decision briefing. The approved initiatives did eliminate 6,918 military and 10,772 civilian personnel by the end of 1997. Other options that could eliminate an additional 15,509 military and 9,511 civilian jobs remained untouched, however.[12]

Major Vanguard recommendations left pending included discontinuance of three major commands: the Military Traffic Management Command, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and U.S. Army, South. A separate August 1990 decision to restructure U.S. Army, Japan, as a major subordinate command of U.S. Army, Pacific, would leave twelve major commands, if the Army leadership disestablished the other three. Another major initiative would reorganize TRADOC, transferring combat development personnel from branch and combined-arms "integrating" centers to a consolidated doctrine center at Fort Monroe. Vanguard proponents believed that these restructuring options would yield immediate benefits from collocating individuals who focused on Army doctrine and combat developments. These options would also permit manpower reductions with a minimum of disruption to key planners for the future Army. The study additionally endorsed a number of ongoing TRADOC studies intended to consolidate branch centers. For example, Vanguard proposals recommended the elimination of the Air Defense Artillery Branch and the Chemical Corps and consolidation of their functions into existing branches, efforts that the Army's leadership eventually rejected.

Although ongoing contingency operations in the Middle East postponed an HQDA reorganization, Vanguard still left a framework

[11] Greenway interv, 3 Jan 1991, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[12] Briefing Materials, Project Vanguard, Decision Briefing for CSA/SEC Army, 14 Dec 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

for change. The study group proposed at least a 20 percent reduction in HQDA manpower from the Goldwater-Nichols ceiling of 3,105 to fewer than 2,500. Although the task force studied a number of reorganization options, it lacked the concurrence of key officials in HQDA and therefore recommended a pro rata reduction in manpower rather than a major headquarters reorganization. Vanguard did, however, offer discrete proposals for merging most of HQDA's 122 FOAs and SSAs. The recommendations would also reduce the 50,000 spaces in these agencies by more than 20 percent.

Vanguard's most significant recommendation for restructuring the Army's headquarters intended to improve HQDA's focus on resource planning. The study group put forward two options for attaining this end. HQDA could expand the Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, into a consolidated Army "program integrator." Alternatively, HQDA could transfer PA&E's functions and manpower to an assistant vice chief of staff, who would serve as the Army's resources manager.[13] The proposals required additional study beyond that done by the Vanguard Task Force. The task force believed, however, that either option offered significant improvements in effective program planning, as well as manpower reductions, through consolidation of offices and functions, throughout HQDA, that dealt primarily with resource planning. The redesign would provide one focal point for headquarters' efforts devoted to resource planning and coordination. But such reorganization would disrupt HQDA functions over the short term and portended significant changes in an internal headquarters "balance of power." Decisions on headquarters reorganization were postponed for further study and perhaps more propitious timing.[14]

The Base Force

Through 1990, independent of Army efforts, the Joint Staff built on Chairman Powell's November 1989 briefing to the secretary of defense calling for a comprehensive plan for transforming the nation's military forces. Finally taking the lead in defense strategy, Powell directed the

[13] Although the Army had an assistant vice chief of staff position from 1967 to 1974, an HQDA reorganization disestablished it after the creation of the director of the Army staff (DAS) position. The DAS had too wide a span of responsibilities to focus on Army resource issues.

[14] *Project VANGUARD*, *Final Report*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 Dec 1990), pp. EX-10 through EX-40, XIV-1 through XIV-9, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Defense Secretary Cheney hosts an Armed Forces Full Honor Arrival Ceremony at the Pentagon for the Japanese minister of state for defense.

Joint Staff early in 1990 to work on what he termed the "Base Force." Despite the initial skepticism of Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney that the Cold War would end by the mid-1990s, Powell continued to drive the Joint Staff to reduce the fighting forces. His staff's studies focused primarily on developing "macro-level" options for reducing numbers of divisions, wings, and carrier battle groups. Believing that the United States could reduce its active forces from 2.1 million to between 1.5 and 1.6 million military personnel, Powell sought a plan that delineated the *minimum* U.S. force levels essential for a post–Cold War era. He believed such forces would require only ten to twelve Army divisions.[15]

The Joint Staff conducted the Base Force study without direct participation by HQDA. Similarly, the staff undertook its strategic analyses without service concurrence. For example, the Joint Staff optimistically rejected the Army's hypothesis that force reduction negotiations in Europe would not reach fruition in time to affect current force structure plans. The Army's leadership recognized that the continuing withdrawal of Soviet military forces from East Germany and Poland gave NATO greater warning time of a Soviet attack in Central Europe. However, Army planners still judged a short-warning conventional attack to be a

[15] Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989–1992* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), pp. 11–15.

plausible, if now less likely, scenario. In contrast, Powell and the Joint Staff believed the Soviet withdrawal represented a decisive Soviet shift from an offensive to a defensive posture in Europe. In essence, the Base Force's planners now took the lead, anticipating a more rapid end to the Cold War than even Army leaders had envisioned, and they were proved correct by subsequent events.[16]

The Joint Staff's dismissal of the Cold War left planners looking beyond the threats central to the current national military strategy and developing a force-sizing standard other than one focused on containing the Soviet threat. The most recent national military strategy and defense guidance had addressed the prospect of U.S. operations in Southwest Asia to help defend against a "robust regional threat, rather than plan solely for thwarting a Soviet attack in the region. Instead of hypothesizing future threats, however, the Joint Staff shifted from a "threat-based" to a more "capabilities-based" force-design process. The latter method caused them to focus on developing a diversity of forces to respond to a broad number of threats, rather than tailoring forces to one or more discrete strategic threats or scenarios.[17] In effect no one knew what the future would hold once the Soviet threat evaporated.

In order to permit force sizing for both a general war with the Soviet Union and regional contingencies, the Joint Staff developed four "force packages," two geographical and two functional. These packages transcended existing regional combatant command areas of responsibility as well as the three types of theaters of operations. Since early in the Cold War, strategic/space had emerged as a distinct type of theater (primarily an Air Force and Navy responsibility), in addition to the traditional maritime (primarily a Navy and Air Force responsibility), and continental (Army and Air Force responsibility) theaters. The two geographical force packages, Atlantic and Pacific, would provide air, naval, and ground forces for conventional operations against either Soviet or indigenous threats. The Atlantic package, for example, comprised forces allocated to fight either in NATO or in a contingency operation in the Atlantic Command's or the Central Command's area of responsibility, including Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Two functional force packages, Strategic and Contingency, would be CONUS-based, with the "strategic

[16] Ibid., pp. 5–9, 13–14, 17–18.

[17] *DPG 1992–1997*, pp. 4, 17; James A. Winnefeld, *The Post–Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects*, RAND R-4243-JS (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992), pp. 1–2, 5–8; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report to Congressional Requesters. Force Structure: Issues Involving the Base Force*, GAO/NSIAD-93-65 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993), pp. 12–13.

forces" constituting all U.S. space and nuclear assets, and the "contingency forces" constituting all unassigned conventional forces. The latter could either reinforce a regional combatant command or prosecute a different contingency operation elsewhere.[18]

By the summer of 1990, the Joint Staff had moved beyond "A View to the 90s" with a more detailed Base Force plan. The new plan represented a reduction, rather than a significant restructuring, of existing U.S. conventional forces. In this vein, the Base Force study proposed replacing forward-deployed units with smaller "forward-presence" forces. Instead of the strong ground forces and supporting base currently in place in Europe and Korea, the Base Force study envisioned a greater emphasis on CONUS-based "force projection" units, capable of responding to a variety of scenarios worldwide.

Reductions in the size and structure of forward-deployed U.S. forces could leave Army units particularly vulnerable. Since 1950, Army force designs, particularly those of heavy units, had evolved to match qualitative improvements in Soviet and Soviet-supplied ground forces.[19] But the Army's armored and mechanized units, designed to dominate a conventional battlefield, were expensive to equip and train, were difficult to transport, and required extensive logistical support. Critics argued that such forces were less valuable for contingency operations elsewhere. In response, supporters of heavy forces argued that the proliferation of Soviet-designed and manufactured armored equipment throughout the Middle East and Asia justified retaining these units. The Base Force study's

[18] John M. Collins, *National Military Strategy, the DoD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan: An Assessment*, Congressional Research Service Report Number (92-493 S) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 11 June 1992), pp. 7, 26–35; Marc Dean Millot, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Managing USEUCOM's Command Structure after the Cold War*, RAND Report Number RAND R-4128-EUCOM/NA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992), pp. 16–17; James John Tritten, *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 33–42; Harry E. Rothmann, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post–Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 26 February 1992); Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 21, 26–27.

[19] See John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998); Glen R. Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Force Design Initiatives, 1939–1989* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990); Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, *Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army Division Designs and Experiments, 1917–1995* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997); and John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), for detailed discussions of Army tactical force redesign efforts.

force-projection logic, however, reinforced the impetus of ongoing Army AirLand Battle-Future studies for designing more flexible structures that could blend heavy and light forces with greater ability to cover rapidly diverse contingency operations anywhere in the world.

Despite a certain congruence between Joint and Army plans, the Joint Staff's Base Force proposals threatened to overwhelm Army plans for the gradual force reductions developed in the Quicksilver reshaping proposals and submitted to OSD in the Army's FY1992–1997 Program Objective Memorandum. As briefed to the Army's leadership, the JCS recommendations envisioned a reduction to 535,500 active-duty Army personnel though 1995, far greater than the Quicksilver II reductions, cutting the Army to 580,000 in fourteen divisions by 1997. Under the Base Force proposals, the total number of active-duty military personnel in the Department of Defense would decline by 25 percent through 1997. When the reductions were subtracted from the Army's 1987 strength of 780,815, total Army cuts would exceed 30 percent. Recommended manpower reductions from 1987 levels for the other services were Air Force, 29 percent; Navy, 14 percent; and Marine Corps, 21 percent. The force cuts translated into a 33 percent reduction in active Army divisions (18 to 12), a 44 percent cut in Air Force tactical forces (27 to 15 wings), and a 24 percent cut in naval battle force ships (568 to 432), with the Marine Corps retaining a three-division/wing structure at slightly reduced strengths. The only way the Army could realistically meet the deeper manpower cut would be by accelerated personnel reductions. Such reductions would only further disrupt unit readiness and cohesion.[20]

Army Chief of Staff Vuono (1987–1991) joined other service chiefs and regional combatant commanders in objecting to the scope of reductions. Without a comprehensive threat analysis for the new strategic environment, future requirements remained murky. The reductions, he argued, appeared more budget-driven than the result of a revised national military strategy. Except for reductions projected pursuant to mutual European withdrawals by NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, the Base Force concept eliminated forces without identifying likely future contingencies and the respective capabilities needed to respond to them. Its entire analysis appeared superficial. Similarly, the concept failed

[20] Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 40–44; Information Paper, Lt Col Persyn (DAMO-SSW), 3 Aug 1990, sub: Future of the Force—POM Army and Fiscally Constrained Alternative, CINC Conference—Force Structure Book, File 90-00207, Vuono Papers, MHI; Collins, *National Military Strategy*, pp. 24–25; U.S. GAO, *Issues Involving the Base Force*, p. 10.

to provide a clear definition of how each service's functions would contribute to the rapidly evolving national security strategy, especially contingency operations in "Third World" arenas. Vuono insisted that, more than the other services, the Army offered a diversity of military capabilities for employment in all contingencies, from security and stability operations to high-threat fighting in a conventional ground war. TRADOC's ongoing AirLand Battle-Future studies promised to redesign the Army into a force more attuned to contingency operations. Yet the Army had already accepted major personnel reductions, exceeding those in the other services. Vuono argued that Army personnel therefore warranted a reprieve from cuts beyond those already programmed.[21]

Powell countered these arguments with budget projections. Although HQDA had already made its Program Objective Memorandum submission for 1992–1997 based on average budget reductions of 10 percent through 1995, Powell had already directed the Joint Staff to plan for a 25 percent reduction in defense budgets over the same years. He also noted that congressional plans projected between 11 and 16 percent additional defense budget reductions. His arguments seemed authoritative to the secretary of defense and many key OSD officials.[22]

During these deliberations, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Paul Wolfowitz sponsored an independent strategic reevaluation in May 1990 that buttressed the Joint Staff's summer planning assumptions. Noting the impending collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Wolfowitz contended that force ratios in Central Europe between NATO and former Warsaw Pact members had already shifted from approximately 1:2.5 in 1988 to 1:1.7 in 1990. The Wolfowitz study assumed that a NATO/former Warsaw Pact agreement would provide balanced force reductions in Europe while it retained a 1:1.6 NATO/former Warsaw Pact force ratio through 1997. After the agreement, the Soviet Union would be unable to launch a theater-wide military offensive in Central Europe without at least one or two years' advance preparation, providing NATO ample warning. Consequently, Wolfowitz offered three U.S. force options: a "Crisis Response/Reconstitution" posture, a "Third World Power Projection" option, and a "Forward Defense without Reconstitution" posture.

Noting the unsettled geopolitical environment, the Wolfowitz study was more cautious than the Base Force study in recommending U.S. force reductions. The OSD piece advocated a more gradual pace of force

[21] Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 22–24, 34–35, 38–44.

[22] Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Budget Impact of Illustrative 25% Force Reduction," Historian's Background Files, CMH; Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 35–37.

reductions through 1997, rather than the Base Force study's goal of 1995. It further recommended that the United States conduct force reductions in three phases, retaining the option to suspend them quickly in the event of a reversal of the Warsaw Pact's decline or escalating tensions. The study's 1997 goal was for a "Crisis Response/Reconstitution force" with an active Army of 520,000 (12 divisions), a 450-ship Navy, a 16–17 tactical wing Air Force, and a Marine Corps of 147,000 (5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades [MEBs] rather than 3 divisions/wings). Except for Marine force levels, the Wolfowitz study almost duplicated the Base Force concept's force levels. The former emphasized, however, building a "reconstitution" capability into any reductions, noting that the final Crisis Response/Reconstitution force would need up to seven years to reconstitute to 1990 levels, should the Soviet threat resurrect itself.[23]

Finally, Congress entered the debate. At the behest of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act contained language mandating service end strengths. The act established service active component strengths for 1995 at 520,000 for the Army, 501,000 for the Navy, 177,000 for the Marine Corps, and 415,000 for the Air Force. Congress agreed to "orderly" and "phased" force reductions and force levels almost identical to those recommended by the Base Force study.[24]

For Army leaders, the recommended cuts were hardly orderly or phased. Facing formidable opposition from the Joint Staff, OSD, and Congress, General Vuono labored throughout the summer of 1990 to adjust the Base Force study's cuts and put them more in line with the levels contained in the Army's 1992–1997 POM submission. Vuono's objections, like those of all other service chiefs except Marine Commandant General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., were ineffective. Since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, service chiefs could only recommend changes to Joint Staff plans. Powell continued to support the Base Force study's reductions, and the Army had little ability to challenge them directly. In the end, pursuant to an October budget agreement between the White

[23] USD(P) Briefing Materials, "DPRB: Threat, Strategy and Implications for Force Posture," May 1990, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Don M. Snider, *Strategy, Forces, and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post–Cold War, 1989–91* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, February 1993), pp. 18–22; Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 30–35.

[24] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, Public Law 510, 101st Cong., 2d sess. (5 Nov 1990), sec. 401; Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991," 17 Oct 1990, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Snider, *Strategy, Forces, and Budgets*, pp. 28–29.

House and Congress, OSD directed the services to reduce forces below Program Objective Memorandum levels, essentially approving the Base Force cuts.[25] In the face of real, rather than projected, budget cuts, Vuono reluctantly acquiesced to a twelve-division, rather than fourteen-division, active force, with all cuts implemented by 1995 instead of through 1997. He acted in part to preserve Army readiness levels. Retaining what the Army considered adequate force levels in light of the reduced budget would mean undermining both readiness and force modernization. The result would be tantamount to destroying the Army from within—by creating a "hollow" Army—and that he refused to do.[26]

Unlike Vuono, the Navy leaders continued negotiating with the Joint Staff on Base Force reductions up until the secretary of defense made his final decisions in December. In this effort, Navy leaders focused more on force structure trade-offs than on postponement of reductions beyond 1995. Marine Commandant Gray's persistent opposition to Base Force reductions to Marine forces did reverse some of them, however. Powell acquiesced in part to the Marine Corps' self-proclaimed role as the nation's ready "911 response force" that needed to be kept strong. In August, Powell thus backed down and increased the Base Force's end strength for the Marines from 150,000 to 159,000. Furthermore, unlike was the case with the other services, the Base Force delayed until 1996–1997 Marine reductions below 170,600, allowing time for additional negotiation concerning the issue.[27]

The Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB), the Defense Department's highest decision-making body for resource issues, approved the Base Force for program and budget purposes on 10 December 1990 in the midst of Operation Desert Shield. HQDA planned to implement the reductions by decreasing the Army to 12 active divisions with 30 active brigades (8 armored, 10 mechanized infantry, and 12 infantry) and 7 round-out reserve component brigades (2 armored, 3 mechanized infantry, and 2 infantry) through 1995. The Army's reserve components would be

[25] See Snider, *Strategy, Forces, and Budgets*, pp. 23–31, for a detailed analysis of Bush administration and congressional maneuvering that led to the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.

[26] Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, and John D. Mayer, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy*, RAND Report Number RAND, MR-133-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992), pp. 33, 41–49, 51–53; Snider, *Strategy, Forces, and Budgets*, pp. 15–16.

[27] Lewis et al., *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces*, pp. 45–48; Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 38, 43–44; Powell, *My American Journey*, pp. 438–439.

pared to 8 divisions with 24 brigades (6 armored, 6 mechanized infantry, 9 infantry, and 3 light infantry) during the same period. Although the reserve component reductions reflected Quicksilver II plans, HQDA accepted OSD proposals to study conversion of two Army National Guard divisions to "cadre" formations.[28] Thus, having started 1990 with authorization for 770,000 active military personnel, with 18 active and 10 Army National Guard divisions, the Army was ending the year with plans approved to reduce active personnel to 535,000 over five years.[29]

On 19 November 1990, Washington and Moscow reached their anticipated agreement of mutual withdrawal of forces in Europe. This event was an important milestone in the end of the Cold War and permitted major withdrawals of U.S. units from Europe. But despite Army attempts to link reductions to changes in the national military strategy, declining budgets remained the primary catalyst for defense reshaping efforts. After endeavoring to adapt the Army to the future, HQDA saw the Base Force study further decreasing approved Army forces below what Army analyses indicated was prudent. Questions remained for the Army's leadership as to whether the Base Force's reductions beyond those proposed in the Army's Quicksilver II program would prove too deep and too rapid. Also unresolved was whether the human cost of such turmoil would prove debilitating for cohesion and morale over the long run.[30]

In any case, by the end of 1990, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had begun to move major national military strategy and force planning decisions from HQDA's control to the Joint Staff and OSD. Goldwater-Nichols directed that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a "Chairman's Program Assessment" of the service's biennial POMs for the secretary of defense. The Base Force study, however, proceeded far beyond a simple program assessment. General Powell succeeded in breaking what one observer described as the "PPBS cycle, in which

[28] In 1992, Congress rejected reductions to the Army National Guard's eight divisions, effectively ending plans to convert two divisions to cadre divisions. See Snider, *Strategy, Forces, and Budgets*, p. 31.

[29] Memo, Gen Carl E. Vuono for Distribution, 5 Nov 1990, sub: Guidance for Updating Fiscal Year 1992/1993 Budget and Fiscal Year 1992–1997 POM, with enclosed Program Reduction Strategy, FY 91 Budget Execution Guidance, File 90-00178; Directorate, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Briefing Materials: FY 92–97 Program Relook, 5 Dec 1990, Program Adjustments DPRB Preparation Secret File 90-00205; DCSOPS, DPRB Briefing Materials: Reshaping the Army for the 1990s, 10 Dec 1990, DPRB Briefing Secret File 90-00206, all Vuono Papers, MHI.

[30] See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1990*, bk. 2, *July 1 to December 31, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1991), pp. 1640–1642, for the text of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

the services submitted [POMs] in competition with each other." Critics of the Program Objective Memorandum process had complained that services tended to "front load" the PPBS processes with expensive force modernization programs, which the secretary of defense could reduce only at considerable political cost. But Powell completely overrode the service POM submissions with the Base Force recommendations. For the first time since Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird instituted the POM process at the end of the 1960s, the PPBS cycle began with an integrated program based, ostensibly, on military requirements.[31]

Even after Secretary Cheney adopted the Base Force, questions continued to arise over its ability to satisfy the nation's military requirements. Critics quickly took issue with several aspects of the Base Force. First, it reduced forces prior to identifying the most likely future contingencies and their respective force requirements. Rather than apportion "pro rata" cuts to the services, it reduced Army units, Air Force supporting tactical air wings, and the "Atlantic force package" units the most. Although the obviously reduced threat from the Soviet Union was the main catalyst, the exact criteria for specific force reductions were unclear to all outside of the Joint Staff and that handful of service representatives who had collaborated on the Base Force study. The failure to share with the services the methodology used by quantitative analytical studies that underpinned the study's recommendations only exacerbated its credibility problems. The key impetus for specific force cuts appeared to be the expectation of increased warning times in the event of a political reversal and general war in Europe, as well as the ability to reconstitute various service capabilities rapidly. Longer warning times for a general war permitted mobilization, training, and deployment of Army and Air Force reserve component forces to supplant those in the active force. Conversely, the long lead times (up to five years) essential for ship building and the lack of significant cost savings in manning ships with Naval Reserve crews argued for retaining relatively larger active naval forces until the Soviet situation was more certain.[32]

A second criticism was that the Base Force merely reduced existing forces rather than begin the arduous process of reorganizing military capabilities for a new, yet-to-be-divined post–Cold War environment.

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[31] Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, pp. 44–45; Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, pp. 13, 27.

[32] See, for example, William B. Kaufmann, *Assessing the Base Force: How Much Is Enough?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23–24; Winnefeld, *Post–Cold War Force-Sizing Debate*, p. 8; John M. Collins, *U.S. Military Force Reductions: Capabilities Versus Requirements*, Congressional Research Service Report Number (92-43 S) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 8 January 1992), pp. 23, 25–26, 56; Collins, *National Military Strategy*, pp. 9, 21–22, 57–58.

Admittedly, just as Operation DESERT STORM, the U.S.-led ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, had disrupted the Army's Project Vanguard, it also hindered the Joint Staff's ability to complete timely analysis for the Base Force. This lack left the study focused on "macro-level" military capabilities: divisions, wings, carrier battle groups, and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). As one critic noted, the Base Force study reduced forces without ensuring that "decisionmakers act to redress undesirable redundancies, consolidate functions, improve procedures, eliminate waste, and otherwise substitute quality for quantity."[33] Effort to streamline overlapping service roles and functions and adopt common doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures could indeed offset part of the reduction in military capabilities stemming from the Base Force's 25 percent cut in previous Defense Department manpower levels. Yet one provision of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act prevented the Joint Staff or OSD from undertaking a detailed force redesign unilaterally. As the service chiefs noted during Base Force deliberations, the services still retained their legal responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training forces.[34]

Two provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, however, directed the chairman to undertake measures directly affecting formerly sacrosanct service hegemony over organizing and training tactical forces. First, the act charged the chairman with "developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces."[35] But even if the Joint Staff developed and promulgated a series of doctrinal publications for joint warfighting and common support, the legislation left unclear whether these would be "directive" in nature or simply guidelines. If directive, then joint doctrine would be a keystone, either unifying or overriding the diverse service doctrines. If only guidelines, then joint doctrine, like so many past attempts at fostering "jointness," would become just another irrelevant adjunct to disparate service approaches to warfighting.[36]

The second provision required the chairman to undertake a triennial review of roles, missions, and functions within the Defense Department. The changing strategic environment alone mandated a reexamination of service roles and functions. Although joint doctrine could harmonize the operational capabilities provided by the services, the triennial review process could identify and consolidate duplicative service functions,

[33] Collins, *U.S. Military Force Reductions*, p. 1.

[34] John F. Troxell, *Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1997), p. 12; Jaffe, *Development of the Base Force*, p. 27.

[35] Section 153.

[36] Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, pp. 48–50.

yielding both efficiencies and improvements in military effectiveness.[37] The review would provide the chairman with options for change in existing functions that had obvious organization, acquisition, and training duplications. He could then recommend changes, most of which the secretary of defense could undertake himself under authority provided by the 1958 act. Such a process, rather than service advocacy, would decide authoritatively which service capabilities would be most applicable to the nation's "911 Force," for example.[38]

The outgoing chairman, Admiral Crowe, had completed the first statutory study of roles, missions, and functions immediately prior to his retirement in September 1989.[39] But the effort had taken place too early to discern changes in the strategic environment authoritatively. Crowe's review noted that the shift of U.S. strategic priorities from a focus on the Soviet Union to a posture that incorporated greater contingency planning for the Third World mandated adjustments to service roles and functions. Yet even as it recommended further study to "revise" and "update" selected functions, Crowe's review continued to endorse existing service roles and functions. The study did note, however, that service doctrines and functions would evolve rapidly, not only in light of changing national military strategy, but also because of "emerging technology" that made possible new operational concepts for the next generation of warfare. It also recommended that the Defense Department address overlapping service functions for space operations and intelligence analysis. But the study avoided any specific reorganization. The only recommended change to service functions was to assign close air support to all of the services, rather than continue to require the Air Force to support Army forces. The result was thus of limited value to those who had hoped that

[37] In discussions of roles, missions, and functions, I use the term *overlap*—neutrally—for a situation in which two or more services possess military capabilities for an identical or a similar function. *Redundancy* I apply to an overlapping of functions that exists for credible military reasons. *Duplication* refers to an overlapping of functions that lacks convincing military reasons.

[38] Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, pp. 50–51.

[39] The phrase *roles and missions* is used frequently in reference to a service's statutory "role," and specific "functions." Though the term *roles and missions* commonly refers to capabilities of Defense Department organizations, the terms *role*, *mission*, and *function* each pertain to a specific organization. Each service has a role. Functions are "more specific responsibilities" assigned by executive order or regulation to the services to fulfill their roles. Missions are "tasks assigned to a unified or specified command," not a service. See William W. Epley, *Roles and Missions of the United States Army* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), pp. 4–7, for the evolution of these concepts.

it would spark a comprehensive redesign and offset reductions with a more tightly integrated, effective force.[40]

The Base Force study also provided little direction for design of a joint force for the future. Nonetheless, it was the Joint Staff's foundation for post–Cold War reshaping. The secretary of defense had approved force cuts even before any new national military strategy articulated how the Base Force would meet the nation's requirements. The Base Force offered few benefits for HQDA or the soldier, other than the prospect that it might avert more arbitrary reductions by Congress. Army critics continued to question whether it was a sound reshaping plan and argued that the Base Force risked "breaking" critical military capabilities. Anticipating this argument, General Powell and OSD officials noted that they had designed the Base Force to be "reversible." Force reductions could stop, and reconstitution begin, in the event that world events did not conform to the sanguine scenario envisioned by Joint Staff planners.

[40] Memo, CM-2243-89, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Secretary of Defense, 28 Sep 1989, sub: Report of the Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Chapter 4
Toward a New Strategy, 1989–1990

The Army's leadership faced two principal hurdles in defending current force levels. First, Joint Staff planners argued that heavy ground forces were difficult to deploy to a contingency with available U.S. sealift assets. Second, the Soviet redeployment of ground forces from Eastern Europe extended warning times for a possible NATO-Soviet conflict in Europe. This changing balance of power in Central Europe had allowed the Base Force planners to advise shifting more ground force requirements for such a contingency from the active Army to the Army National Guard. Although Army planners considered these Base Force assumptions optimistic, the Army had little leverage to continue to oppose the reductions once the secretary of defense had accepted the degree of risk inherent in the Base Force.

The Defense Management Review

While the Army undertook Project Vanguard and the Joint Staff conducted the Base Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense launched its own study, the Defense Management Review (DMR). Adopting a 1987 Packard Commission recommendation, Secretary of Defense Cheney launched the initial DMR study in 1989. The first efforts were modest in scope, attempting to shape and coordinate service infrastructure reorganization plans. Under the DMR's aegis, HQDA consolidated its own internal reshaping into the 1989 Army Management Review, which streamlined acquisition and logistical processes, yielding a projected $12 billion in savings through 1995.[1]

Congress reinforced the Defense Department efforts with the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. The act mandated an annual 4 percent reduction in personnel assigned to Defense Department "management

[1] Army Management Review Task Force, "Army Management Review: Report to the Secretary of Defense," Oct 1989; Dick Cheney, "Defense Management: Report to the President by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney," Jul 1989, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

headquarters" from 1991 through 1995.[2] In addition to this cumulative reduction of more than 18 percent in headquarters personnel, the act also reduced active component general officers, with the Army dropping from 410 to 302 over the same five-year period. Although Base Force reductions of tactical forces would account for reductions of many general officer positions, HQDA would have to eliminate, downgrade, or consolidate a number of general officer positions elsewhere in its structure. Consequently, both provisions of the act were catalysts for the consolidation of nontactical headquarters throughout the Defense Department.[3]

The cost reduction goals that had driven Base Force cuts and congressional actions sparked more ambitious DMR recommendations in 1990. Seizing the initiative for infrastructure reform, the OSD comptroller developed a number of discrete initiatives for cost reduction and institutional consolidation for study by OSD and the services. These proposals aimed at consolidating similar functions that were currently spread across the services in defense agencies or under a single service as the Defense Department's "executive agent." Specific DMR recommendations affected the continued autonomy of the Army's Corps of Engineers, Information Systems Command, Health Services Command, Military Traffic Management Command, Criminal Investigation Division Command, and major elements of the Army Materiel Command (*Chart 5*).[4] Widespread service objections and the Gulf War forestalled implementation of such consolidations in 1990. Nevertheless, OSD's continuing studies of various options in these realms left the Vanguard Task Force's proposals and other Army reorganization plans in limbo.

Declining defense budgets provided strong incentives for a continued search for organizational efficiencies. The DMR-recommended consolidations offered the potential for cost reductions and streamlined, better

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[2] DoD Directive 5100.73, "Department of Defense Management Headquarters and Headquarters Support Activities," identifies those Defense Department organizations defined as management headquarters. In the Army these include HQDA and staff support activities, major command headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, U.S. Army Space Command, and selected major subordinate command headquarters in the Army Materiel Command.

[3] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, Public Law 510, 101st Cong., 2d sess. (5 Nov 1990), secs. 403, 906.

[4] *Project VANGUARD*, *Final Report*, pp. I-10 through I-12; Memo, Col Robert B. Cato, Chief, Army Management Review Coordination Office (AMRCO), for the Secretary of the Army, 18 Sep 1990, sub: Additional FY 1992 Defense Management Report (DMR) Initiatives Information Memorandum; Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 996, sub: Consolidation of the Investigative Agencies, 17 Nov 1990; DMRD 982, Management of Military Construction, 12 Nov 1990; Office of the CSA, *Weekly Summary* 40 (13 Apr 1990) No. 15, pp. 17–20, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

functionally organized, major support operations within the Defense Department. A short-term cost of these benefits, however, would be disruptions to existing services and programs as well as a reshuffling of service career patterns for military officers. The DMR initiatives also left open questions concerning the Army's continued sovereignty over programs essential for mission support and soldier morale. For example, the DMR study concerning "Management of Defense Health Care" suggested that nondeployable health care facilities might be merged into a "Defense Medical Support Agency," and staff discussions seemed to suggest that changing eligibility standards for such care among dependents and retirees in particular might prove a good source for monetary savings.[5] Unsurprisingly, the Army leaders opposed such measures, questioning their near-term cost savings and emphasizing their potential disruption to existing programs during both a major contingency operation and a period of significant force reduction.[6]

Although it set ambitious goals, the DMR process enjoyed only limited success in restructuring the Defense Department for enhanced efficiency and effectiveness. The DMR proponents lacked the full-time staff that, for example, had given the Army's Project Vanguard the capability to develop detailed supporting analyses adequate to confront resistance. Moreover, the DMR was not empowered to develop a framework for integrating consolidated department functions into a support command structure similar to the World War II Army Service Forces, as the 1945 Marshall-Collins Plan had proposed (*Chart 6*). Instead of designing an integrated multifunctional support organization, the DMR sought to consolidate similar discrete support activities, preferably into new defense agencies. In fact, had the Defense Department adopted all of the DMR-proposed consolidations, it would have ended up with something reminiscent of the nineteenth-century War Department bureau system (*Chart 7*). Rather than integrating these functions in a manner that would ensure both responsiveness to military requirements and a minimum of overlaps and duplications, these new defense agencies would be disconnected and potentially unresponsive to anyone except the secretary himself.

The review did effect several consolidations, however, until the incoming Clinton administration halted the effort in 1993. A 1991 decision shifted most supply depots from the Army Materiel Command's

[5] Interv, Mark Sherry with Dr. David S. C. Chu, 17 Dec 1997, Washington, D.C., Oral History Activity, CMH.

[6] Interv, Mark Sherry with Mr. Blair Ewing, Task Force on Defense Reform, 19 Feb 1998, Pentagon, CMH; DMRD 970, sub: Proposal on Management of Defense Health Care, 17 Nov 1990, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Chart 7—The Structure of Army Organization in the 1890s



Source: Maj. Francis T. Julia, *Army Staff Reorganization, 1903–1985*, Historical Analysis Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), chart 1 after p. 21; Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 21.

authority to the Defense Logistics Agency. OSD consolidated service finance agencies and commissary operations during the same year. Finally, the outgoing administration approved consolidation of certain information management organizations at installations in November 1992. These consolidations and related management improvements gleaned $40–$50 billion in overhead and support savings from 1991 through 1997. Although perhaps more successful than the Vanguard study in effecting real organizational change, the DMR's overall failure to consolidate more organizations and headquarters left the services to meet the statutory management headquarters reduction.[7]

The Gulf War

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM underscored the need for the ongoing U.S. strategic review. They also tested command and control arrangements for operational forces implemented subsequent to the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization. Finally, they demonstrated the effects of the Quicksilver and Base Force reductions upon Army and other military capabilities.

Although it disrupted HQDA and Defense Department reshaping efforts, the Gulf War demonstrated the Army's ability to conduct a ground operation in a major regional contingency against a regional power armed with modern mechanized forces. The 82d Airborne Division was the first large Army unit to arrive in theater, joining coalition allies and other U.S. forces already in Saudi Arabia on 8 August 1990. Unlike previous contingency operations, DESERT SHIELD required a major follow-on deployment. In fact, CENTCOM troop requirements quickly strained the active Army's capabilities.[8]

The XVIII Airborne Corps, with four divisions, completed deployment to the theater by mid-October. Because of Quicksilver reduction plans, the Army had already begun inactivating the 2d Armored

[7] Defense Management Review study (DMR) 902, sub: Consolidation of Defense Supply Depots, undated (1990); DMR 910, sub: Consolidation of DoD Accounting and Finance Operations, undated (1990); DMR 918C, sub: Defense Information Infrastructure, undated (1990); DMR 972, sub: Consolidate Commissaries, undated (1990); Ltr, Mr. Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, Defense Science Board Task Force on FY 1994–99 Future Years Defense Plan, to Ms. Marilyn Elrod, Staff Director, House Armed Services Committee, 17 May 1993; ASD (Comptroller), "Summary Report: Defense Management Report Initiatives," Oct 1993, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[8] Interv, Mark Sherry with Gen Dennis J. Reimer, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga., 31 Jan 1994; Interv, Dwight Oland with Lt Gen William H. Reno, U.S. Army, Ret., 5 Jan 1993, Washington, D.C., both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Division and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), two units that otherwise could have deployed. The massive troop requirement led the secretary of defense to obtain presidential approval on 22 August for the mobilization of 25,000 reserve component combat support and combat service support personnel. President Bush's 8 November order to increase the U.S. Central Command's forces for offensive operations, rather than to enforce a quarantine against Iraq, necessitated deploying another corps headquarters and two divisions from Europe and another Army division from CONUS, and further reserve mobilizations. Although three Army National Guard brigades were mobilized, they became stalled in the train-up process and were not allowed to deploy in time to meet the combatant commander's schedule. Fortunately, the seven active divisions proved adequate as a "decisive force" during the ensuing campaign, and no other contingencies—such as hostilities in Korea—presented themselves.[9]

Operation DESERT STORM devoured Army tactical and combat service support resources. CENTCOM's decisive force required deployment of ready Army units in Europe, depriving the European Command of most of its forward-deployed forces. Ultimately, the Army deployed the equivalent of eight divisions (two-thirds of its Base Force strength) to DESERT STORM. The desert terrain and enemy armored forces made the five armored and mechanized divisions the most valuable units for the ground campaign.[10] Ominously, a protracted DESERT SHIELD–type defense "quarantine" of Kuwait and Iraq, rather than an offensive operation, would have required unit rotations if the contingency had continued beyond twelve months. Even with only four to five division equivalents in the theater, rotation requirements would have quickly exceeded the ten active Army divisions in the Base Force's Atlantic and contingency force packages. The refusal by the commander of the U.S. Central Command to accept light infantry divisions in the theater further exacerbated the Army's dilemma of where to find sufficient forces for rotation. DESERT STORM's eight-division ground force requirement, moreover, exceeded available active Army ground transportation, bulk fuel, water purification, and other combat service support capabilities. These shortages required the early mobilization of a number of reserve component units, as well as extensive host-

[9] Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., *The Whirlwind War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995), pp. 83, 107–108.

[10] Two armored cavalry regiments and an independent armored brigade constituted forces equivalent to the eighth Army "division" in theater.

nation support. As a result, the operations yielded abundant lessons for future reshaping plans.[11]

Although not the case during the contingency operation in Panama in 1989, HQDA's support was essential to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. HQDA activated the Army's Crisis Response Cell (CRC) and its Crisis Action Team (CAT) to coordinate the mobilization and deployment of Army units. The pace of events and the scale of the mobilization quickly exceeded the CAT's capabilities, which were tailored to a smaller contingency operation. By November, most of the HQDA staff was thus engaged full-time in coordinating mobilization and logistical support for DESERT SHIELD. At the same time, other Army Staff agencies and the Corps of Engineers focused on the post-hostilities rebuilding of Kuwait.

Mobilization alone required formidable effort, with more than 130,000 Army reserve component personnel activated by the end of February 1991. The headquarters monitored the selection of units for mobilization and helped coordinate the training and equipping of both active and reserve component units prior to their deployment. The Army's headquarters accomplished these duties by exercising the secretary of the Army's authority under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and directing the transfer of equipment from nondeploying units to compensate for shortages in deploying ones. Ongoing Army reduction efforts complicated this last step. Many units in CONUS and Europe were preparing for transfer or inactivation under the Quicksilver reduction plans, or as a result of negotiated mutual force withdrawal agreements in Europe, and were already transferring their equipment. This materiel had to be rapidly identified and shipped elsewhere—or the inactivations temporarily suspended. Even after Army units arrived in the theater, HQDA ensured continued sustainment and in-theater modernization of Army as well as other U.S. and allied forces.[12]

Although HQDA supported DESERT STORM adequately, a growing number of subsequent contingency operations tested the Army's ability to sustain them while restructuring and reducing forces. Even before U.S. troops had withdrawn from the DESERT STORM theater, President Bush authorized U.S. aid to Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq. By 18 April 1991, the U.S. European Command had organized a joint task force to provide humanitarian relief to the

[11] Collins, *U.S. Military Force Reductions*, p. 12; Schwarzkopf interv, 13 Jan 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[12] Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 51–54; U.S. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1992), pp. H-12 through H-21.

Army senior leaders receive an update briefing overlooking the Crisis Action Team (CAT) in the Army Operations Center (AOC).

refugees. Designated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the relief effort relied primarily on troops from U.S. Army, Europe, including aviation and special operations units and one airborne infantry battalion. These units worked with allied and U.S. Marine troops to provide food, shelter, and security for the refugees. HQDA coordinated mobilization and deployment of U.S. Army Reserve units to Turkey and northern Iraq, including a small number of reserve component civil affairs specialists, who were urgently needed to support the overcrowded refugee compounds.[13]

Development of a New Strategy

During the year following the secretary of defense's December 1990 approval of the Base Force, the Joint Staff and OSD finally completed a comprehensive strategic review. Based on that effort, the Defense Department promulgated a new national military strategy in January 1992. Unlike what occurred during development of the Base Force,

[13] Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 340–353.

Joint Staff planners worked closely with the Army Staff and the other service headquarters in this endeavor. At the same time, events in the Soviet Union vindicated the assumptions of General Powell and Base Force advocates that Soviet capabilities would decline rapidly. After an abortive August 1991 military coup by hard-line Communist elements, the Soviet Union had collapsed from within by January 1992, evolving into a weak "Confederation of Independent States" (CIS). As a result, and for the first time in more than forty years, the United States formally shifted from a global containment strategy directed at the Soviet Union to a focus on regional threats.[14]

Although the Defense Department had begun planning for confronting a non-Soviet aggressor in the Middle East as early as 1989, this contingency had remained a secondary consideration until the fall of the Soviet Union and the nearly simultaneous conclusion of the Gulf War. But thereafter the Joint Staff and OSD focused on maintaining the ability to fight two, near-simultaneous, "major regional contingencies" (MRCs). Basically, Joint Staff planning scenarios envisioned a second contingency operation that required deployment of an "initial response force" to a second theater after U.S. forces had already engaged an aggressor in a first. The two were termed "MRC-East" and "MRC-West." The planning also envisioned the need for forces to respond to a simultaneous, lesser regional contingency. Forces for the lesser regional contingency, however, would come from those also earmarked for the two major regional contingencies.[15]

The Joint Staff and Army planners considered MRC-East the most "stressful" of the contingencies that Army forces programmed for the Base Force would face. For this scenario, which involved the defense of friendly Middle East countries against aggression by a regional power, the Army envisioned an initial-response force built around the XVIII Airborne Corps, including the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 1st Cavalry Division (Armored), and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The III Corps, also CONUS-based, would reinforce the XVIII Airborne Corps with a "decisive force" consisting of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 4th Infantry

[14] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy, 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), pp. 1–4; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA): 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 July 1992), pp. 1-1 to 1-6; Tritten, *Our New National Security Strategy*, pp. 72–84.

[15] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Military Net Assessment: 1991* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mar 1991), pp. 9-1 to 9-16; *JMNA 1992*, pp. 9-15 to 9-18; *DPG 1994–1999*, ANNEX A.

Division (Mechanized), and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).[16] Even though the Joint Staff considered these Army combat forces adequate for such a contingency in the Middle East, it still assessed the available Army force as deficient in critical support capabilities.[17]

The Joint Staff designated its second major planning scenario, a hypothetical North Korean attack on South Korea, MRC-West. Built on the I Corps, the Army's initial-response force would comprise three divisions: the 2d Infantry Division (two brigades forward-based in theater), the 25th Infantry Division (Light), and the 7th Infantry Division (Light). Because of a shortage of active divisions, the III Corps would be the decisive force in both cases. In the event of concurrent contingencies starting in the Middle East, the western contingency would have to await successful prosecution of the first contingency before the III Corps could redeploy and the regional combatant commander could launch a counterattack in the second theater. Joint Staff planners envisioned the decisive force as the minimum force required to launch a counterattack in either theater with only "moderate" risk.[18]

The Joint Staff also identified another possible major contingency that would involve aggression by a resurgent Soviet Union, or one or more of its stronger former "republics," against a neighboring country. The current defense guidance estimated that, if some central authority could gain control of the former Soviet Union, it could rebuild a conventional ground force adequate for a single-theater offensive operation, 70 to 80 division equivalents (1.4 to 1.6 million soldiers), in three to four years. To deter or confront such a threat, the Base Force strategy envisioned forward-basing 150,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe, in support of NATO. The Army's contribution would center on the V Corps with two heavy divisions, the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized). In the event of a contingency, additional Army reinforcements would come from forces apportioned to the two major regional contingencies. Army POMCUS support for reinforcing this force would be reduced from six division sets to six brigade sets, adequate for the active brigades in the III Corps. The XVIII Airborne Corps would reinforce these five divisions with an additional five divi-

[16] Each of these three divisions was a "round-out" division, with one of its three brigades an Army National Guard unit that required mobilization and further training before deployment.

[17] DAMO-SSW Briefing Materials, "Shaping the Army for the 1990s," 18 Apr 1991, Historian's Background Files, CMH; *DPG 1994–1999*, ANNEX A, pp. 5–8; *JMNA 1992*, pp. 9-9 to 9-12.

[18] DAMO-SSW Briefing Materials, "Shaping the Army for the 1990s," undated; *DPG 1994–1999*, ANNEX A, pp. 9–12; *JMNA 1992*, pp. 9-4 to 9-7.

sions, including the 7th Infantry Division. Finally, the I Corps would deploy with six Army National Guard divisions, for a total of sixteen divisions. But deployment speed was not considered critical, reflecting the waning military power of the former Soviet republics.

Without a more concrete threat—and as the possibility of a Soviet resurgence continued to recede—future plans for Europe and NATO remained vague. Unlike in its work on the two major regional contingencies, the Joint Staff had not prepared a detailed assessment for a contingency operation in Europe. Questions regarding specific threats were seconded by uncertainty regarding the depth of reductions in the military forces of the other NATO members. One 1991 Army estimate concluded that if NATO European allies demonstrated a voracious hunger for a "peace dividend," a worst-case scenario might find NATO forces unable to defend a neighbor invaded by the Russians. Future events in the former Soviet Union would either vindicate the Base Force and the new national military strategy or lead to a high-risk situation, given the diminution of NATO defense programs.[19]

A Joint Staff Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) provided another component of its strategic review. This study responded to congressional direction to "determine future mobility requirements for the Armed Forces and . . . develop an integrated plan to meet these requirements."[20] The MRS analyzed the DESERT SHIELD deployment and programmed U.S. airlift and sealift for both intertheater (strategic) and intratheater (tactical) mobility through 1999. After conducting more than ninety, separate, simulated theater operations, the study concluded that, although the deployment for DESERT SHIELD had been successful, the Defense Department needed to invest in additional airlift and sealift. Unlike the Base Force study, which had rejected the Army's Antaeus analysis in favor of deeper reductions, the MRS supported the Army's perennial request for enhanced strategic mobility capabilities in terms of transport shipping and cargo planes. Army supporters hoped that Army force reductions mandated by the Base Force would help pay for these ships and aircraft rather than for other Navy and Air Force programs.[21]

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[19] DAMO-SSW, "Shaping the Army for the 1990s," Historian's Background Files, CMH; *DPG 1994–1999*, pp. 18, 36–37, ANNEX A, pp. 13–16, 25–27; *JMNA 1992*, pp. 9-4 to 9-7.

[20] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, Public Law 510, 101st Cong., 2d sess. (5 Nov 1990), sec. 909.

[21] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mobility Requirements Study*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 Jan 1992), pp. ES-3 to ES-6, IV-32 to IV-34, VIII-3 to VIII-4; *DPG 1994–1999*, pp. 33–34.

Rather than provide a comprehensive plan for designing post–Cold War U.S. armed forces, the Base Force study and subsequent strategic reviews only began the process of readjustment. The Gulf War and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door for criticisms of the strategic assumptions that underlay the size and composition of the Base Force. Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that a high-intensity, major regional contingency could require employing two-thirds of the Base Force's eight Army heavy divisions, leaving only two to three heavy divisions to deter or respond to another contingency. A second criticism concerned the Base Force's sufficiency to prosecute extended contingency operations. If Operation DESERT SHIELD had continued as a protracted "quarantine" of Iraq, the Army would have had to resort to unit rotation to extend its presence in Saudi Arabia beyond twelve months. An extended presence would have required a sufficient pool of units to allow "reconstitution" and to retrain forces for return to the theater. The deep force reductions under the Base Force would deplete active Army formations that would have been essential for these rotations.[22]

Influential outside observers, such as retired Army Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, questioned the Base Force's retention of relatively high levels of naval forces, especially aircraft carriers. With the apparent Soviet demise, the U.S. Navy faced no competitor, or combination of competitors, that could justify the quantity of "blue water" naval forces developed in pursuit of the previous decade's Maritime Strategy and "600-Ship Fleet." Odom also questioned retention of Marine forces beyond the single division that programmed amphibious assault shipping could transport and launch against a hostile shore. His analysis asserted the traditional Army claim that Marine forces are *naval* forces tailored for amphibious-assault operations, not *ground forces*. Odom went on to maintain that the strategic environment of the future would pose significant demands for ground forces to participate in frequent contingency operations. To meet these requirements, he recommended reshaping Army forces into 13 heavy divisions, 1 air assault division, and 1 division-equivalent composed of 2 airborne brigades and a ranger regiment.[23]

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[22] Collins, *U.S. Military Force Reductions*, pp. 25–26, 52–56; Collins, *National Military Strategy, the DoD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan,* pp. 9, 15–16, 31–34.

[23] William E. Odom, *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1993), pp. 74–89. For an earlier discussion of the Marine force structure, see Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

Supporting Odom's argument for Army force levels larger than those of the Base Force was their interoperability on a battlefield that required highly decentralized decision making. Both heavy and light Army units shared a common institutional basis, with compatible doctrine, training, and leader development. Army units from different duty stations could deploy to contingency operations and operate as a coherent team without interservice friction. Indeed, analyzing Operation DESERT STORM, Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and fellow committee member Congressman William Dickinson noted persistent problems in joint operations of U.S. forces. They argued that, although Goldwater-Nichols had solved most problems at the theater level involving joint command and control, difficulties persisted at lower tactical levels. For example, Army and Marine units relied during DESERT STORM on different logistical systems, which impeded joint operations involving the two components, as did their incompatible communications systems and the lack of adequate Marine night-vision equipment. Further doctrinal difficulties that surfaced concerned the allocation of theater air assets for battlefield interdiction and close air support, and together they all had threatened to disrupt an integrated air-ground campaign. Aspin and Dickinson's study underscored the need for authoritative joint doctrine and a comprehensive review of service roles and functions.[24]

Reconstituting the Army

Although DESERT STORM did not derail ongoing U.S. defense reshaping efforts, it stalled them and then sent them along different tracks. The Gulf War delayed major Army force reductions, but it could not reverse the declining budgets that were now decisively driving change in the Defense Department. For Army leaders, the immediate problem after DESERT STORM was to coordinate redeployment of Army units and equipment from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and, at the same time, station in the region sets of pre-positioned unit equipment that would ease their return if necessary. The drawdown of Army forces in Europe complicated the problem. Early in March 1991, HQDA completed an "operational plan" to reshape the Army. That plan reduced U.S. Army, Europe, to about 158,000 military personnel, with 2 divisions, 2 armored cavalry regiments, and 2 division sets in POMCUS by the end of 1994. The rest of the equipment would be transferred to allies, returned to CONUS, or moved to the Middle East.

[24] Les Aspin and William Dickinson, *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 9–10, 15–16, 23–24, 44.

Les Aspin takes the oath of office as secretary of defense.

The Army Staff also had to determine rapidly which USAREUR equipment used in DESERT STORM would remain in the region, which would return to Europe, and which would return to the United States.[25]

Army plans proved unrealistic to pre-position materiel, rather than redeploy the hardware, for a complete armored or mechanized division in CENTCOM's area of operations. Problems in persuading friendly countries in the region to host the storage effort, along with the high costs of establishing a massive infrastructure from scratch, ensured that the division goal would be a long-term prospect. Although negotiations continued, by 1992 the Army and CENTCOM had redeployed all Army equipment from the gulf area except a battalion-sized "training set" in Kuwait.[26]

Failure to obtain either U.S. or host-nation funding to warehouse additional materiel in Saudi Arabia led HQDA to reexamine maritime

[25] Information Paper, Major Daze (DAMO-SSW), 25 Apr 1991, sub: Force Generation; Briefing Materials, "CINCEUR CFE Plan," both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[26] Office of the CSA, *Weekly Summary* XLII (17 Jan 1992) No. 3, pp. 5–7; ODCSOPS Briefing Materials, "Strategic Mobility Concept and Strategy," 15 Feb 1991, File 91-00155, Vuono Papers, MHI.

pre-positioning options. Having placed a pre-positioned infantry brigade set of equipment on Military Sealift Command ships in the Pacific from 1963 to 1966, the Army was somewhat familiar with pre-positioning afloat. The deputy chief of staff for operations and plans in February 1980 had proposed to the joint chiefs that an armored cavalry regiment store a complete set of unit equipment afloat in CENTCOM's predecessor organization's area of operations.[27] Because of higher priority POMCUS shortages and marked differences in shipping requirements, the JCS instead had selected the alternative, unit equipment for a Marine Amphibious Brigade (Marine Amphibious Brigades were redesignated Marine Expeditionary Brigades in the late 1980s). The Marine force had been based afloat in the Indian Ocean for nearly ten years before DESERT STORM, but it lacked much of the heavy equipment needed for sustained combat in the desert and other combat service support. The CENTCOM pre-positioning issue remained unresolved until 1993, when HQDA obtained Defense Department approval for the combination of a brigade set pre-positioned afloat and one pre-positioned ashore. This Army program continued to raise questions of roles and functions, however, with some advocates of Marine programs proposing that pre-positioning at sea be an exclusively Marine function.[28]

Base Realignment and Closure

While the Army's strategic planners wrestled with matters of forward presence and force projection, the service became involved in the issue of streamlining military installations. Based on a 1988 congressional authorization, the secretary of defense that year had established a commission to recommend closure and realignment of defense facilities, decisions that always had significant political repercussions. The commission was to give the secretary a list of installations recommended for realignment or closure; by previous agreement, Congress could disapprove the entire list but not reject individual items. Called the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, it recommended, and the secretary approved, the closing over the next several years of several small Army headquarters posts such as Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and the Presidio of San Francisco. Responding to Defense Department requests,

[27] The U.S. Readiness Command assigned to its Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force contingency responsibility for the Middle East from 1979 to 1984, when CENTCOM assumed this mission.

[28] JCS 1454/161, "Service Recommendations for Prepositioned Sealift Package in the Persian Gulf," 8 Feb 1980; Information Paper, DAMH-HDO, "Forward Floating Depot in the Pacific Theater," 19 Feb 1991, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Congress legislated additional "rounds" of base closure actions in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with the president appointing a separate commission for each round. In each case the commissioners worked closely with HQDA and the other services to make the most sensible recommendations.

Although the first commission had recommended closing only a few installations, the subsequent panels could significantly reduce the number of Army training installations. Most of the Army's CONUS installations had been constructed during the World War II mobilization and were not large enough to meet current unit training standards.[29] Unlike after World War I, when the War Department disposed of most of its division-sized training posts, the Army after World War II retained a number of "excess" facilities for mobilization contingencies. Army reserve components used inactive or "mothballed" facilities for training during peacetime, and the Army reactivated several posts during the Korean and Vietnam wars. To meet increasingly stringent Defense Department standards of habitability, the Army modernized barracks at active installations after the Korean War and built housing for military dependents.[30]

The Base Force provided a framework for the 1991 and later commissions to close now-"surplus" Army installations and generate savings in operations and maintenance budgets. Closure, rather than mothballing, of Army training posts posed definite military risks. The 1991 BRAC Commission, for example, based its analysis on plans for a twelve-division active Army with only eight divisions based in the continental United States. Consequently, the commission recommended closing one active-division post, Fort Ord, California, along with Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and other, smaller posts. These recommendations were potentially more damaging to the Army than those of the 1989 commission, because they reduced the Army's flexibility to return the three forward-presence divisions (two Europe, one Korea) to bases in the United States if political pressures mandated this course. The 1991 BRAC proposals also included the disposal of several Army cantonments with modernized facilities that would be valuable for mobilization. Despite these drawbacks, the president approved the recommendations, Congress acquiesced, and they became law. More than the cuts in active forces, the 1991 base closure actions

[29] The contemporary Training Circular 25-1 set a minimum of 82,000 maneuver acres for an armored or mechanized infantry battalion to conduct the full range of unit training, with a desired minimum of 200,000 acres once ranges, cantonment areas, and other facilities were included.

[30] John B. Wilson, "Facilities for Mobilization in the Twentieth Century," in "Historical Survey of U.S. Mobilization: Eight Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century," ed. David F. Trask, Manuscript CMH 146, Historical Resources Branch, CMH, pp. 10–13, 20–21, 31–33.

reduced the Army's ability to "reconstitute" forces rapidly to respond to changing strategic requirements.[31]

Political pressures to offset loss of employment in the local economy favored immediate reuse of closed installations rather than their retention in mothball status for mobilization and other military purposes. Critics argued that recommendations tended to ignore the impact of a base closure on the nearby installations of other services, or on the active and reserve component units from other services that often relied on the closed installation. Hazardous waste cleanup costs associated with the closings, and the Army's inability to sell property rather than transfer it to other government agencies, also threatened to diminish planned savings. Consequently, base realignment and closure actions became controversial for both military and political reasons.[32]

HQDA Redesign, 1992

By the time General Gordon R. Sullivan became Army chief of staff on 21 June 1991, HQDA's focus had shifted away from DESERT STORM and back to reshaping a smaller Army. His predecessor, General Vuono, had eschewed a major reorganization during his tour, because he believed it would be too disruptive to conduct simultaneously with the major reductions and redeployments already under way. Pressure built rapidly on Sullivan, however, to implement the Base Force reductions. At the same time, he faced ever-declining budgets with no end in sight. Various Army leaders, including TRADOC Commander General John W. Foss, recommended branch and major command consolidations as well as tactical reorganizations. Furthermore, Defense Management Review recommendations met with growing approval in a Congress eager to consolidate overlapping service support functions, especially in the medical area, in order to save money. Several key congressional leaders believed such an

[31] For instance, in January 2000, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management estimated that it would cost $3.55 billion in FY 2000 dollars to build the facilities for one mechanized division post alone, should the Army need to expand its CONUS base structure in the future. Interv, Mark Sherry with Mr. Michael Ryan, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), HQDA, 5 Jan 2000.

[32] Memo, Col Albert J. Genetti, Jr. (DACS-DM), 18 Mar 1991, sub: BRAC 91 Final Report, File 91-00166, Vuono Papers, MHI; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Jack LeCuyer, 17 May 1994, Pentagon; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Michael V. Harper, 13 Apr 1994, Pentagon, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with Gen John W. Foss, USA, Ret., 1 Mar 1994, Williamsburg, Va., Oral History Activity, CMH; Stephen E. Bower, *The American Army in the Heartland: A History of Fort Benjamin Harrison, 1903–1995* (Indianapolis: Indiana Creative Arts, 1996), pp. 443–444.

Army Secretary Stone swearing in General Sullivan as Army chief of staff

amalgamation could deliver defense budget savings and thus relieve pressure on the Army's budget. These external efforts, however, imperiled any remaining stimulus from the Antaeus study that might have encouraged HQDA to influence the Army's destiny.

HQDA's first priority was to stay ahead of declining budgets through timely unit and manpower reductions. One way to do so was to accelerate personnel separations and thus overtake reductions postponed because of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A combination of voluntary incentives and involuntary personnel actions thus reduced the Army by more than 100,000 military personnel in 1992. Needless to say, the process of essentially "pink slipping" so many career soldiers after a successful but arduous desert campaign was somewhat distressing.[33]

Mindful of the cuts being taken by the field army, the service leaders also sought to streamline the Army's headquarters. On 14 October 1992, Under Secretary of the Army John W. Shannon and Vice Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer chartered a Headquarters Redesign Study to do just that. With the goal of creating an "optimal structure" for a smaller and more efficient Department of the Army (DA) headquarters,

[33] Reno interv, 5 Jan 1993; Interv, Dwight Oland with Lt Gen William H. Reno, U.S. Army, Ret., 17 Feb 1993, Washington, D.C.; both Oral History Activity, CMH; Harper interv, 13 Apr 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

the effort also reflected Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone's overall desire to reorganize the Army before OSD imposed its own version of restructuring on the service.[34]

Under Secretary of the Army Shannon

In its deliberations, the study group consulted with HQDA principals and found widespread differences of opinion about reorganization that stemmed largely from perceptions of the Goldwater-Nichols experience. Most officials agreed that the Army needed a more streamlined headquarters but disagreed on its final form. Several Army Staff officers believed that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation had shifted to the Army Secretariat too many essential functions, such as research, development, and acquisition, which required day-to-day coordination and direction of the Army Staff. Conversely, other officials wanted to remove more functions from the Army Staff, recommending, for example, placing the Office of the Judge Advocate General under the General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Few, however, disagreed with the argument that the headquarters needed to focus most of its efforts on Defense Department Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System functions.[35]

Lacking both time and a mandate for a sweeping redesign that would have required legislative approval in any case, the Shannon-Reimer study accepted the existing headquarters structure. It sought efficiencies through better alignment of functions with statutory responsibilities. The Army's leadership approved the study's recommendations on 15 January 1993. The limited reorganization added an assistant chief of staff for installation management to the Army Staff and mandated

[34] Charter of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Transformation Group, 14 Oct 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[35] In *Command of the Seas* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 96, former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., estimated that 80 percent of the personnel in the military departmental headquarters were engaged in PPBS processes during a normal year.

General Reimer's swearing-in ceremony as Army chief of staff

a reduction of field operating agencies and staff support agencies from 113 to 72 by 1997. Headquarters manpower was to decline from 3,105 to 2,536 during the same period, and FOA/SSA strengths from 47,487 to 33,792.[36]

The 1992 Roles and Missions Study

While the Shannon-Reimer Study was under way, the Defense Department undertook a much more significant streamlining effort. Goldwater-Nichols mandated a triennial JCS Roles and Missions Study in 1992. Unlike the chairman's earlier Base Force study, the new roles and missions study offered an opportunity to adapt existing service capabilities to evolving national military strategy and to design a joint force for the future. Service critics had argued that the Defense Management Review attempted to impose civilian concepts of business efficiencies on military organizations. The chairman's study group intended, instead, to solicit military input on how to reduce overlap-

[36] *Shannon-Reimer HQDA Transformation Study, Final Report*, 16 Apr 1993, Historical Resources Branch, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with Maj Gen Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., 14 Dec 1992, Pentagon, and LeCuyer interv, 17 May 1994, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

ping functions among the services and consolidate similar capabilities in a more holistic manner. The task was soon to prove exceedingly difficult.

With congressional pressure to consolidate duplicative defense functions increasing, those working on the chairman's study soon proposed consolidations of combat and support capabilities. Their recommendations, however, sparked significant service opposition. The status quo was at risk, and stakes were high, with opportunities for services to gain ever-scarcer resources at the expense of others. The results might also produce consolidations, removing, for example, certain intelligence and logistical functions from the services, and consolidating them under defense agencies. Alarmed, Army leaders sought to forestall major reorganization until completion of Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," which was still undergoing revisions and would not be approved until September 1993, after the chairman's study. With neither a common warfighting nor a common support doctrine, Army leaders contended that realignments of roles and functions were premature. The other services found similar reasons for caution.

Service objections slowed Joint Staff recommendations for major consolidations of functions. The Army objected specifically to proposals for consolidation of service organizations for space, theater-level intelligence mergers, and a modification to the Unified Command Plan that would assign the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) responsibility for the readiness and joint training of CONUS-based Army and Air Force units. General Sullivan argued that the consolidations of space and intelligence activities threatened to reduce battlefield capabilities that were essential to the soldier. He also contended that the Atlantic Command, if accountable for both a geographic area of responsibility and CONUS readiness, would have too great a span of control to be effective.

These objections led to deferrals on decisions regarding the first two issues but not the last. JCS Chairman Powell approved assignment of CONUS-based service tactical/TO&E units to ACOM. The JCS study, however, avoided definitive recommendations concerning overlaps between Army and Marine contingency forces. It circumvented the issue by asserting that, despite growing overlaps in conventional ground force capabilities for contingency operations, the two forces remained "complementary," not duplicative. The Joint Staff also postponed decisions on depot maintenance consolidations pending further study. Except for the Atlantic Command decision, the JCS study thus avoided contentious issues and recommended limited consolidations. The outcome of

the chairman's study, as might be expected, hardly assuaged congressional criticism of residual overlaps in the defense establishment.[37]

The momentum that the Antaeus and Quicksilver studies might have given the Army going into the post–Cold War strategic reshaping had dissipated by the end of 1992. Now on the defensive, the service was fighting to retain capabilities and reshape its tactical and institutional forces in the face of accelerating budget reductions. Goldwater-Nichols had indeed changed HQDA's influence within the Defense Department. The JCS chairman wielded his new authority in developing the Base Force, circumventing the PPBS process in the absence of service support and forcing change on the services. Consequently, the Base Force was controversial, reducing operational forces without undertaking proportionately severe infrastructure reductions or aggressively attempting to rationalize service roles and functions. The 1992 roles and functions study could have complemented the DMR studies and streamlined the Defense Department to offset some of the Base Force's reductions in capabilities, with improvements in both efficiency and effectiveness. Instead the Defense Department left this task for the next administration. Time would tell how well the new Clinton administration's national security team would work with the Army to reshape the service for a new era while meeting ever-growing contingency requirements.

[37] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Feb 1993), pp. II-6 to II-7, III-35 to III-51; Memo, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 Jan 1993, sub: Review of Draft Report, "Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col William Foster (DAMO-SSW), 25 Feb 1994, Pentagon; Reimer interv, 31 Jan 1994; Harper interv, 13 Apr 1994; LeCuyer interv, 17 May 1994, all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Powell's Roles and Missions Report Retains Services' Redundancies," *Armed Forces Journal International* (March 1993): 10.

Chapter 5
Change from Above

President William J. Clinton entered office in January 1993, a fortuitous time to be the nation's commander in chief and influential leader among the world's democracies. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies were enjoying the dawning of what the previous president had termed "a New World Order." Although he had campaigned primarily on a domestic political agenda, the incoming president called for another comprehensive strategic review. The new effort would focus on reducing costs of national security programs while assessing the security needs of the future.

A question for Army leaders was the extent to which they could influence the process and outcome of this review. Further external efforts to restructure the Army seemed imminent. Congress clearly desired to shape decisions on key defense issues, especially those involving roles, missions, and functions. The Base Force had shown that OSD and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could impose major cuts on the services with little input from below. A key question for the Army's leadership was whether OSD and the Joint Staff in undertaking Clinton's strategic review would invite open participation by the Army and the other services, as the chairman's roles and missions study group had in 1992, or whether it would develop concepts in isolation and impose them on the services.

The Bottom-Up Review, 1993

During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton had stressed that the Soviet collapse would now allow the United States to cut military forces by as much as 200,000 below Base Force levels and reap additional budget savings. His new secretary of defense, Les Aspin, was on record as favoring further force reductions even before his nomination for office. As chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Aspin in January 1992 had begun to dispute the assumption that the Base Force provided the minimum force levels and military capabilities for the new era. Although the Base Force study had anticipated Soviet retrenchment, it had not predicted a complete breakup of the Soviet Union, a fortuitous

circumstance allowing additional reductions in U.S. military forces. During the next month, Aspin and his committee staff had developed four "illustrative options" for sizing future U.S. conventional forces. All four would reduce force levels beyond those of the Base Force, cutting Army forces to between eight and ten divisions. The options would also reduce the defense budget by $91 billion to $114 billion between 1993 and 1997.[1]

With his prior congressional staff work as background, Aspin launched a Bottom-Up Review, or BUR, in March 1993, shortly after his confirmation as secretary of defense. This strategic review's name reflected its methodology. The Base Force study had recommended preserving what might be viewed as excess military capabilities as a hedge against an uncertain future. For the BUR, Aspin directed OSD and the Joint Staff to develop a new national military strategy and build forces "from the bottom up," focusing on military units and capabilities rather than raw numbers. The study was to undertake a threat assessment of the post–Cold War era, develop a new national military strategy, and recommend the military forces and equipment to support it.[2]

Unlike the Base Force study, the BUR incorporated both OSD and limited service participation at its outset. Rather than center the study in the Joint Staff, Aspin created a series of "task forces" with OSD and Joint Staff co-chairs as well as representatives from the services, unified commands, and defense agencies. Individual task forces focused on key issues, including strategy, force structure, force modernization, and infrastructure. Service representatives participated in discussions, aware that, although they could contribute to options developed by each task force, they could not "veto" or forestall these options.[3]

As a matter of expediency, the Bottom-Up Review adopted Aspin's prior work in the House of Representatives, as well as the president's national security strategy that called for "engagement, prevention, and partnership." The review undertook its threat assessment concurrently

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[1] Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options* (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992); Colin L. Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 579–580; James A. Winnefeld, *The Post–Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects*, RAND Report Number RAND R-4243-JS (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992), pp. 1–6.

[2] Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), pp. 3–4.

[3] Ibid.; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col William Foster (DAMO-SSW), 25 Feb 1994, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

with OSD's and the Joint Staff's preparation of a draft national military strategy. Congruent with Aspin's vision of a post–Cold War security environment, the study discarded Base Force plans for a major regional contingency (MRC) in Europe. It also linked notional Middle Eastern (MRC-East) and Asian contingencies (MRC-West) to immediate real-world threats: the Middle Eastern contingency now focused on an Iraqi or Iranian invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the East Asian scenario was a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The draft strategy also identified "smaller scale operations," including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other intervention operations, as well as overseas presence operations. It thus moved significantly beyond Base Force assumptions.[4]

Having directed that the study focus on force requirements for two, near-simultaneous, major regional contingencies, OSD officials quickly found their initial assumptions somewhat ambitious. Their first assessments of the force requirements for two major regional contingencies, for example, examined scenarios in which "short-warning" attacks by Iraq and North Korea rapidly overwhelmed existing regional defenses of the United States and its allies. In the Korean short-warning scenario, for instance, United Nations forces failed to halt North Korean forces at or near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The analysis offered a similarly pessimistic assessment in the event of an MRC-East short-warning scenario. Consequently, each theater required strong ground forces to constitute a "decisive force." Such a requirement was hardly welcome by a study group that aimed to reconcile national military strategy with declining defense budgets.[5]

Not surprisingly, OSD officials balked at the cost of forces for two simultaneous, or even near-simultaneous, major regional contingencies as planned in the Base Force strategy. The near-simultaneous scenario assumed that conflict in the second theater would commence directly following the outbreak of hostilities in the first. Instead of basing active component force requirements on two concurrent major regional contingencies, OSD directed the Bottom-Up Review's task forces to study a concept that emerged from Aspin's 1992 congressional studies. In the case of simultaneous major regional contingencies, a "win-hold-win" option called for fighting one contingency through to conclusion and "holding," or halting aggression, in the other theater. After a successful counterattack in the first major regional contingency, the services would

[4] Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 3, 7–9.

[5] Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000: Force Packages to Meet New Dangers," 8 May 1993, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

"reconstitute" the first contingency's forces in theater, except for "post-conflict stability" forces. The reconstituted units would then redeploy to conclude operations in the second theater.

Aspin's congressional study suggested that early-deploying U.S. air power alone could hold the aggressor in the second theater until reconstituted naval and ground forces could arrive. Conversely, Joint Staff analyses concluded that 2 to 3 divisions, 9 tactical air wings, and 3 carrier battle groups would be adequate to hold in the second contingency. The Joint Staff argued that this force might have to conduct defensive operations for a protracted time before receiving the "swing" forces from the other theater. Some members of the task forces questioned whether a U.S. ground force of several light divisions would even deter, or could respond adequately to, a second major contingency.[6] By the summer of 1993 the win-hold-win option had thus disappeared from consideration, but such debates had set the Bottom-Up Review back several months.

Representatives from HQDA's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) and Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E) had observed the early stages of the BUR with growing misgivings. Army analyses concluded that the decisive force for each theater would have to include 2 corps headquarters, 7 divisions, and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Yet Army representatives were unable to secure endorsement from either the Joint Staff or OSD for these force levels. Instead, the Bottom-Up Review implicitly endorsed the win-hold-win force option of deploying only two or three divisions to the "hold" theater, whatever the practicality of such a strategy. This position would allow the study to recommend reducing the number of Army active divisions to ten and the number of active personnel to 495,000, with an estimated cost saving of $5 billion to $6.5 billion from 1994 through 1999.[7]

After more than seven months of study, the Bottom-Up Review's task forces submitted their recommendations to the secretary of defense. Aspin announced his decisions in October 1993, endorsing the recommended force reductions. Outgoing JCS Chairman Powell argued that the Bottom-Up Review essentially resulted in "a defense based on the need

[6] Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000," Historian's Background Files, CMH; Aspin, *Report of the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 29–30; *DPG 1995–1999*, p. 9; Winnefeld, *Post–Cold War Force-Sizing Debate*, pp. 3–4, 9, 61–63; Powell, *My American Journey*, pp. 579–580.

[7] Foster interv, 25 Feb 1994; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Michael Harper, CSA's Staff Group, 13 Apr 1994, Pentagon; Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000," all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Table—Proposed Reductions in Force: A Comparison Between Studies

Service	*Base Force*	*Bottom-Up Review*
Army	12 active divisions	10 active divisions
	6 reserve divisions	5+ reserve divisions (including 15 "enhanced readiness brigades")
	535,000 active personnel	495,000 active personnel
Navy	12 carrier battle groups	11 carrier battle groups
	432 ships	346 ships
	502,000 active personnel	394,100 active personnel
Air Force	15 active tactical wings	13 active tactical wings
	11 reserve tactical wings	7 active tactical wings
	436,000 active personnel	390,388 active personnel
Marine Corps. . .	3 marine expeditionary forces	3 marine expeditionary forces
	159,000 active personnel	174,000 active personnel

Source: Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), pp. 28–29; Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, *The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)*, part 1, *Summary and Program Element Detail Fiscal Years 1995–1999* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 Sep 1993), p. 5; *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 41–42; Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000," all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

to fight two regional wars, the Bush strategy, but with Clinton campaign cuts." Aspin programmed Bottom-Up Review reductions through 1999. In all cases but one, these reductions exceeded those of the Base Force study (*Table*).

The Marine Corps managed to increase its end strength from the Base Force's 159,000 to 174,000 (marine expeditionary forces were task-organized, air-ground teams consisting of the equivalent of two or more marine expeditionary brigades). The Marines succeeded by arguing that Base Force study reductions would drive their peacetime "personnel tempo" (PERSTEMPO) to one of 65 percent of troops in tactical units, either deployed from home station or undergoing training in the field. The Marine argument assumed, however, that the United States would maintain the same numbers of Marine units forward-deployed on unaccompanied tours in Okinawa. The objections of the Army and other services to reductions were unsuccessful.[8]

[8] Powell, *My American Journey*, p. 579; Collins, *National Military Strategy, the DoD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan*, p. 24; Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-*

The Defense Department thereafter sought to validate through further analysis the force levels that the Bottom-Up Review had recommended to fight two "near-simultaneous major regional conflicts." The BUR developed a standard "building block" for a major regional contingency that comprised 4–5 Army divisions, 4–5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force tactical wings, 100 heavy bombers, 4–5 carrier battle groups (CVBGs), and special operations forces. In addition to forces for major regional contingencies, the study also delineated "the prudent level of forces that should be planned for a major intervention or peace enforcement operation," which, although smaller than force requirements for a major regional contingency, still was formidable.[9] These forces would come from the same active forces planned for the two major regional contingencies, thus theoretically precluding execution of all these tasks simultaneously. Despite the planning for conducting two major regional contingencies while undertaking simultaneous smaller operations, the BUR study proponents apparently discounted the likelihood of such a scenario that would require a Base Force level of forces. Thus Aspin's final BUR report argued that "to maintain forces of this size would require additional resources, thereby eliminating any 'peace dividend' the American people are expecting as a result of the end of the Cold War. Yet our analysis showed that, despite this larger investment, [the larger force] would provide only a small increment of increased military capability." The report promised that programmed "force enhancements"—modernization and other improvements—would succeed in offsetting the reduced capability resulting from the greater cuts in force levels.[10]

The Army leaders grudgingly accepted the Bottom-Up Review's force levels in exchange for the promised "force enhancements" and the maintenance of the active Army's readiness. BUR force enhancements included better strategic mobility through the pre-position of unit equipment in theater as well as the continued production of C–17s and purchase of Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ships;

Up Review, pp. 28–29; Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, *The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)*, part 1, *Summary and Program Element Detail Fiscal Years 1995–1999* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 Sep 1993), p. 5; *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 41–42; Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000," all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[9] The *DPG 1995–1999* came up with a slightly larger ground force, noting that this "total set of forces might be needed to conduct the most demanding peace enforcement operations we envision." *DPG 1995–1999*, p. 19.

[10] Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 18–23, 30; *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 17–19; Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Force for 2000," Historian's Background Files, CMH.

improvement in strike capabilities of carrier battle groups and long-range bombers through the use of "smart" conventional munitions and "brilliant" antiarmor weapons; and the upgrade of munitions for Army deep-attack missiles and conventional tube artillery.[11]

To counter Army objections to cutting the active force to ten divisions, the Defense Department assented to converting fifteen Army National Guard combat brigades to "enhanced readiness brigades." Because of readiness problems with the three National Guard brigades mobilized for DESERT STORM, the Army had refused to deploy them to the theater while they underwent retraining in the United States that lasted through the Gulf War.[12] The Office of the Secretary of Defense now directed the Army to upgrade the training and materiel readiness of the fifteen selected brigades to the point that they could deploy at a fully ready "C-1" level shortly after mobilization. But whether such an unprecedented readiness posture for Army reserve component maneuver units could be achieved was questionable. Furthermore, with increasing pressures to cut the Army's reserve components, OSD's action threatened to ignite a competition between the active Army and the Army National Guard over missions and resources. Although the Base Force study had opened the door to such discord by recommending that the Army National Guard be assigned responsibility for mobilizing and deploying most of the forces needed for a major regional conflict in Europe, the BUR threatened to drive a much deeper wedge between Army components.[13]

In sum, even with "force enhancements" modernization, many Army leaders doubted that the Army force levels prescribed by the Bottom-Up Review would be adequate to support either the present or the proposed national military strategy. The active forces would be strained to provide a decisive force for two, near-simultaneous, major regional contingencies, to say nothing of what the stress would be were they required to divert units to participate in concurrent operations. Yet Army criticisms focused more on the study's force analysis and its analytical "tools" than its basic assumptions.

The Joint Staff had analyzed the two major regional contingencies through scenarios that strategists in its Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5) had developed. These scenarios included "excursions" of "baseline" scenarios that examined operational variables,

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[11] Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 19–20, 93–94.

[12] Department of the Army Inspector General, "Special Assessment: National Guard Brigades' Mobilization," 14 Jun 1991, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[13] *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 30–33, 41; Foster interv, 25 Feb 1994; Harper interv, 13 Apr 1994; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Jack LeCuyer, ODSCOPS Initiatives Group, 17 May 1994, Pentagon, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

such as arrival times of units and deployment of different types of units than those planned. The Joint Staff did not attempt "weapons of mass destruction" excursions, however, because existing analytical tools could not easily measure such weapons' effects on a conventional ground campaign.[14]

After the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5) developed the Joint Staff's "illustrative planning scenarios," analysts in the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J–8) developed studies to analyze military capabilities to meet the requirements for two major regional contingencies. They relied on an established Tactical Warfare (TACWAR) model for the force-on-force analyses of the two conflicts. Army critics noted, however, that the TACWAR model had been developed for theater-level analysis in Europe. Although it could break down a theater into a number of "pistons," or subtheaters, TACWAR was more an operational than a tactical model and derived its results through the simulated attrition of opposing forces. TACWAR lacked an integral capability for analysis of ground maneuver options, including envelopment or flanking attacks. Similarly, it could measure the impact of tactical air only in broad terms. TACWAR's relatively unsophisticated analytical ability in any circumstances other than direct force-on-force attrition required "manual input" of a wide variety of variable data on issues, including readiness, maneuver, and command and control. The Army's operations staff, supported by the Concepts Analysis Agency, an Army research organization, disputed many of the values that the Joint Staff placed on each variable.[15]

Concurrent with its analysis of force capabilities, levels, and costs, the BUR sought to outline a new military strategy based on a reevaluation of future threats. Its analysts rejected equating the tenuous new Confederation of Independent States with the former Soviet Union. Instead, OSD and the Joint Staff focused on the Russian state itself but considered it a declining military threat, unlikely to assume superpower status for at least a decade or to engage in aggression on its neighbors over the near term. They recommended, however, that the United States continue to maintain a reconstitution capability as a hedge against "a

[14] Interv, Mark Sherry with Dr. Robin Buckelew, Strategic Synchronization Cell, 5 May 1997, Pentagon; Interv, Mark Sherry with Gen John W. Foss, U.S. Army, Ret., 1 Mar 1994, Williamsburg, Va., both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[15] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mobility Requirements Study*, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 June 1993), pp. A-3 to A-5; Col (USA, Ret.) Raoul Henri Alcala, "U.S. Army Participation in the Bottom-Up Review," prepared for Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 12 Oct 1993, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Russia that might return to anti-Western national objectives and undertake to reassert its full military potential."[16]

The new strategy confirmed the focus already adopted by the Bottom-Up Review's force analysis. It identified regional powers in the Middle East and Asia as posing the principal near-term threats to U.S. interests. For example, the primary scenario for the major regional contingency in the Middle East (MRC-East) was a defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against aggression from a rearmed Iraq. Lesser regional contingencies (LRCs), primarily peace enforcement and intervention operations, composed the final category of threat emphasized by the new strategy. The Bottom-Up Review envisioned the United States contributing to lesser regional contingencies as a member of a multinational force. The new strategy planned for sending troops to a lesser regional contingency, if the United States had the requisite forces that could deploy rapidly and the contingency offered a "high probability of success," promised "minimal U.S. casualties," would enjoy "sustained support" from the public, and would allow the United States to "disengage on our own terms."[17]

Strategically, the Bottom-Up Review reaffirmed the maintenance of U.S. forward-presence forces in Europe and Asia but at reduced strengths and costs. It lowered forces in Europe to a hundred thousand, cutting each of the two Army divisions there to two brigades, with the third brigade returning to the United States. The new review justified these force levels as essential to "preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO" rather than to pursue a more tangible military need. Such a posture suggested only a temporary justification for force levels until it was clearer how NATO would evolve. Maintaining U.S. forces in Europe would also underline Washington's commitment to NATO and perhaps temper the already precipitous decline in the forces of its NATO allies. Although insecurity about North Korea postponed further reduction of the hundred thousand U.S. troops in East Asia, the Defense Department's 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative, which called for redeploying at least one more Army brigade from Korea to CONUS, remained suspended, not rejected. A decisive break from its predecessors, the Bottom-Up Review's strategy portended greater changes to come.[18]

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[16] *DPG 1995–1999*, p. 11.

[17] Quotes from *DPG 1995–1999*, p. 14, and see also pp. 1–13, 15, 23–29. Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 5–12.

[18] *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 19–21; William E. Berry, Jr., *The Invitation to Struggle: Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, May 1996), pp. 12–14. The

Critics noted several contradictions within the Bottom-Up Review. Although the BUR claimed that the four to five Army divisions were adequate to successfully prosecute a major regional conflict, the defense guidance hedged, asserting that "this force should be sufficient under conditions where we stop the enemy's offensive short of its primary objective. This should not be taken to imply that we might not commit more forces than these in a single MRC." Like the Base Force study, the Bottom-Up Review simply reduced forces without expanding on the chairman's recent study of roles, missions, and functions to consolidate military capabilities that overlapped services. The study also ignored recently completed and ongoing Defense Management Review studies, which offered options for consolidations within the Defense Department's infrastructure. Instead, OSD simply noted in planning and programming guidance that "opportunities for savings through consolidation, both within and across Services and Agencies, must also be pursued."[19]

Both supporters and critics of the Bottom-Up Review accepted that U.S. forces would likely become increasingly involved in "lesser regional contingencies." Yet the study failed to account for the increasing demands that these operations would place on Army resources. And it offered little justification for reducing Army forces while keeping the Marine Corps force structure above the five marine expeditionary brigades that could be deployed by existing sealift (slightly more than two by Navy amphibious shipping and three by maritime pre-positioning shipping). Instead, the Bottom-Up Review implied that Marine and Army ground units were interchangeable for both major and lesser contingencies. Such a position disregarded major differences in doctrine, training, leader development, and logistics that complicated operations involving the two services and thus made extensive planning for them mandatory. Finally, having justified Army force reductions on the basis of the Soviet demise, the review failed to justify the continued existence of the Navy's huge surface, carrier, and submarine fleets. The nation had built these ships to counter the now precipitously declining former Soviet navy, and no peer competitor was on the horizon. The huge nuclear arsenal maintained by the air and naval services fell into the same category. It appeared to critics that the Bottom-Up Review's results were shaped as much by budget considerations and each service's perceived strength on Capitol Hill as

withdrawal of the Army brigade in Korea was scheduled for implementation in the mid-1990s.

[19] *DPG 1995–1999*, pp. 17, 53; Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, pp. 85–86.

by a rational response to a new national military strategy. Once again, the "squeaky wheels" had gotten the grease.[20]

The Commission on Roles and Missions, 1994–1995

Like the Base Force study before it, the Bottom-Up Review cut operational forces while leaving infrastructure (headquarters, doctrine centers, and schools) largely intact. Such uneven reductions supported criticisms that Defense Department reshaping plans had preserved supporting "tail" structure at the expense of warfighting "teeth." Critics argued that bloated service headquarters continued to compete with each other and promote often duplicative forces and programs. The competition and duplication within the department, along with declining defense budgets, only threatened to exacerbate interservice rivalry and make effective reshaping even more difficult. A few voices even began to question the value of service participation in program planning, noting that the Base Force study and Bottom-Up Review each circumvented existing planning, programming, and budgeting processes to reach seemingly integrated results.[21]

Again Congress reasserted its prerogatives in national security decision making, as it had done with the Base Force. This time the legislature expressed its disapproval of the "egregious" overlap in functions among the services. The Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, Senator Sam Nunn, noted on 2 July 1992 that he believed there were at least ten areas of overlap among service tactical and support capabilities that needed consolidation. These areas included air power, contingency or expeditionary ground forces, theater air defenses, space operations, helicopter forces, intelligence, functional organizations and activities, logistics and support activities, administrative and management headquarters, and National Guard and reserve component forces.[22] The 1992 Chairman's Roles and Missions Study, with its gradual, evolutionary approach, failed to satisfy Nunn and other congressional critics of "wasteful duplication" within the Defense Department. The House Armed Services Committee chairman, Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, joined

[20] Foss interv, 4 Mar 1994; Harper interv, 13 Apr 1994; LeCuyer interv, 17 May 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, February 1994), pp. 30–32, 34–40.

[21] See, for example, Odom, *America's Military Revolution*, pp. 134–137.

[22] See floor speech by Senator Sam Nunn, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Service's Roles and Missions," 2 Jul 1992, CORM Background Material, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

his Senate colleague in seeking reform. Dellums ensured that the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act directed the secretary of defense to establish an independent "Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces."[23]

Congress directed the secretary to appoint an independent panel composed of seven members (Congress later authorized expansion of the panel to eleven members). The legislation required that the commission examine critically, "evaluate and report" on "alternative allocations of," and recommend changes in the "definition and distribution" of current roles, missions, and functions. The secretary of defense was to appoint commission members, and the commission was to report, within one year of its first meeting, to the congressional armed services committees, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After consulting with the chairman, the secretary was to submit his comments to the committees within ninety days of receiving the report.

The transition between the outgoing secretary of defense, Les Aspin, and the new one, William J. Perry, delayed the appointment of members until the spring of 1994. Perry selected Dr. John P. White of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government to serve as commission chairman. The other members of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) included Perry's predecessor as secretary of defense and four recently retired general officers, one from each service. The secretary assigned the commission leased office space in Rosslyn, Virginia, and provided resources for a full-time staff. The commission appointed an executive director, who in turn coordinated the detail of selected staff members from DoD. Each service provided two colonel-level staff members, and the Joint Staff, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Army Reserve, and the Air National Guard each provided one colonel. OSD's Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate also contributed several staff members, and the commission hired other staff members on contract. Finally, the commission obtained analytical support from several major contractors, including the four federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs): the Rand Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Logistics Management Institute.[24] Meeting about once a month, the commission

[23] Odom, *America's Military Revolution*, pp. 123–124; Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., Center of Military History, with Mr. Archie D. Barrett, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 19 Sep 1995, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[24] Memo, Army Roles and Missions Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA (DAMO-ZM), for Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, Aug 1994, sub: John White, Directorate of Roles and Missions Files, CMH; Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Mr.

operated in an open forum and invited HQDA and the other service headquarters to participate.

Unlike in the Bottom-Up Review in which HQDA staff agencies dealt directly with OSD and Joint Staff counterparts, HQDA established a temporary directorate as a focal point for Army actions involving the commission. Headed by Brig. Gen. John Costello, the Roles and Missions Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans assumed responsibility on 22 June 1994 for coordination between the Army and the commission. At its peak the Army's Roles and Missions Directorate had a colonel as deputy, an executive officer, nine action officers (majors and lieutenant colonels), a judge advocate, and a historian. Each action officer became the HQDA point of contact for several of the issues under deliberation by the commission. By the time the commission began debating alternatives in the autumn of 1994, the Army's Roles and Missions Directorate had a written campaign plan with Army positions on each likely issue.[25]

General Costello as a lieutenant general later in his career

Because the commission was undertaking the second study of roles, missions, and functions during General Sullivan's tour as chief of staff, HQDA already had positions on most issues. As with the 1992 Chairman's Roles and Missions Study, Army leaders were apprehensive that decisions based on inadequate analysis could damage critical warfighting capabilities. Also, they believed that the commission's work could ignite interservice rivalries by providing a forum for one or more services to attempt a "resources grab" of programs and functions of the others. Noting that

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Michael Leonard, Executive Director, CORM Staff, 26 Jun 1995, Rosslyn, Va.; Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Mr. Mark F. Cancian, Director, Infrastructure and Central Support Group, CORM Staff, 13 Jul 1995, Rosslyn, Va.; Interv, Mark Sherry with Mr. Philip Odeen, Chairman, National Defense Panel, 8 Apr 1998, Fairfax County, Va., all Oral History Activity, CMH.

[25] Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Brig Gen John Costello, 8 May 1995, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH.

the 1992 chairman's study had enjoyed the best professional input available from the Joint Staff and the services, Sullivan maintained that it had gone as far as possible to minimize duplications. He argued, contrary to Congress' perception, that any duplications existed only "at the margins" of principal service functions, and he opposed most of the infrastructure consolidations that the DMR had proposed and that Congress appeared to endorse. Despite the stated congressional intent for the CORM to make detailed recommendations leading to significant changes in the Defense Department, Perry wanted it to focus on savings through efficiencies, particularly in aircraft procurement programs, operational forces, and infrastructure, in order to fund additional modernization programs. Army leaders, in contrast, appeared unsure, and either unprepared or unwilling to capitalize on the commission's efforts to reshape the Army and the national defense structure.[26]

Meeting for the first time in May 1994, the commission first set its staff to work identifying and analyzing issues. The staff divided the issues they identified into six mission areas, each of which combined several of the twenty-one missions that the staff had derived from the national security strategy and the national military strategy. The staff then derived what they termed the "military components" of each mission and discrete tasks for each component, which they then compared with the services' functional capabilities affecting each task. Commission analysts found what they considered 328 problems involving overlaps. The staff reduced the number of issues to fifty-six by the commission's second meeting, on 23 September, at which time the commissioners selected twenty-six of them for further review.[27]

The commissioners invited the JCS chairman and the service chiefs to testify at the 23 September meeting. Army General John M. Shalikashvili, who had succeeded General Powell as JCS chairman in October 1993, urged the commission to protect warfighting capabilities for two major regional contingencies and to seek ways of "improving the joint fight." General Sullivan argued similarly, detailing the Army's focus on protecting and improving warfighting. The Navy and Marine

[26] Briefing Materials, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, to CORM, "Roles, Functions, and Missions," 14 Sep 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Msg, Gen Sullivan to Gen J. H. Binford Peay, CINC U.S. Central Command, 25 Jul 1995, sub: Roles and Missions, DAMO-ZM Executive Officer Files, CMH; Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army, Ret., 29 Mar 1996, Washington, D.C., Oral History Activity, CMH.

[27] Transcript, "Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Opening Meeting," Rosslyn, Va., 24 May 1994; CORM Briefing Materials, "Update and Initial Selection of Issues," 23 Sep 1994, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

General Shalikashvili being sworn in as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Corps took like positions that reflected comfort with the status quo. The Air Force chief of staff, General Merrill A. McPeak, broke with his peers, however, emphasizing the need for more "jointness" and rejecting the current balance of forces. McPeak gave the commissioners a detailed briefing that highlighted a number of overlapping operational capabilities among the services. He also recommended that the commission assess several specific overlaps across service capabilities. He proposed consolidations affecting Army, Navy, and Marine capabilities but made no similar suggestions regarding the Air Force. Although his briefing obviously breeched interservice collegiality, it set the stage for the work that followed.[28]

After the services and other interested parties made their presentations, the commission's staff spent the next six months examining the twenty-six issues that the commissioners had selected for further

[28] CORM Briefing Materials, "Update and Initial Selection of Issues," 23 Sep 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Chief of Staff's Presentations to the CORM, Army Roles and Missions Directorate Files, CMH; General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF, *Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 14 Sep 1994).

study. Most of the operational issues affected the Army directly. The perennial issue of Army and Marine Corps overlap in expeditionary and contingency forces quickly surfaced, with a focus on Army "light forces," including airborne, airmobile, and light infantry divisions. Other operational issues directly affecting the Army included headquarters for joint task forces, doctrine and forces for peace operations, and possible specialized "constabulary forces." Issues involving Army and Air Force overlaps that McPeak's briefing had highlighted included close air support, capabilities for "deep battle," service capabilities for theater missile defense and theater air defense, control over space operations, and airpower organization. The ten commission issues concerning infrastructure all affected the Army's support structure. Most of these infrastructure issues had already arisen during the 1992 Chairman's Roles and Missions Study or through the DMR. Although the commission's focus on twenty-six key issues left many major overlaps among service functions for other groups to study later, its staff and the Army's Roles and Missions Directorate were fully engaged in examining these issues in the time allotted.[29]

At least one commission study group evaluated infrastructure alternatives by weighing four criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, risk of "undesired consequences in key tasks," and "customer focus." Initial staff analysis developed at least three options, or courses of action, for each issue: maintaining the "status quo," consolidating, or otherwise restructuring.

The consolidation options generally covered old ground analyzed during the Defense Management Review. Unlike in the earlier effort, however, the commission's staff developed a conceptual framework for integrating consolidated support functions. Most of the commission's consolidation proposals also had options recommending the merger of certain functions into a consolidated OSD-level support organization in order to improve "horizontal" integration. The staff provided two models for this type of organization: a support "command" reporting to the JCS chairman and a "defense support organization" that reported to OSD. Either model would create a multifunctional support organization reminiscent of the World War II Army Service Forces.[30]

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[29] CORM, "Issue Status Review Update" Files, 18 Nov 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH. The Army's Roles and Missions Directorate maintained its own set of issue papers on each CORM issue, along with briefings that articulated the Army position on each issue.

[30] Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Col L. Patrick Wright, Deputy Director, Army Roles and Missions Directorate, 10 Mar 1995, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH; CORM, "December 14 Read-Ahead and Issue Review," CORM, "Issue Paper Reviews, February 19–20, 1995," and CORM, "Executive Summaries: Commission Meeting,

Although the defense establishment had been making slow but steady progress toward greater consolidations and unification, the commission rejected most options that would accelerate that trend. There were a few exceptions, however. Despite objections by HQDA, the commission did recommend assigning Army "operational support aircraft" to the Air Force. For most other infrastructure issues, the commission favored "outsourcing" as many support functions as possible to the private sector. Unlike consolidation, this approach to infrastructure reform was a radical one that went far beyond rationalizing department support functions.[31]

The outsourcing recommendation sparked immediate controversy. For example, one roles and missions study produced by a contractor contended that the increasing average age of Defense Department equipment posed significant obstacles to outsourcing depot-level maintenance support. The study argued that an increasing percentage of military aircraft and other hardware was rapidly becoming "old technology and not attractive to leading edge, high-tech aerospace firms." Furthermore, plants performing depot maintenance suffered a number of environmental problems that dissuaded new firms from undertaking such efforts. Nevertheless, the commission appeared to favor opportunities for greater monetary savings over restructuring actions that could also yield improvement in military effectiveness.[32]

Although the Commission on Roles and Missions may have missed opportunities to better integrate the Defense Department's infrastructure, it did offer several recommendations to improve joint warfighting. The commission stressed that the Joint Staff or a joint agency, rather than

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8 March 1995," all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Commission on Roles and Missions, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 24 May 1995), pp. 3-1 to 3-27.

[31] Several CORM staff studies likely contributed to this outcome. They confused *consolidations* of functions—dispersed across the services into a single command or agency in place of the service organizations—with *centralization*, which would create another management layer over existing organizations. Consolidation would enhance interoperability and flexibility across service lines at the expense of limiting service influence on the function primarily to determining requirements. The resulting situation would be analogous to the Army's reliance on the other services for close air support, airlift, and sealift. Centralization might also provide an enhanced level of interoperability and common doctrine but at the expense of another bureaucratic layer between the supporting organization and its customer.

[32] Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Col Christopher A. Rockwell, Army Roles and Missions Directorate, 27 Mar 1995, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH; "Logistics Issues Case Studies for the Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces," 8 Feb 1995, Defense Depot Maintenance Issue, Appendix A, CORM, "Issue Paper Reviews, February 19–20, 1995," Historian's Background Files, CMH.

the services, should rapidly develop a comprehensive joint doctrine. Additionally, the commission recommended strengthening the regional combatant commander's authority over theater communications support, intelligence requirements and priorities, and joint training. To improve joint training and effect integration of CONUS-based forces, the commissioners proposed the creation of a "functional" unified command. Although it applauded the U.S. Atlantic Command's efforts since October 1993 as "joint force integrator," the commission noted that the command's interpretation of its authority over joint training was not accepted by the services. The panel recommended divesting the Atlantic Command of its geographic area of responsibility and focusing the command on developing forces "trained and integrated as joint forces." The commissioners thus favored extending joint authority at the services' expense.[33]

In general, the commission respected most of the Army's positions on operational and warfighting issues. Although they designated the Air Force as the "lead" service in space, the commissioners preserved Army and Navy roles there. They also confirmed existing Army and Air Force functions in theater air defense, theater missile defense, and close air support.

On a more ominous note, the commission recommended that the services "make better use" of their reserve components. Could the Army National Guard's "enhanced readiness brigades," the commission asked, attain the readiness levels necessary to meet the timetables for deployment to serve in one or both of the major regional contingencies defined by the Bottom-Up Review? Also, the commission noted that, because the BUR deleted the requirement for eight Army National Guard divisions as a hedge against a renewed Soviet threat to Europe, the Army could reduce guard strength by at least fifty thousand personnel. Such a proposal again invited an open conflict over functions between the active Army and the Army National Guard. Moreover, the commission's recommendation that forces be developed specifically for "peace operations" and that the Army be assigned responsibility for "short-term" training of foreign constabulary units was vague. The recommendation also left unclear whether the entire Army or only the Army National Guard would serve as the proponent for this function and which components would man forces tailored to peace operations.[34]

One of the operational issues that the Commission on Roles and Missions raised (as did the 1992 chairman's study) concerned overlap-

[33] CORM, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-1 to 2-31.

[34] Ibid.; CORM, "Issue Paper Reviews, February 19–20, 1995," and CORM, "Issue Papers," 8, 11 Mar. 1995, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

ping Army and Marine capabilities for "forcible entry." The commission's staff provided five options: (1) maintaining the status quo; (2) converting the Army's corps headquarters and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters to "joint task forces"; (3) distributing the Army's airborne capability to one brigade in each of three light infantry divisions; (4) reducing Marine capabilities for "sustained land combat"; and (5) deleting six active Army heavy brigades by relying more on Army National Guard and Marine capabilities. The second option would delete one corps headquarters and one MEF headquarters in exchange for enhanced interoperability and would force jointness on the Army and Marine Corps "from the head down." The fourth option would begin to address the surplus of Marine forces over available amphibious shipping but would also mandate reexamination of the Bottom-Up Review's force levels. The fifth option, which would further reduce the active Army, would also require that Army National Guard units attain readiness levels adequate to mobilize and deploy to meet deadlines for early participation in the two major regional contingencies.[35]

Given these specific options, the commissioners unsurprisingly opted to retain the overall status quo between Army and Marine capabilities and force levels. They did endorse, however, enhanced interoperability of corps and MEF headquarters. The commissioners also recommended that the Marine Corps assume "single agent management" responsibility for pre-positioned unit equipment at sea, despite the disparity in the combat service support capabilities between the two services. The commissioners accepted the argument that Army and Marine forcible entry capabilities (airborne assault and amphibious) were complementary but did not examine force levels for either capability. The Army's action officer responsible for this issue noted the CORM staff's predilection for analyzing overlapping capabilities primarily through cost-benefit analysis and concluded that the service was fortunate that the commission avoided the Army-Marine overlap question. The two services derived costs differently, all but precluding comparison of capabilities, and such analysis tended to ignore a more significant criterion-effectiveness.

Although NATO regularly evaluated Army units in Europe during training operations, there was no comparable system in the United States to evaluate and compare readiness and other operational capabilities of units from different services. Citing the 1958 Defense

[35] Draft paper, "Army and Marine Corps Capabilities," 15 Feb 95, in CORM, "Issue Paper Reviews, February 19–20, 1995," Historian's Background Files, CMH; CORM, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-28 to 2-30.

Reorganization Act's provisions for services to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces, OSD and the Joint Staff had regularly deferred to them for capability assessments. But service standards for readiness and training differed considerably. Moreover, with less than compatible service doctrines, training, leader development approaches, and combat service support systems, Army and Marine units were not interchangeable on the battlefield. Consequently, Army leaders preferred to deploy a full array of Army capabilities, including light infantry, to a contingency operation. Once in the theater, it would be much easier to attach, detach, and task-organize Army units within the theater than to rely on forces from a different service with likely problems of interoperability.[36] From the Marine viewpoint, the problems were comparable, although their forces often relied on Army components for long-term sustainment ashore.

Another largely ignored warfighting issue critical to the Army was what the Air Force termed the "deep attack" function. The commission examined a number of doctrinal issues and programs involving deep attack, including the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), noting the complexity of the deep-attack function and commission members' lack of the requisite technical knowledge to offer constructive recommendations. Consequently, they advised the secretary of defense to undertake an in-depth study of the issue independently.[37]

In addition to warfighting and infrastructure issues, the Commission on Roles and Missions addressed Defense Department "processes" and management. The commission offered specific recommendations for streamlining the Defense Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Noting problems with attracting and retaining political appointees of adequate quality, as well as an extensive duplication of functions between service secretariats and service staffs, the

[36] Intervs, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Lt Col Peter G. Cassi, Army Roles and Missions Directorate, 24 Jan, 20 Mar, and 4 May 1995, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH. See also David B. Kassing, *Light Army and Marine Expeditionary Force Roles and Functions: Perspectives from RAND Research*, RAND Report Number PM-283-CRMAF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1994), for a detailed comparison of Army and Marine light forces that underscores the difficulties in using existing analytical tools, including TACWAR and Rand's Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM), to compare operational capabilities of units from the two services.

[37] CORM, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-26 through 2-28, CORM Issue Paper, "Deep Attack/Precision Conventional Strike," 3 Mar 1995, and Briefing Materials, "CORM Bomber Analysis," 10 May 1995, all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Information Paper, Lt Col Richard J. Whitaker, 24 May 1995, sub: Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services (CORM) Report: Deep Attack/Precision Conventional Strike, CMH Roles and Missions Collection, CMH.

Togo West being sworn in as secretary of the Army

commissioners recommended merging secretariats and military staffs. Such mergers would result in a reduction of political appointees, and a single staff would report to the service secretary through the chief of staff. The commission's proposal was far less sweeping than the post–World War II Marshall-Collins Plan or the proposals by a 1960–1961 advisory panel for defense organization, chaired by former secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, which would have eliminated military departments and service secretaries. At least, however, the commission's proposal would have continued the course of incremental unification while it streamlined headquarters.[38]

The Army accepted, or could live with, most of the commission's recommendations. Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., objected, however, to the recommendation to reduce political appointees in the Army Secretariat and merge it with the Army Staff. He preferred to conduct his own reorganization study. The Army's Roles and Missions Directorate did not concur with twelve of the commission's 174 recommendations.

[38] CORM, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 4-10 to 4-13, 4-23 to 4-27.

The secretary of defense accepted most of the Army's reservations and directed more study on disputed issues.[39]

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces gave the Defense Department a second look within two years at issues essential for development of a joint force. Its report had both strengths and weaknesses. The CORM provided an outside perspective from individuals without vested interests in future forces and programs. On the other hand, the commission lacked the technical expertise that the Joint Staff, working with the service staffs, could bring to bear on the critical warfighting issues integral to a study of roles, missions, and functions. The commission also vacillated between organizational reforms for military effectiveness and those for greater efficiency. Lack of support for the commission by all the services except the Air Force likely meant that its recommendations would be opposed by most of the services. Finally, although a congressional initiative, the commission lacked bipartisan support. Soon after the Republican Party gained control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 1994 election, the new leaders of both armed services committees distanced themselves from the Commission on Roles and Missions, leaving it orphaned. Consequently, the commission proposed no major changes but did make recommendations that would advance evolutionary progress toward joint warfighting and institutional unification.[40]

[39] Memo, Secretary of the Army for Secretary of Defense, 14 Jun 1995, sub: Army Response to the Report from the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces—Information Memorandum, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[40] Interv, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., with Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army, Ret., 29 Mar 1996, Washington, D.C., Oral History Activity, CMH; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles & Missions Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, August 1995), pp. 5–6, 31–32, 40–41.

Chapter 6
The Army Responds

While the Defense Department, Congress, and HQDA were wrestling with an overhaul of national military strategy and reviewing roles, missions, and functions, the Army was expanding its participation in contingency operations. Indeed, the world situation vindicated the emphasis that the new national military strategy placed on lesser regional contingencies. The Army soon found itself sending more units to conduct a variety of humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, show of force, and stability missions. In these contingencies, the units served as part of a multinational force under the auspices of an international organization (e.g., the UN), or the Organization of American States (OAS), or a collective security organization (e.g., NATO). Those skeptical of such U.S. involvement, including some Army officers, believed that other countries should provide most of the forces for these operations. But that rarely happened. The NATO countries, in particular, had sought to scale back their military forces and defense budgets after having served in the front lines of the Cold War for more than four decades and had reduced their active forces by a larger proportion than had the United States.[1] Hence the United States had to contribute sizable forces for contingency operations in Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe. The Army provided the bulk of U.S. forces for each contingency.

New Contingencies

Army forces began deploying to Africa in 1992 in response to the collapse of the Somali government. Internal unrest and famine in the country created a major refugee crisis in the region. The first Army troops deployed to Kenya in August as part of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.

[1] For example, under the 1990 "Two Plus Four" agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, Germany agreed to reduce its total active manpower from almost 500,000 in 1989 to no more than 370,000, with only 260,000 in its army—this in exchange for the withdrawal of the Group of Soviet Forces from the former East Germany.

From there they accompanied many of the relief flights that airlifted food directly to an airfield in Somalia.[2]

As the situation in Somalia deteriorated, President Bush decided to send U.S. troops directly into the country. In December, the U.S. Central Command sent a Marine task force, operating under a UN flag, to secure the capital, Mogadishu, as part of a follow-on operation entitled Restore Hope. Army logistical units and then combat forces soon followed the Marines, supporting them and forces from UN allies in the distribution of relief supplies to alleviate mass starvation in the war-ravaged country.

Shortly after the first U.S. troops arrived in Somalia, the new Clinton administration persuaded the United Nations to expand its role there to include peace enforcement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. A new mission, the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), began assuming that function, with expanded participation by other nations. The Army deployed elements of the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia by mid-1993 as part of the UN force. They were joined in August 1993 by a special operations task force: Task Force Ranger.[3]

The Army contingent in Somalia suffered under two main handicaps. First, the UN Command employed disparate forces with little interoperability. When these units became engaged in combat operations against local militias, their lack of cohesion posed significant problems of command and control and coordination. Second, the U.S. Army contingent in support of the UN had no heavy units to bolster the light forces in the event of conflict with the guerrillas. After a fierce and deadly firefight in Mogadishu between a local militia and U.S. and UN forces on 3 October 1993, President Clinton opted to phase out U.S. peacekeeping forces by April 1994. The Army redeployed its combat forces but retained a small logistical force in Somalia until the following year to support the UN Command.[4]

After the withdrawal from Somalia, Army units continued to deploy to lesser regional contingencies elsewhere in Africa and in the Caribbean. Confined to humanitarian relief efforts for Rwandan refugees, the European Command's Operation Support Hope (17 July–6 October 1994) was a more modest effort than that in Somalia, involving only 983 Army personnel deployed from U.S. Army, Europe. Among the European-based

[2] Richard W. Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2002), pp. 5–9.

[3] Ibid., pp. 15–16; C. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), pp. 13–20. By mid-November, troops from twenty-nine nations, including 28,000 from the United States, were serving in Somalia.

[4] Allard, *Somalia Operations*, pp. 17–20; Stewart, *U.S. Army in Somalia*, pp. 15–25.

A Pentagon press briefing being held on Operation Restore Hope

forces deployed to Rwanda were all of USAREUR's water purification and distribution units, which remained there for the duration of the contingency. Operation Sea Signal was a combination border enforcement and humanitarian relief operation, which also began in July 1994. It involved about 2,800 Army personnel deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to maintain a camp for Haitian and Cuban migrants sheltered on the base. Both operations strained many active Army units that had specialized capabilities, including water purification, civil affairs, and military police.[5]

Operation Uphold Democracy, launched in late September 1994, was a UN and OAS peace enforcement commitment that restored Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. The operation required more than 15,000 soldiers, including most of the 10th Mountain Division. In addition, units from the 82d Airborne Division were launched on 16 September for an airborne operation intended to "take down" the country. The operation was canceled at the last moment because of a diplomatic settlement that averted a direct clash between U.S. and Haitian military

[5] Trudie Eklund, "Operation Support Hope (Rwanda): Chronology," undated, Historical Resources Branch, CMH; David Bentley, *Operation Sea Signal: U.S. Military Support for Caribbean Migration Emergencies, May 1994 to February 1996*, Strategic Forum 73 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, May 1996); W. Darren Pitts, "A Guantanamo Diary—Operation Sea Signal," *Joint Force Quarterly* 9 (Autumn 1995): 114–120.

forces. The U.S. Atlantic Command also dispatched to Haiti headquarters, medical, and combat support troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 3d Special Forces Group, and the 75th Ranger Regiment, augmented by various civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. The Defense Department relieved the 10th Mountain Division with most of the 25th Infantry Division during the spring of 1995, and OAS troops relieved most of the U.S. ground forces by the end of the year. Once again, HQDA helped mobilize several of the reserve civil affairs units that proved essential for this type of operation. Reserve component military police units also mobilized to replace active-duty units deployed from essential duties in the United States.[6]

On 9 October 1994, in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, President Clinton directed a show of force by the U.S. Central Command in Kuwait. This operation involved two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which were airlifted to Kuwait, where pre-positioned equipment awaited them. Unlike the other contingencies, this one did not require reserve mobilization. HQDA was involved in VIGILANT WARRIOR, however, applying the secretary of the Army's authority under Title 10 to sustain Army forces with pre-positioned equipment afloat and coordinating with the Joint Staff for shipment of it to Kuwait.[7]

As the Army was preparing for the withdrawal of the 25th Infantry Division from Haiti, and the 10th Mountain Division was undergoing reconstitution after having returned earlier, the U.S. European Command was dispatching most of the 1st Armored Division from bases in Europe to a peace enforcement operation in Bosnia. Three years of ineffective operations by a UN protection force had failed to end the continuing civil war there, and greater direct military involvement by U.S. and other NATO forces was essential. Although the United States had expected members of the European Community or European NATO members to expand peace enforcement operations to a level sufficient to suppress organized violence, the Europeans had failed to act.

After the warring parties in Bosnia signed the 21 November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, the United Nations approved a NATO "Implementation Force" (IFOR) of sixty thousand troops in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The first of these units began entering Bosnia in December. The United States initially contributed twenty-eight thousand

[6] Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), pp. 9–28.

[7] Army Operations Center Briefing Materials, "Current Operations and Intelligence Briefing," 3 Nov 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

troops, mostly 1st Armored Division soldiers from U.S. Army, Europe, to the operation, which disarmed warring parties over the next year. The United Nations authorized continuation of NATO operations in December 1996, when it replaced the IFOR with a smaller "Stabilization Force" (SFOR).

With the change in mission, Operation JOINT GUARD supplanted JOINT ENDEAVOR. NATO cut its forces almost in half, to 31,000 troops, with the United States reducing its contingent by one-third. Facing the likelihood of an extended operation, the European Command relieved the 1st Armored Division with most of the 1st Infantry Division. Although most Army forces in Bosnia came from active units based in Europe, HQDA and Forces Command mobilized selected reserve component military police, civil affairs, military history, and combat service support units, which rotated through Bosnia along with active Army units. In sum, as in Somalia and Haiti, the Army had to commit substantial forces to these missions for extended periods of time.[8]

What President Bush had titled the "New World Order" did indeed signal significant changes in the international environment that affected the U.S. Army. One significant impact on HQDA was a tide of continuing demands for Army forces to conduct contingency operations. Operations GOLDEN PHEASANT in 1988 and JUST CAUSE in 1989 had been brief and relied entirely on active forces from the rapid-reaction XVIII Airborne Corps. Thereafter, however, contingency operations had been frequent and extended, taxing the Army's active and reserve forces. For example, in 1994 the 10th Mountain Division participated in its second contingency deployment in two years. That division was relieved in Haiti in early 1995 by the Army's only other light infantry division, a U.S. Army, Pacific, unit, the 25th Infantry Division. But existing contingency plans committed this unit to early deployment in the event of a major regional contingency in the Pacific or Asia, and its assignment to a contingency in the Caribbean increased the level of risk associated with a major regional contingency. The Army could no longer maintain readiness for major regional contingencies and simultaneously support contingency operations without relying on reserve units.

Army participation in lesser regional contingencies revealed several difficulties attendant to the employment of U.S. and combined forces in what were now termed "operations other than war (OOTW)." These missions taxed certain specialized Army units. Shortages of active

[8] Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), pp. 1–52.

Army civil affairs and military police units were particularly severe. In addition, these contingencies strengthened the arguments for restructuring the Army into more easily task-organized contingency forces, combining special operations, light, and heavy forces at the division level and lower. With Army tactical forces organized into fixed divisions, taking functional units away from their larger parent organizations caused significant administrative, logistical, maintenance, training, and command problems. The Army's experience in these operations also underscored the difficulties faced by a multinational force of units that lacked common training, doctrine, or even a common language in attempting to operate together as a team. Because they involved NATO forces that had trained together over four decades, operations in Bosnia proved far smoother than had those in Somalia and elsewhere.

The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers

Even as they were participating in studies to respond to a changing strategic environment and coordinating Army participation in contingency operations, Army leaders also were attempting to regain the initiative in reshaping the Army. As his vehicle for this endeavor, Chief of Staff Sullivan launched the "modern" Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM). Sullivan adopted the name from a series of major field maneuvers that had tested and helped overhaul the Army's tactical forces in 1941. He intended the analogy to signal a break with the Cold War Army's tendency toward "business as usual" and its gradual, almost cautious, pace of change. Sullivan sought to galvanize creative energies throughout the Army for a broad-based, comprehensive, and dynamic overhaul of Army doctrine, forces, and modernization programs.[9]

The new chief of staff spent his first year, 1991–1992, defining his goals for the Army and for the Louisiana Maneuvers. Although he hoped to quickly establish momentum for change, Sullivan first considered whether to adopt a new division design that the Army would implement over the next two years. Any decision in favor of a redesign was bound to elicit challenge from a number of senior Army leaders who believed that success in Operation Desert Storm vindicated existing organizations. Rather than risk a hasty decision, Sullivan chose a path of more deliberate change, carefully coordinated throughout the Army. Consequently, in May 1992, he disseminated a charter formalizing the Louisiana Maneuvers process as his tool to transform the Army. The charter prescribed the establishment

[9] James L. Yarrison, *The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1999), pp. 8–11.

of a LAM Task Force of approximately fifty personnel, headed by a brigadier general, to coordinate the "maneuvers." With the task force's main body at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and elements at other TRADOC posts, the chief of staff opted to make the TRADOC commander "deputy director" while retaining ultimate control himself. The LAM Task Force served to coordinate the articulation and investigation of LAM issues, from force redesign to the accelerated development of a second-generation, forward-looking infrared receiver (FLIR) system. Sullivan established a LAM "Board of Directors," and pressed into service all commanders of major Army commands, regional combatant commanders who were Army generals, and other selected general officers, including the vice chief of staff and HQDA's deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, to act as its members. This board would debate LAM issues and make recommendations to the Army's leaders.[10]

During its first two years, the Louisiana Maneuvers focused on designating issues for investigation. The LAM Task Force coordinated ideas solicited throughout the Army and guided these issues through the LAM process to the board of directors. In this respect, like the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review, the LAM process bypassed the biennial Program Objective Memorandum, the Army's normal vehicle for submitting an integrated program into the Defense Department's planning, programming, and budgeting processes. Sullivan intended the Louisiana Maneuvers to provide a more comprehensive means to develop issues that required multiyear development and experimentation programs.

In its first year, the Louisiana Maneuvers process accelerated development and the fielding of a number of programs. Among them were logistics hardware and software programs designed to provide "total asset visibility" of parts and consumable supplies both in theater and in transit. Too often, central accounting offices lost track of supplies and materiel in transit or in intermediate depots. The LAM process also developed a wide range of simulations and exercises as tools for the design and testing of new tactical forces and doctrine, such as the "Synthetic Theater of War" used at the Army's Combined Arms Center. Finally, the process resulted in Sullivan establishing in July 1994 on the Army Staff an Army Digitization Office (ADO) that reported to the vice chief of staff. The ADO was the chief's tool for coordinating the disparate Army force modernization programs that used digital information technology to provide various

[10] Ibid., pp. 15–23, 35–39.

battlefield forces with common "situational awareness" through electronic information sharing.[11]

Sullivan also used the Louisiana Maneuvers to coordinate three HQDA command-post exercises, General Headquarters Exercise (GHQ)-93, GHQ-94, and GHQ-95. GHQ-93 operated from 12 to 28 August 1993 in the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon. GHQ-94 continued the exercises, operating in four phases through 17 June 1994, and GHQ-95, covering three phases, ended in June 1995. These exercises were the first since Operation DESERT STORM to test the Army Command Post's ability to coordinate Army support in the event of a major contingency operation. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans conducted each exercise, with the LAM Task Force providing evaluators. GHQ-93 operated in conjunction with the annual ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (UN Forces Korea) and FUERTES DEFENSAS (U.S. Southern Command) command-post exercises.[12]

To enhance control, the Army's DCSOPS conducted all three exercises as Army-only operations centered on two, near-simultaneous, major regional contingencies. Both GHQ-93 and GHQ-94 showed that the Army would be overtaxed to meet regional combatant commanders' requirements for early-deploying forces. In both, players, who represented the combatant commander, requested that the 101st Airborne Division be one of the first units to deploy to their theater. GHQ-95 exercised a scenario similar to that of its predecessor, further refining detailed troop requirements for two major regional contingencies. The exercises validated the need for an Army force of two corps headquarters, seven divisions, and two armored cavalry regiments to prevail in a single major regional contingency. Other key GHQ findings endorsed the need for early access to the Army's reserve components, unlike what had happened during Operation DESERT SHIELD. The exercises also highlighted the requirement for greater accuracy in reserve-unit readiness ratings and in setting dates on which units would be available for deployments.[13]

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[11] Ibid., pp. 23–24, 39–43; Department of the Army, *United States Army Modernization Plan, 1995* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994).

[12] Yarrison, *Modern Louisiana Maneuvers*, pp. 43–45; HQDA, "GHQx 93 After Action Report: Volumes 1 & 2 (17–26 August 1993)," Historian's Background Files, CMH; Lt Col John C. Dibert, "General Headquarters Exercise Insights," *Military Review* 77 (March–April 1997): 62–66.

[13] HQDA Briefing Materials, "GHQ 94 Phase III Update," 18 May 1994; HQDA Briefing Materials, "GHQ 94 Phase IV Update," 16 July 1994, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Dibert, "General Headquarters Exercise Insights," pp. 64–67.

Force XXI

During its final active year, 1994–1995, the Louisiana Maneuvers focused on "Force XXI." Force XXI began as a concept for combining a comprehensive Army tactical and institutional force reorganization with the adoption of advanced digitized communications by selected tactical units. The first objective of Force XXI was to reorganize the Army around a new operational doctrine by the year 2000, when the first tactical digital communications equipment would be available. Sullivan assigned TRADOC to undertake the reorganization of tactical forces, centered on the redesign of the Army's "heavy" divisions. Designating this effort "JOINT VENTURE," TRADOC dusted off the AirLand Battle-Future reorganization studies while it also planned for the tactical use of electronic information in conjunction with the Army Digitization Office. In addition to redesigning the tactical forces around emerging technology, Sullivan charged JOINT VENTURE to develop more "modular" organizations to ease the tailoring of deployed task forces and for "distributed," more decentralized, operations.[14]

TRADOC undertook its study using both simulations and directed exercises with troops (Advanced Warfighting Experiments/AWEs) to design and test model organizations. The first experiment tested a battalion-sized armored task force in April 1994. A second exercise tested a brigade task force three years later. By April 1995, the command had developed eleven options for heavy division redesign and by the following autumn reduced those to three: a scaled-down version of the existing division, a hybrid heavy/light division, and a flexible "brigade-based" model. After additional testing in early 1998, TRADOC recommended that the Army adopt the most conservative option, the scaled-down fixed division. The Army's leadership could implement this design with minimal disruptions stemming from new doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, leader development, and training. The option, however, disappointed some Army officers who sought a more comprehensive reorganization that might have resulted in a more agile force better adapted to the decentralized operations envisioned for future contingencies. Others worried that gutting the traditional combat division would be politically disastrous for both the active Army and the National Guard, as few civilians would understand the complexities of a more flexibly organized force.[15]

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[14] Yarrison, *Modern Louisiana Maneuvers*, pp. 49–50.

[15] Ibid., pp. 41–42, 67–69; TRADOC Briefing Materials, "The Army in Transition," undated (Feb 1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Army Vice Chief of Staff General Tilelli

The second main thrust of Force XXI was an institutional redesign aimed at the TDA, or "institutional," Army—the training commands, recruiting agency, schools, labs, and major headquarters, including Army component commands for each regional combatant command. Secretary West and General Sullivan appointed the Army's vice chief of staff, General John H. Tilelli, Jr., in conjunction with the assistant secretary of the Army (manpower and reserve affairs), to coordinate the project. HQDA's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, which coordinated the institutional redesign effort, eschewed establishment of a temporary special task force to conduct the study. Instead, to analyze such functions as personnel management and information management, the DCSOPS organized eight "functional area assessments." He also established an "umbrella" assessment intended to integrate the results of the other analyses. Each assessment would provide the Army's vice chief of staff and assistant secretary of the Army (manpower and reserve affairs) with three reorganization options for each subject organization. The functional area assessments would analyze the advantages and disadvantages of each option and recommend one solution to the Army's leadership. Neither OSD nor the Joint Staff undertook similar infrastructure reshaping efforts, as they had done concurrently with the 1990 Vanguard study and the 1992 HQDA Transformation Study. Consequently, neither organization offered either specific guidance or alternative reorganization proposals such as the DMR initiatives. The Army was free to conduct its own comprehensive redesign but without a means to assess how its reorganization might contribute to or detract from joint warfighting.[16]

[16] Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., and Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, "Charter for Redesigning the Institutional/TDA Army," 13 Jan 1995; Memo for Institutional Army Axis General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) Members, 21 Mar 1995, sub: Institutional Army Re-engineering and Redesign Campaign Plan, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

The functional area assessments of the Army's major commands began in September 1995. As their framework for institutional redesign, the functional assessments used "Draft Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM)-100XX," which attempted to develop a doctrine for reorganizing the Army's nondeployable organizations to best support the operational or field Army. Taking language employed by the Commission on Roles and Missions, the Army's leaders directed that these and the other functional assessments focus on "core competencies," "core capabilities," and "core processes" for the Army and each subordinate organization.[17]

The draft pamphlet provided options for consolidating the Army's fourteen major commands. Its preferred option would consolidate the CONUS MACOMs into three, large commands, one for force development, another for force generation and projection, and a third for force sustainment. The Army service component commands for each unified command would remain unchanged. This reorganization, a more comprehensive one than Project Vanguard had recommended in 1990, would reverse the trend of a widening horizontal span of control below HQDA that had begun in response to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes established during the McNamara era. At that time, the Army had created single-function major commands such as the Corps of Engineers and Army Medical Command to permit those organizations to compete better for resources in program and budget processes that OSD dominated.[18] Merging these organizations into multifunctional commands threatened to disrupt the Army's existing resource management processes and might also undermine joint operations. Submerging organizations such as the Army's Military Traffic Management Command under an intermediate headquarters could hinder their responsiveness to the unified commander they supported. Draft DA PAM-100XX provided an ambitious framework for reorganization, but

[17] Department of the Army Pamphlet 100-XX, "Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign: Final Draft," 31 July 1996. The Army disseminated the final version of the document, DA PAM 100-1, on 5 March 1998.

[18] The Army created a number of staff support agencies and field operating agencies subordinate to HQDA for the same reason. During Secretary McNamara's administration, OSD dominated the services by developing its own program and budget issues. It then referred these to the affected services for comment, usually with a very short deadline. Too often, intervening multifunctional headquarters delayed getting a timely response to OSD and jeopardized the Army's position. Consequently, Army headquarters and MACOM force design operated on a "centralize it if you want to keep it" basis. See Brownlee and Mullen, *Changing an Army*, pp. 171–174, for General William DePuy's firsthand experience with late McNamara-era PPBS policies.

the difficulty in adopting such a plan would lay in the details of both design and implementation.

The functional area assessments provided uneven and often disjointed recommendations for reorganizations. Although HQDA's principal members participated in a decision briefing for each assessment, the DA operations staff relied primarily on major commands rather than on an independent task force to develop redesign options. Hence most functional area assessments focused on options for the internal redesign of existing commands. For example, although TRADOC coordinated the Training, Leader Development, Organize [*sic*], and Doctrine assessment, it concentrated its efforts on TRADOC rather than on how the larger Army performed those functions. Consequently, although the HQDA Redesign assessment recommended the transfer of the Army War College from the DCSOPS to the Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC was unprepared to take it. Despite these coordination difficulties, the functional area assessments led to the elimination of one major command and the establishment of another. The Army's Forces Command absorbed most of the Information Systems Command, with the remaining functions going to TRADOC and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). The Army leadership also chose to convert the Space and Strategic Defense Command from an HQDA field operating agency to a major command, redesignated the Space and Missile Defense Command.[19]

Unlike those who directed the other assessments, the directors of the HQDA Redesign Functional Area Assessment established a special study group to develop detailed recommendations. The Army's director of management organized the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Redesign Working Group in May 1995 for this purpose. Located in leased space in Arlington, Virginia, the group comprised twelve action officers, augmented by five contract personnel and retired Army general officer, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Otstott, whom the vice chief of staff hired on contract during the early autumn. Two colonels and one senior civilian from the Army Staff and Army Secretariat, respectively, initially co-chaired the group.[20]

The Redesign Working Group operated independently, subject only to general guidance. It conducted most of its own research and generally

[19] DCSOPS Briefing Materials, "Redesign of the Institutional Army: Phase II/GOSC 1," 16 Apr 1996, Historian's Background Files, CMH; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Mr. Albert D. Brown (DAMO-FDF), 28 Feb 1996, Pentagon, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[20] Conversation, Mark Sherry with Col Michael G. Jones, HQDA Redesign Working Group, 31 Oct 1995, Arlington, Va.; Conversation, Mark Sherry with Mr. B. Anthony Turner, HQDA Redesign Working Group, 2 Apr 1996, Arlington, Va.

did not solicit recommendations from within headquarters. It did obtain briefings from most major staff sections and agencies, as needed, and group members also conducted interviews with principal members of HQDA. Conspicuously missing from this process was specific direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense concerning how to streamline the Army's headquarters.[21]

This absence of OSD guidance was critical because, to a greater degree than the Army's major commands, HQDA, its field operating agencies, and its staff support agencies had evolved in response to changes in organization and management processes by OSD and the Joint Staff. Former Senator Sam Nunn, who had been a key architect of the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization, included HQDA as an integral part of the thirty-thousand-person "corporate DoD headquarters," which, he argued, required visionary reorganization in order to eliminate duplication. Yet, as inextricably linked as it was to OSD and Joint Staff processes, HQDA could hardly eliminate or consolidate offices that allowed the Army to participate in the PPBS. And the Army needed to continue its participation in the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which reviewed the services' key modernization programs. Since the late 1980s, Army participation in the JROC had increased significantly.[22]

Lacking direction from a comprehensive DoD redesign study, or even detailed guidance from OSD, the HQDA Redesign Working Group turned to the National Performance Review (NPR). The review was an effort by the Clinton administration to improve management efficiencies and "business practices" throughout the executive branch. But it offered little direction for a headquarters redesign intended to streamline and eliminate duplications, much less to advance the Defense Department's slow march toward jointness and unification.[23]

Conducting "functional area reviews" in November and December 1995, the Redesign Working Group developed a series of alternatives for headquarters restructuring. The working group produced options for reorganizing the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, and each one of the headquarters' sixty-one field operating agencies and fourteen staff support

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Sam Nunn, "Future Trends in Defense Organization," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 64.

[23] Vice President Al Gore, *Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: The Report of the National Performance Review* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993); Report of the National Performance Review, *Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Status Report (September 1994*) (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1994).

agencies. In compliance with Draft DA PAM 100-XX, the redesign options sought to realign the headquarters through the transfer of "operational functions" to major commands or, in one case, to OSD. All of the options would reduce all headquarters agencies by at least 10 percent. The working group's recommended options would eliminate or merge fourteen field operating agencies and eight staff support agencies. These recommendations also would transfer another twelve field operating agencies out of the headquarters. The recommended redesign would significantly reduce authorized headquarters' personnel spaces from 37,110 to 20,237, including SSA/FOA manpower. HQDA proper, however, would be trimmed less, from 2,457 to 2,311 spaces. In February 1996, the working group presented to the principal members of headquarters all of the options in its "HQDA Redesign Functional Area Assessment." The Army's leadership accepted most of the recommended options, eliminating 3,268 civilian spaces from the Army and, in addition, transferring 13,605 military and civilian personnel authorizations to major commands.[24]

The Redesign Working Group's recommended restructuring of the headquarters proper entailed only minor changes. Some HQDA officials had proposed some consolidation of the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff. At the secretary of the Army's direction, however, the HQDA assessment ignored all recommendations to merge the Army Staff and Secretariat and eliminate most assistant secretary positions. The group did, though, persuade Army leaders to re-create the position of assistant vice chief of staff at the rank of lieutenant general. This position mirrored equivalent positions on the staffs of the Navy and Air Force and afforded the Army parity when fighting for Army programs in interactions with the Joint Staff and OSD. The HQDA Redesign Functional Area Assessment also transferred two large field operating agencies, the Army Recruiting Command and the Military Entrance Processing Command, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the Training and Doctrine Command.[25]

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[24] HQDA Redesign Working Group Briefing Materials, "HQDA Redesign Analysis: The Most Promising Organizational Options," 25 Oct 1995; Briefing Materials, "Redesign of the Institutional Army: Phase II/GOSC 1," 16 Apr 1996, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[25] Briefing Materials, "HQDA Redesign Analysis," 25 Oct 1995; Memo, Honorable Togo D. West, Jr., for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 16 Oct 1995, sub: Commission on Roles and Missions Recommendations on Restructuring Military Department Staffs, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Conversation, Mark Sherry with Col Michael G. Jones, Headquarters Redesign Working Group, 4 Mar 1996, Arlington, Va. The Army Secretariat's recommendation would have had the assistant secretaries and ARSTAF principals reporting simultaneously to the service secretary, under secretary, chief of staff, and vice chief.

Like the other functional area assessments, the HQDA Redesign Assessment provided a headquarters reorganization that reflected the "art of the possible." It continued the Army's course of evolutionary organizational change. This approach minimized disruption to a force already undergoing considerable turmoil because of budget reductions and increasing commitments to contingency operations.

When the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force ceased operations in June 1996, it had seen its main creation, Force XXI, take shape, sponsored jointly by the HQDA deputy chief of staff for operations and plans and TRADOC. Although it had championed a number of materiel programs that helped adapt the Army to a battlefield incorporating modern digital information technology, the main impact of the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers was intellectual. By late 1993, it had focused HQDA and all Army major commands on the force modernization process dominated in recent years by the Training and Doctrine Command and the Army's acquisition community, providing a conduit for bringing programs, such as the second-generation, forward-looking infrared receiver (FLIR), directly to the Army's leadership for enhanced support.[26]

Despite its successes, the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers could not restore the Army's lost force structure. After DESERT STORM, the service's leaders continued to fight an uphill battle for resources. Budget reductions from the Bottom-Up Review forced the Army to balance force modernization with force levels and readiness. Instead of trying to protect force levels, the Army's leadership chose to favor readiness, continuing to budget for a training operational tempo of 800 annual miles/14.5 flight hours for the active Army, while its active strength declined from 535,000 to 495,000 by 1996. At the same time, the evolving international environment posed increasing requirements for Army formations. National military strategy was shifting to a post–Cold War footing, emphasizing major regional contingencies and lesser regional contingencies. Neither changes in roles and functions nor expanded contingency requirements, however, led directly to a larger budget share for the Army that could increase either its end strength or its capabilities. Nevertheless, the first priority of the Army's leaders continued to be readiness, and the second to attract the level of resources to support its expanding missions. Restructuring remained but a distant third.

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[26] Yarrison, *Modern Louisiana Maneuvers*, pp. 78–81; Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, *Louisiana Maneuvers: The First Year* (Fort Monroe, Va.: March 1994); LeCuyer interv, 17 May 1994, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Chapter 7
The Quadrennial Defense Review, 1996–1997

The 1996–1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to conduct an overarching strategic review on a scale adequate for the redirection of the nation's security priorities. Several influential members of the Senate and House armed services committees, along with some OSD leaders and outside defense experts, saw the world undergoing a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) and believed that the Defense Department had already fallen behind. This concept postulated revolutionary changes in military technology that would rapidly make existing military hardware and organizations obsolescent. RMA advocates sought to fund high-technology modernization at the expense of existing force levels and even readiness throughout the Defense Department. These advocates quickly collided with nervous service chiefs and regional combatant commanders who noted that increased participation by U.S. forces in contingency operations mandated the maintenance of ready, active component forces for a variety of missions. At the same time, although the post–Cold War drawdown was ending, budget pressures continued to demand reductions and economies in defense programs and structures.

The QDR was a relatively recent innovation. Having last asserted its prerogatives for defense reorganization when it chartered the 1994–1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Congress acted again in 1996. Based on a recommendation by the CORM for a "quadrennial strategy review" at the outset of each administration, Congress charged the secretary of defense, "in consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," to undertake the first such Quadrennial Defense Review and report to Congress by 15 May 1997. The effort would examine defense strategy, forces, modernization programs, infrastructure, projected budgets, and other major aspects of defense programs and policies. Congress further directed that the QDR project military strategy and force alternatives through 2010, rather than over the next five years. Among its specific tasks, the QDR was to examine the impact on the Defense Department of recent participation in

"military operations other than war," such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance.[1]

Changing National Military Strategy

By late 1996, participation in lesser regional contingencies (LRCs) had become a recurrent event for Army units of all types and sizes. The Defense Department gradually modified its strategic priorities to reflect the increasing frequency and importance of such missions. In April 1996, Secretary of Defense Perry directed that the Defense Department plan to respond with military force when essential to protect three "categories of national interests": "vital interests," "important interests," and "humanitarian interests." The last two were new, with "important interests" defined as those that, although they do not affect "our national survival or well-being . . . do affect Americans' quality of life and the character of the world in which we live," and "humanitarian interests" as those that could be served by assuaging the effects of natural disasters and other hardships with available relief forces. Perry wanted to place several conditions on deploying troops in the two new categories. As he saw the future, the sequel to the Cold War was not world peace and disarmament but active U.S. engagement around the globe to help "shape" international security by maintaining the peace.[2]

Except for maritime interdiction operations in the Caribbean and shows of force staged exclusively at sea, most U.S. contingency operations involved Army forces. For example, the Army provided about 79 percent of U.S. troops in Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 and 57 percent of U.S. forces in operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990–1991. Subsequent commitments to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations kept active Army units busy and required the activation of reserve units that were in high demand. In addition to maintaining their fighting skills, active units deploying to contingency operations usually required specialized training for tasks not part of their normal missions. Such double training loads, when added to days deployed on contingency operations, created a high "personnel tempo"

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[1] Commission on Roles and Missions, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 24 May 1995), p. 4-9; *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*, Public Law 201, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (23 Sep 1996), secs. 923–924.

[2] Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance: FY 1998–2003* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 10 Apr 1996), pp. 1, 5–7, 26–30, 34–35.

(PERSTEMPO).[3] Reservists activated for contingency operations suffered similar training demands in addition to disruption of their full-time civilian careers. Both conditions augured morale problems likely to affect reenlistments.[4]

From the beginning, Defense Secretary Perry recognized the link between these increased commitments and their impact on the morale of the force. Unlike the post–World War II draftee Army, the post–Vietnam War volunteer force was composed of career soldiers with extensive family commitments. He thus made maintaining and improving "quality of life" part of his programming guidance and a criterion for decision making in the Quadrennial Defense Review.[5] For example, many soldiers suffered from inadequate or substandard family housing and barracks on the Army's many installations, both overseas and in CONUS. Although the service was slowly building or converting most of its barracks to meet the 1982 standard of two soldiers per room, low budgets and construction lags had continually bedeviled the effort. That the Army was ahead of the Marine Corps in this area was its only consolation.[6]

But despite emphasis on improving the soldier's quality of life, Perry hesitated to obtain funds to accelerate improvement by making additional cuts in personnel and forces. He hoped that programmed modernization and other improvements of existing forces would increase their effectiveness over the long run, making them adequate for the growing number

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[3] PERSTEMPO was originally a Navy accounting category that compared days away with days in residence at the home port (home station). In recent years, the Army and other services have expanded the category to include "time spent in deployed field activities" while in residence at the home station, including overnight field training.

[4] Strategic Synchronization Cell, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Briefing Materials, "America's Army," undated (Nov–Dec 1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[5] Perry had appointed a "Task Force on Quality of Life" in November 1994 to examine problems and make recommendations. The task force noted a wide diversity in the quality of quarters for single soldiers in particular. One member asked, "Would you drop off your son or daughter at a college dorm, if it looked like some of the barracks we've seen?" The task force's report further asserted that only the Air Force came close to meeting the 1995 revision of the Defense Department's housing standard, which mandated no more than one soldier per room, with the quality of the other services' facilities varying significantly.

[6] OSD, *DPG 1998–2003*, pp. 51–52; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Quality of Life* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Oct 1995), pp. 1–94; Rick Maze, "Barracks Blues," *Navy Times*, 11 Aug 1997, pp. 12–14. Although the Navy claimed it could meet 1995 DoD barracks standards by 2013, ahead of the Army, most Navy unmarried enlisted personnel lived in cramped spaces aboard ship even while in port, offsetting the apparently higher Navy standard of living.

of tasks being assigned to them. For example, the modernization of U.S. airlift and expansion of sealift and pre-positioned unit equipment in selected theaters would increase deployment speed and flexibility. In another case, improvements in joint and service capabilities in surveillance and in command, control, communications, and computers promised to make existing forces more effective. The accelerated acquisition of more effective munitions, especially precision-guided munitions, promised similar dividends. Perry also hoped that the fifteen Army National Guard "enhanced brigades" could be brought to a level of readiness adequate to deploy in time to a second major regional contingency and to serve as a "hedge" in the event that either conflict needed more forces than projected. Having thus endorsed the modernization of the Bottom-Up Review force, the defense secretary recommended against further reductions in forces and manpower at the outset of the QDR.[7]

Army Preparations for the Quadrennial Defense Review

Dismayed by the disproportionate reductions in Army forces relative to the other services made by the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review, many Army officers approached the Quadrennial Defense Review warily. During the summer of 1996, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer began organizing HQDA's effort for the upcoming review. He decided that the Army would coordinate its QDR functions through a special cell, similar to the Army's Roles and Missions Directorate during the 1994–1995 Commission on Roles and Missions' tenure. Established in September 1996, the "Strategic Synchronization Cell" comprised twelve to fifteen field-grade action officers assigned as "directed military overstrength" for no longer than a year. The cell's director was a brigadier general, with a colonel as his deputy. Assisting was a full-time Senior Executive Service analyst to coordinate Army studies to ensure their integration with OSD and Joint Staff analyses. The new assistant vice chief of staff of the Army (AVCSA) provided overall coordination.[8]

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[7] Quoted words from OSD, *DPG 1998–2003*, p. 24, and see also pp. 8–19, 21–23, 25–27.

[8] Interv, Mark Sherry with Lt Gen Jay M. Garner, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 9 May 1997, Pentagon; Interv, Mark Sherry with Col William McManaway, Deputy Director, Strategic Synchronization Cell, 8 Apr 1997, Pentagon; and Interv, Thomas Carhart with Lt Col Timothy S. Muchmore, Strategic Synchronization Cell, Dec 1996, Pentagon, all Oral History Activity, CMH. Directed military overstrength personnel were those staff assigned for no more than one year to positions beyond HQDA's table of distribution and allowances.

The Strategic Synchronization Cell participants sought to develop an Army "campaign plan." Some held that the Bottom-Up Review, relying on flawed analytical studies, had reduced the Army two divisions below the level of prudent risk. These officers believed that, in light of the Army's recent high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), which was the result of its expanded participation in contingency operations, the Defense Department should restore Army force levels to twelve active divisions. Other participants sought clarification as to what the Army would seek to defend most during the review. Were the "crown jewels" ten active divisions, or were they an active Army strength of 495,000 soldiers? Still others sought clarification of the relative priority of Army force modernization programs, current readiness, and current and future force levels. Other questions surfaced concerning the Army's relations with the other services and how to react to possible raids by them on Army "turf," or resources. Few answers were forthcoming through the autumn as the Army's QDR team members prepared for what they expected to be a contest.[9]

Inhibiting the Army's efforts to map out a detailed campaign "strategy" for the Quadrennial Defense Review was a general confusion over what exactly the effort would emphasize and the methodology it would employ. Secretary Perry stepped down in late autumn, leaving the review to his successor, William S. Cohen. Then, as OSD officials organized for the study, they decided to bring the Joint Staff into the effort to a greater degree than during the Bottom-Up Review. Subsequently, OSD and the Joint Staff divided the QDR into three echelons. To oversee the entire study effort was a Senior Steering Group (SSG), co-chaired by the deputy secretary of defense and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and staffed by the under secretaries and vice chiefs of staff of the services. Beneath the SSG, an Integration Panel co-chaired by OSD's director of program analysis and evaluation, the assistant secretary of defense (strategy and requirements), and the Joint Staff's director, J–8,

[9] Garner interv, 9 May 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH; Strategic Synchronization Cell Briefing Materials, "The BUR—In Retrospect," undated (Autumn 1996), and Dr. Ralph A. Hallenbeck, "Defending an Army End Strength of 495,000," Science Applications International Corporation, 10 Sep 1996, Historian's Background Files, CMH. For examples of studies recommending a minimum Army force level of twelve active divisions and at least 500,000 active military personnel, see Kim R. Holmes and Thomas G. Moore, eds., *Restoring American Leadership: A U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Blueprint* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1996), pp. 192–204, 212–213; General Glenn K. Otis, *Decisive Force: Landpower Essay No. 96-2* (Arlington, Va.: Association of the U.S. Army, Mar 1996), and Frederick W. Kagan and David T. Fautua, "Could We Fight a War If We Had To?" *Commentary* (May 1997): 25–29.

Defense Secretary Cohen, left*, hosts an Armed Forces Full Honor Arrival Ceremony at the Pentagon for a visiting dignitary.*

would perform most of the study's coordination. This panel included the Army's assistant vice chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, and equivalent representatives from the other services (*Chart 8*). Finally, the third, or working level, would consist of several functional panels treating discrete issues, a setup similar to that employed by the BUR.

In October 1996, OSD established five functional panels, one each for Strategy, Force Structure, Modernization, Readiness, and Infrastructure, and in December added a sixth, a Human Resources Panel. A deputy under secretary or an assistant secretary from OSD and a one- or two-star officer from the Joint Staff co-chaired each functional panel. OSD also invited the Army and the other services each to provide a one- or two-star representative on each panel. By December, the QDR's Integration Panel had even further subdivided the functional panels by approving the establishment of several subpanels within the Modernization and Infrastructure areas. Over the course of the review, the Integration Panel would establish additional subpanels within all panels, expanding their number to more than fifty. But whatever the number of panels and

Chart 8—Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization for Quadrennial Defense Review, December 1996



Source: Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (AVCSA) Briefing Materials.

subpanels, the QDR would operate in a more open forum than had the Bottom-Up Review, with the Army and the other services participating in all echelons.[10]

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff General Garner

HQDA appointed a general officer as "quarterback" for the Army's efforts on each of the six main panels. The deputy chief of staff for operations and plans provided quarterbacks for the Strategy, Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness panels. These assignments ensured that the Army's QDR effort would tap the diverse capabilities of HQDA's largest staff element. Each Army quarterback headed an Army "task force" composed of HQDA action officers with responsibility in the functional area. Each quarterback had, as a full-time deputy, a colonel from the Strategic Synchronization Cell who was the cell's expert in that area. Through these colonels, the cell endeavored to "horizontally coordinate" the efforts of the Army task forces, an admittedly difficult task. Although OSD and the Joint Staff did not establish a "resources" panel, General Garner set up a separate Army Resources Task Force, quarterbacked by the Army's director of program analysis and evaluation. Garner believed that the Quadrennial Defense Review would focus primarily on resource issues and that HQDA thus needed a task force devoted exclusively to examining how any changes in Army resources could affect Army programs (*Chart 9*).[11]

Although lacking a clear sense of how OSD and the Joint Staff would proceed, Garner directed the Strategic Synchronization Cell to gather information on the gamut of issues likely to surface during the study. Such matters included the implications of the "win-hold-win"

[10] Joint Staff, "Charter for the Quadrennial Defense Review," undated (Autumn 1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH; McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997.

[11] Garner interv, 9 May 1997; McManaway interv, 8 April 1997; Strategic Synchronization Cell Briefing Materials, "Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Army Plans and Preparation," undated (Oct 1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

concept for fighting two major regional contingencies that OSD had proposed during the Bottom-Up Review, or delays in or cancellations of major modernization programs. Meanwhile, the Army's Strategy Task Force members sought to develop a "metric" for sizing the Army's tactical forces, including a realistic "division slice" incorporating support units for contingency operations. The analysis extended further to developing simple "force packages" of Army units smaller than a division—"mission task-organized forces" (MTOF) that the Army could sell to the Joint Staff and OSD. Perhaps the most significant product emerging from the Army's initial efforts to define likely QDR issues was a "vignette drill," led by the Army's Resources Task Force, which developed three scenarios based on possible reductions in the Army's budget. Each vignette examined the impact of budgetary reductions of 10, 20, and 30 percent on Army organizations, with regard both to their forces and their administrative structures.

The vignette exercise demonstrated that previous reorganizations had already gleaned all significant efficiencies in Army infrastructure. Consequently, even a 10 percent Army reduction would require cutting active forces by at least two divisions as active strength fell to 450,000. Reductions of this size, analysts felt, would doom the nation's ability to respond to two, "near simultaneous," major regional contingencies. The Army was either closing in on its minimum level of resources or had already reached that point.[12]

By November 1996, the Army's Quadrennial Defense Review team had developed several study goals. First, HQDA sought to guide the QDR to an outcome reflecting an emerging national military strategy that focused on worldwide ground contingency operations. Such a result would not only favor the Army but also reflect current realities. Recent experience had demonstrated a demand for Army forces that would likely continue into the foreseeable future. Many HQDA staff officers believed that the recent increase in Army involvement in lesser regional contingencies justified a corresponding increase in the Army's share of the defense budget. Wary that advocacy for such an increase would provoke major interservice rivalry during the review, General Garner acted to avoid anything that would appear to be an Army raid on other

[12] Strategic Synchronization Cell Briefing Materials, "QDR: Army Plans and Preparations"; Strategic Synchronization Cell, " Strategic Synchronization Cell Tasking List," 28 Oct 1996; Strategic Synchronization Cell Briefing Chart, "Phase 0 . . . The Buildup Period"; Information Paper, DACS-DPR, sub: Quadrennial Defense Review Working Issue #2 - Impacts on Army of TOA Reductions, 31 Oct 1996; and Strategic Synchronization Cell Briefing Materials, "DRAFT: Response to AVCSA Tasker," 24 Oct 1996, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

services' programs or resources. His position, however, tended to eschew any comprehensive review of service roles and functions.[13]

The Army's second major goal for the Quadrennial Defense Review was to prevent OSD from reducing Army active forces or their readiness to fund any modernization programs of the Army or other services. Operation DESERT STORM had precipitated a number of articles and monographs by defense intellectuals heralding an imminent revolution in military affairs driven by information technology. Presumably, such future development would sweep aside existing warfighting doctrines, equipment, and organizations, making existing, or "legacy," forces superfluous and all expenditures on them wasteful. Unfortunately, such "pie-in-the-sky" predictions had a long history in the twentieth century.

The Army itself had sought to harness various technological aspects of the revolution in military affairs during the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers process, especially rapidly evolving digital information technology. Yet Army leaders hardly subscribed to a notion, advanced by more zealous commentators, that weapons platforms with revolutionary new capabilities and a generation of enhanced precision-guided munitions would emerge over the next two decades to dominate the battlefield. Ostensibly, these systems would offer "leap-ahead" technology capable of rendering existing weapons obsolete. Many RMA supporters had thus advocated reducing existing forces, especially ground forces, to provide funding for developing and fielding these promising new systems. But the specifics of the promised revolutionary technology remained vague.[14]

Obviously, such radical proposals threatened the Army's QDR campaign. From the perspective of many Army action officers, the recommendation would continue a disturbing trend begun by the Base Force and aggravated by the Bottom-Up Review: reducing Army forces in order to fund other services' programs, such as sealift. Consequently, the Army's QDR game plan had to deemphasize modernization in order

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[13] Briefing Materials, "QDR 97: America's Army," undated (Jan 1997); Army Operations Center Briefing, "Army Briefing to the Honorable William S. Cohen," 19 Dec 1996; Garner interv, 9 May 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[14] For examples of contemporary studies supporting RMA visions, see Daniel Gouré and Christopher M. Szara, eds., *Air and Space Power in the New Millennium* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), and Briefing, Dr. Dan Gouré and Jeffrey M. Ranney to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Avoiding the Defense Train Wreck," 14 Apr 1998. For examples of contemporary studies challenging key RMA premises, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 139–179, and Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, USMC, and Maj Gen Robert Scales, USA, "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," *Strategic Review* 25 (Summer 1997): 14–20.

to provide a coherent message to OSD and the Joint Staff. Early studies by the Army's Modernization Task Force—set up by HQDA to coordinate Army issues in the QDR's Modernization Panel—had indicated that major Army weapons systems, such as the M1 main battle tank and UH–60 medium-transport helicopter, would be reaching obsolescence by the end of the next decade. Army leaders also maintained their commitment to developing and fielding the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and the RAH–66 Comanche scout helicopter. But they chose not to make force modernization central to their Quadrennial Defense Review effort.[15]

In the end, the Army's QDR position projected *evolutionary*—rather than *revolutionary*—change. The United States was no longer engaged in an arms race with a "near-peer" competitor, a contest that had been characterized by often rapid, but generally ephemeral, "leap-frog" advances in technological advantage by one side over the other. Rather, the Army's QDR team postulated that technologically the United States was enjoying a "strategic pause" after more than four decades of superpower competition.[16] The nation was now free to research, develop, and experiment carefully with extremely expensive hardware that incorporated new technology in as close to an operational environment as possible before deciding which proven "leap-ahead" systems to purchase. In cases where new weapons systems failed to demonstrate leap-ahead capabilities, the United States could continue to "recapitalize," maintaining existing inventories by purchasing new items of the same systems already in service. Carefully planned maintenance and rebuild programs could also extend the lives of such systems. These cheaper solutions would enable the United States to continue to "overmatch" technologically any likely opponent in the next decade. The Army's campaign plan for the Quadrennial Defense Review was thus markedly conservative: hold on to forces and readiness, rather than seek to use the study to modify defense and Army resource priorities.[17]

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[15] Rand Briefing Materials, "Developing the Army's QDR Story," Nov 1996, Historian's Background Files, CMH; McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[16] Interpretations of "strategic pause" vary, and the concept remains controversial. Among Army QDR participants, it connoted a cessation of "leap-frog" *technological* innovation between two "near-peer" rivals. Army participants were well aware that the international environment would continue to evolve in ways both predictable and unpredictable through the next decade and that national military strategy would have to change in response. Other services used "strategic pause" to connote an opportunity to reduce active force levels to obtain funds for more aggressive modernization of U.S. forces.

[17] Briefing Materials, AVCSA to CSA, "Army QDR Puts & Takes," 17 Dec 1997;

Joint Staff Quadrennial Defense Review Plans

During the QDR the Joint Staff, for the first time since the 1992 Chairman's Study of Roles, Missions, and Functions, would play a major role in a reshaping study. The Joint Staff was now armed intellectually with *Joint Publication 3-0*, which provided a capstone doctrine for joint operations, along with sixty-two other published joint manuals. Another thirty-five manuals were in production. Although critics argued that the services might simply choose to ignore the joint material in developing their own doctrines and programs, this recent productivity portended continuing, albeit slow, progress toward truly integrated multiservice operations.[18]

JCS Chairman General John M. Shalikashvili had advanced the cause of jointness during the summer of 1996. He approved *Joint Vision 2010* for publication as a "conceptual template" for force development throughout the armed forces over the next decade and a half. *Joint Vision 2010* sought a "more seamless integration of service capabilities" with less duplication of functions, suggesting renewed emphasis on the consolidation of roles and functions. The joint concept also identified "accelerating technological change" as a tool likely to transform, rather than supplant, existing military capabilities through 2010. *Joint Vision 2010* predicted that technology's most likely impact on warfare was in the information/intelligence arena, through the provision of what he called "dominant battlespace awareness" of both friendly and enemy operations in a theater. Such information superiority promised that U.S. forces would dominate a likely enemy through faster joint maneuver capabilities, "precision engagement" (the use of smart munitions), better "force protection" (the ability to avoid casualties), and "focused logistics" (the use of information technology to distribute supplies more effectively).[19]

Joint Vision 2010 offered the promise of "enhanced synergism" by the more thorough integration of all service components at the theater level. The new doctrinal template opened the door for greater joint involvement in force development and the extension of joint command and control of operations below the regional combatant commander, or theater level. Finally, *Joint Vision 2010* suggested a more evolutionary approach in warfighting than that trumpeted by the more zealous proponents of an impending revolution in military affairs.

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and Briefing Materials, "Task Force In Progress Reviews For VCSA," 4 Nov 1996, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[18] Gen John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996): 1–5.

[19] "*Joint Vision 2010*: America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow," *Joint Force Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996): 34–49.

The Joint Staff made only minor organizational adjustments for its role in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The chairman designated the director, J–8 (force structure, resources, and assessment), to coordinate the Joint Staff's participation in the study. J–8 established a QDR support team of four officers who worked full-time coordinating study analyses with the QDR panels, other Joint Staff directorates, the services, and OSD. Once the panels began to develop recommendations for alternatives to the existing Future Years Defense Program force, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) also became involved in both oversight and support of the QDR. But it was the Joint Staff's J–8 Directorate that would undertake most of the analyses of options recommended by the panels and the JROC, a function of keen interest to the Army.[20]

The Joint Staff had already undertaken a recent study that would prove useful for the QDR. In response to a recommendation by the 1994–1995 Commission on Roles and Missions, the secretary of defense had directed the Joint Staff to do what came to be known as the Deep-Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS). The JROC organized the study as part of a three-phase Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) that began in August 1995. During the next year, the Joint Staff also conducted a separate "Close Support End-to-End Analysis" (CSEEA) that complemented the DAWMS. The Joint Staff accepted conceptual and analytical support from the Army's TRADOC Analysis Center for the CSEEA, which concentrated on surface-attack capabilities from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to a line 40 kilometers beyond (0–40). The J–8 and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) provided the analytical support for the rest of DAWMS, relying on the familiar TACWAR model as well as a new "Weapon Optimization and Resource Requirements Model" (WORRM). Developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses, WORRM used existing war plans for major regional contingencies in Southwest Asia and Korea to identify the highest priority targets in the theater and assign the appropriate delivery system and weapons to attain the "maximum target value destroyed." Although this weighting criterion focused on military effectiveness, the DAWMS also integrated similar efficiency measures in its assessment. Another study criterion was a maximum resource "cap," or limit,

[20] Joint Staff QDR Support Group Briefing Materials, "Quadrennial Defense Review," 26 Nov 1996; and MFR, 29 Oct 1996, sub: "Two Laps Around the Table: The Joint QDR Process," both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with Lt Col Frank Finelli, USA, QDR Support Team (J–8), 25 Apr 1997, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH; John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger Allen Brown, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis: A Retrospective Look at Joint Staff Participation*, RAND Publication DB-236-JS (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), pp. 8–12.

of the $10.6 billion already programmed for deep-attack programs. Each weapon analyzed in the simulation counted against this cap, and weapons competed against one another. Thus cost-benefit comparisons remained integral to the study and could conceivably eclipse military effectiveness as a decision-making criterion.[21]

The DAWMS continued through March 1997, while the QDR was still under way. As DAWMS operated with open participation by the services, HQDA initially assigned the Concepts, Doctrine, and Force Policy Division of the Office of the DCSOPS to coordinate the Army's work on it. To better focus that work, the DCSOPS established in the summer of 1996 a temporary organization dedicated to the study, the Joint Warfighting Studies and Analysis Division.

DAWMS and the CSEEA each involved the conduct and analysis of "excursions" from, or alternatives to, the baseline case. These alternatives examined strategic scenarios for three periods, 1998, 2006, and 2014, using munitions programmed or projected to be in the U.S. inventory at those times. Both studies reached completion during the late spring of 1997. They concluded that tactical air would play a major role in the two regional contingencies under all scenarios examined and that it would gain air superiority during the early stages, or "halt" phase, of each contingency. This stabilized situation would permit aircraft to rely more on conventional munitions delivered from medium altitudes, rather than expensive precision-guided munitions, for both close support and interdiction operations. DAWMS endorsed both the Army's helicopter-launched Hellfire missile and the service's projected later generations of its long-range surface-to-surface guided missile, the Army Tactical Missile System, as "critical and effective" systems in the major regional contingencies. The study recommended increased purchases of these systems over the next five years. Army participants in the two studies believed that the DAWMS and the CSEEA vindicated their own analyses. The studies confirmed that Army weapons with ranges of more than forty kilometers beyond friendly lines gave the regional combatant commander a backup to air-delivered weapons. Rather than a duplication resulting from unconstrained interservice competition, these Army systems could compensate for limitations of weather and communications on air-delivered, precision-guided weapons.[22]

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[21] DAMO-FDX Briefing Materials, "Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) and the Close Support End to End Assessment (CSEEA)" (Nov 1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[22] DAMO-FDX Briefing Materials, "Attack Weapons Mix Study," undated (Dec 1996); and Joint Staff Briefing Materials, "Close Support End to End Assessment DAWMS MAA Part 1, April 1997," 26 Mar 1997, both Historian's Background Files,

The Review Begins

JCS and OSD analysts used approved wargaming tools to help examine future needs. Expanding their efforts beyond the BUR's focus on major regional contingencies, they did five separate studies to support the review. The first, the "Two Major Theater War (MTW) Warfight Analysis," dealt with two, near-simultaneous, major contingencies and was similar in method and scope to the Bottom-Up Review.[23] Done by a J–8 group working primarily with the Force Assessment Panel, this study used the familiar TACWAR model for analyzing ground and air campaigns. A related study by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) assessed the naval aspects of each major theater war. As DAWMS had already provided a "warm" TACWAR database for each contingency, the J–8's analyses of force alternatives for each war were relatively straightforward. Several of the Army's and some of the other services' QDR participants questioned TACWAR's suitability for the post–Cold War era, especially because of its inadequate ability to model for such variables as maneuver, weather, and terrain. TACWAR nonetheless remained the standard analytical tool for the Quadrennial Defense Review.[24]

CMH; Conversation, Mark Sherry with Capt Robert Sweeney, U.S. Navy, Warfighting Analysis Division, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J–8), Joint Staff, 30 Jun 1997, Pentagon.

[23] Although the current *DPG 1998–2003* used the familiar "major regional contingency (MRC)" to denote the notional theater wars in Southwest Asia and Korea, in February 1997 OSD and the Joint Staff changed the reference to "major theater war (MTW)." At the same time, they changed "lesser regional contingencies (LRCs)" to "small-scale contingencies (SSCs)."

[24] Interv, Sherry with Capt Sweeney, 30 Jun 1997; and with Dr. Robin Buckelew, Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 5 May 1997, Pentagon, CMH; Rear Adm John W. Craine, Jr., U.S. Navy, and Cmdr Michael R. Shumaker, U.S. Navy, Ret., "Navy's Response to the Quadrennial Defense Review," *Military Operations Research* 3, no. 5 (1997): 6–8, 14–16. TACWAR, the oldest of four theater-level simulations in the Defense Department, was used by the Joint Staff, OSD (PA&E), and the combatant commands. The other models were Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM), developed and used by the Rand Corporation; Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM), used by the Center for Army Analysis (formerly the Army Concepts Analysis Agency); and THUNDER, used by the Air Force's Studies and Analysis Agency. See U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency Memorandum Report CAA-MR-97-54, "A Survey of Theater Combat Models: Tools That Support DoD's Strategic Analysis and Policy Development" (Bethesda, Md.: CAA, October 1997), for an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each model. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., *Military Modeling for Decision Making*, 3d ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1997), pp. 31–33, 37–39, 141–177, for background on strengths and weaknesses of models and simulations used by the Defense Department.

The "Two MTW Warfight Analysis" study group began its work in January 1997 and continued until late April. The results provided the Force Assessment Panel with a "force sufficiency" analysis and a "risk assessment" analysis of two future wars, one in Korea and one in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both fought in 2006. The war scenarios came directly from the Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPSs) that supported the current defense guidance, not from the regional combatant commanders' existing war plans, and incorporated all programmed force modernizations. Consequently, the two major theater wars reflected the peculiarities of terrain and estimated opposing forces unique to those theaters, rather than those that would be encountered with more generic adversaries in notional contingencies.[25]

The Two-MTW study expanded several aspects of similar analyses done for the Bottom-Up Review.[26] The J–8 study group ran eight, full, near-simultaneous, two-MTW simulations. Some of these began with hostilities in Korea, followed by an outbreak of war in Southwest Asia. The others followed the opposite sequence. Unlike the Bottom-Up Review's analyses of the two major regional contingencies, these simulations incorporated insights from two other ongoing analytical efforts. The QDR's Baseline Engagement Force analysis and Dynamic Commitment exercises both contributed data concerning "peacetime force engagement," the level of effort that U.S. forces were expending on a routine basis in lesser contingencies and operations other than war. That is, rather than starting the two major theater wars with all U.S. forces at home stations, the Two MTW Warfight Analysis commenced hostilities in the two theaters while essential forces were engaged in small-scale contingencies across the globe, as they would be in a "real world" situation. The analysis also conducted "excursions," or variants, of the baseline analysis, incorporating the use of weapons of mass destruction in a given theater. Other such excursions involved decreasing warning times before the outbreak of hostilities in each theater and the impact

[25] Finelli interv, 25 April 1997, CMH; J–8 Warfighting Analysis Division Briefing Materials, "MRC Assessment," 19 December 1996, Historian's Background Materials, CMH; *DPG 1998–2003: Scenario Appendix*, pp. A-1 to A-3-15.

[26] The Joint Staff followed the 1993 Bottom-Up Review with another strategic mobility study, the 1994–95 Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-Up Review (Update) (MRS BURU). The Joint Staff's next study, the 1995 Nimble Dancer I, assessed the BUR force's capabilities for conducting near-simultaneous major regional contingencies in 1997. Shortly after this study, Nimble Dancer II assessed the BUR force's capabilities for two, near-simultaneous, MRCs in the period 2001–2005. DAWMS then conducted a weapons optimization analysis for 1998, 2006, and 2014. See DCSOPS Briefing Materials, "Nimble Dancer Implication," undated (1996), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

of "across the board" U.S. force reductions of 10, 20, and 30 percent. Although these analyses were more comprehensive than previous studies evaluating the two-regional conflict scenario, they still relied on what many observers believed to be excessively optimistic assumptions. For example, the analyses assumed that the United States and its allies would attain rapid dominance of the sea around each theater, permitting the unmolested transport of Army forces and materiel to each contingency. Hence the Army and other services continued to dispute elements of these analyses.[27]

Complementing the Two MTW Warfight Analysis, the Baseline Engagement Force study attempted to calculate the impact of peacetime forward presence, humanitarian and peacekeeping deployments, and small-scale contingencies. The study provided analytical support for the efforts of the Readiness, Strategy, and Force Assessment panels. One study goal was to determine total force requirements to support an overseas presence of a hundred thousand personnel in Western Europe and a hundred thousand in East Asia. A second goal was to calculate the units needed for small-scale contingencies, including those units "reconstituting" at their home stations after returning, and those training for deployment to a contingency operation. Another category of units was those involved in sustained peacekeeping operations under international agreements, including the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert and an operation in Montenegro. As the study progressed, it also identified certain "high demand-low density" (HD-LD) units, required for both major-theater wars and small-scale contingencies, that suffered from a high annual operational tempo, such as water purification teams, civil affairs detachments, and specialized aviation maintenance units. It also examined the impact on soldiers in occupational specialties with high personnel tempo rates and how their possible overuse might affect the continued health of an all-volunteer force.[28]

Another study, related to the Baseline Engagement Force study, was the Multiple Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC)/Small-Scale Contingency (SSC) Assessment. Undertaken by the assistant secretary of defense (strategy and requirements) with Joint Staff assistance, it supported the strategy, force assessment, and readiness panels by analyzing U.S. participation in small-scale contingencies over the

[27] Craine and Shumaker, "Navy's Response to the Quadrennial Defense Review," pp. 8–9; Memo, Lt Gen Eric K. Shinseki, USA, Army Operations Deputy, for the Director, Joint Staff, 27 Mar 1997, sub: Ground Force Assessment Analysis, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[28] Briefing Materials, J–8 Forces Division, "Baseline Engagement Force Status Report," 23 Dec 1996, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

previous two decades. Attempting to forecast future U.S. participation based on the new national military strategy, the study projected needs for "heavy-demand future" and "moderate-demand future" cases to 2010. Although its authors acknowledged that the department's leadership could accept either scenario as a forecast, they characterized the heavy-demand future as a "conservative" or "worst-case" projection. The study also recommended more selectiveness in U.S. involvement in future small-scale contingencies.[29]

At the other end of the spectrum of conflict, OSD sponsored a "Peer Competitor" analysis to support the QDR. Rather than focus on immediate problems with small-scale contingencies and other peacetime engagement operations, this analysis looked fifteen years into the future. Its primary aim was to determine when the United States could face another superpower, or "near-peer," competitor, whether nation-state, empire, or unified coalition. The Peer Competitor analysis undergirded the Modernization Panel's efforts. Unlike for the other major QDR analytical studies, it was the assistant secretary of defense (program analysis and evaluation), rather than the Joint Staff, who led this study. In conjunction with this effort, his office also conducted a TACWAR-based analysis that focused on a hypothetical major-theater war scenario in the more distant future.[30]

The J–8's Dynamic Commitment wargame series, which was the last of the analytical efforts by either the Joint Staff or OSD, overlapped with the Small-scale Contingency and Baseline Engagement Force analyses and helped integrate them. The primary objective of the Dynamic Commitment series was to give decision makers a better idea of the forces needed to satisfy the requirements of all the future scenarios being studied. The result was a "force allocation" exercise that committed programmed forces planned in the services' 1998–2003 Program Objective Memorandums against a series of projected contingencies, termed "vignettes," over an eight-year period. It integrated baseline force commitments to forward presence and extended peace-

[29] Briefing Materials, J–8, "Dynamic Commitment: The Transitions Wargame Series in Support of the Quadrennial Defense Review," 23 Dec 1996; Briefing Materials by Col David M. Shanahan, J–8, "Multiple LRC Assessment," 23 Dec 1996; Briefing Materials by Ms Michelle Flournoy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy), "Smaller-Scale Contingency Force Requirements Study," 19 Apr 1997, SECDEF Review Briefing, 25 Apr 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[30] Interv, Mark Sherry with Honorable William Lynn, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), 19 Jun 1997, Pentagon, CMH; Briefing Materials, OSD (PA&E), "Parametric Modernization Analysis/Regional Great Power Scenario," 18 Apr 1997, QDR Executive Session Briefing Materials, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Finelli interv, 25 Apr 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

keeping missions with force requirements for small-scale contingencies, domestic humanitarian assistance operations, and major theater wars. Dynamic Commitment augmented the two major regional contingencies studies by demonstrating that not all units could deploy at a high state of readiness from home stations to a theater. In actuality, units earmarked for employment in a major theater war are often engaged in other contingencies, training for deployment to a contingency operation, on a baseline engagement force mission, or reconstituting and retraining after returning from an operation. Such conditions must influence a force sufficiency analysis.[31]

Unlike the Two MTW Warfight Analysis, Dynamic Commitment operated without modeling and simulation tools. Although retaining the game methodology, it consisted of four seminars, Dynamic Commitment 1 through Dynamic Commitment 4. The first session was an administrative exercise that focused on game procedure. The second seminar, in January 1997, identified issues and disagreements and submitted them for resolution to the senior decision makers at Dynamic Commitment 3 in February. After that seminar, interest in the games grew. Some two hundred players participated in Dynamic Commitment 4, held 20–22 March. The exercise divided game players into two "Blue Teams," with game controllers running each team through separate and simultaneous operations. Each team played the same vignettes but in a different order. Representatives at the colonel/captain level from the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the services played the roles of regional combatant commander and service chief roles for each Blue Team. Other participants served as "facilitators," or controllers; technical experts on transportation, intelligence, personnel, and other issues; and Joint Staff and OSD "risk assessors" from the QDR panels.[32]

The Blue Teams operated over a timeline of eight years, extending from 1997 through 2004, with each year divided into four quarters and

[31] Interv, Mark Sherry with Col Stanley F. Gorenc, USAF, Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division, J–8, 29 Jul 1997, Pentagon, CMH; Briefing Materials, Joint Staff for JROC, "Quadrennial Defense Review," 9 January 1997; and Briefing Materials, Strategic Synchronization Cell for RC Offsite Conference, "Dynamic Commitment," 1 June 1997, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[32] Briefing Materials for JROC Update, "Dynamic Commitment: A Risk Assessment of the POM Force Against the JSR World," 3 April 1997; Briefing Materials, Col John Gingrich (DAMO-SSW), Army Strategy Task Force, "Dynamic Commitment GAME 2: QDR Dynamic Commitment HOTWASH," undated (February 1997); Joint Staff, Dynamic Commitment 3 Game Book (19–20 February 1997); Joint Staff, Dynamic Commitment 4 Game Book (20–22 March 1997), all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Gorenc interv, 29 Jul 1997, CMH.

with one game "move" for each team per quarter. Each move centered on one or more vignettes, or scenarios, that required the commitment of U.S. forces. Dynamic Commitment developed its forty-six vignettes from a variety of sources. Actual contingency operations that the United States had conducted over the past nine years were the bases for twenty-three of the vignettes. Another nine were derived from the ongoing Small-scale Contingency Assessment. Four were based on the current defense guidance and another four on actual war plans. The remaining six came from miscellaneous sources. Vignettes represented various types of past and anticipated contingency operations that included major theater wars, opposed interventions, shows of force, "no-fly" operations that restricted flights of military aircraft, maritime operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, domestic humanitarian assistance operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). During each move, game players representing the regional combatant commanders developed force requirements and referred them to the services to be filled with forces available. Dynamic Commitment made no effort to "fight" each vignette, or otherwise test the sufficiency of the forces to be committed, beyond seminar consensus.[33]

The Dynamic Commitment war games examined two possible "futures." One exercised the force contained in the services' Program Objective Memorandums for 1998 through 2003. The second pursued an "excursion" that exercised a force that had undergone an across-the-board 10 percent reduction. The games examined the impacts of "tradeoffs" of forces of different capabilities or even different services. They also assessed the effects of a high tempo of employment on units that were high demand-low density, specialized forces.[34] They demonstrated that forces deployed to other contingency operations could not always immediately withdraw and deploy to a major theater war effectively without some rest and retraining. Dynamic Commitment thus showed that the QDR's force-sufficiency analysis would face significant requirements for forces and for other capabilities to satisfy small-scale contingencies.[35]

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[33] Gorenc interv, 29 Jul 1997, CMH; JROC Update Briefing, "Dynamic Commitment," 3 April 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Craine and Shumaker, "Navy's Response to the Quadrennial Defense Review," pp. 7–8.

[34] Although the HD-LD category pertained primarily to aircraft and other assets of the Navy and the Air Force, it also encompassed several Army capabilities, including Patriot air defense units and Guardrail intelligence aircraft.

[35] Gorenc interv, 29 Jul 1997; JROC Update Briefing, "Dynamic Commitment," 3 Apr 1997, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Army players, as well as those of the other services, had mixed reactions to Dynamic Commitment's methodology and conclusions. For instance, several Army players objected to changes in the types and number of vignettes from Dynamic Commitment 2 to Dynamic Commitment 4. Contingencies played in the earlier seminar reflected the historical frequency of each type of operation during the preceding nine years. The Army's QDR team argued that Dynamic Commitment 4 vignettes, based more on the emerging national military strategy than on historical experience, underestimated likely participation of Army units in future contingencies.[36]

A second problem concerned management of the game play. An unstated goal for service players was to maximize commitment of their own forces in each vignette. Increasing their service's utility for the exercise would hopefully offer an effective hedge against force reductions. Consequently, some service representatives attempted to commit their units to every vignette possible, despite the lack of requirements for these forces by regional combatant command representatives, actions that often seemed blatant grabs for roles and functions. Similarly, Dynamic Commitment controllers deferred to service representatives on issues of readiness and on the time required to reconstitute units after they had participated in a contingency. Services offered often radically different estimates of the time required to recommit such units to other vignettes, because lower estimates could often increase a service's participation in the next vignette. As game controllers failed to assert common standards for assessing the readiness and reconstitution times for units from the services, service and regional combatant commander representatives had to stop the game and argue whether a specific unit from a service should contribute to the next vignette. Such issues left Army players uncomfortable with the overall "fidelity" of the exercise.[37]

The diverse service approaches to force allocation raised larger issues of roles and functions. Army players argued specifically that Dynamic

[36] Briefing Materials, Center for Land Warfare, "QDR Transition Game 'Dynamic Commitment': Army Response and Analysis Plan," undated (Feb 1997); Briefing Materials, Col John Gingrich (DAMO-SSW), "Dynamic Commitment Game 2 Hotwash," undated (Jan 1997); Briefing Materials, Col John Gingrich (DAMO-SSW), "Army Insights from Dynamic Commitment 4," 2 Apr 1997; JROC Update Briefing, "Dynamic Commitment," 3 Apr 1997; QDR Executive Session Briefing Materials, Maj Gen Mark Hamilton, Vice Director, J–8, "Dynamic Commitment," Apr 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[37] Briefing Materials, Col John Gingrich (DAMO-SSW), Army Strategy Task Force, "QDR Dynamic Commitment 2 Hotwash," undated (Jan 1997); Position Paper from Col Brownlee (DAMO-SSW), 18 Feb 1997, sub: Dynamic Commitment (DC) Game Issues-OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO Impacts; Gorenc interv, 29 Jul 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

Commitment controllers considered Army and Marine units interchangeable. In many vignettes, controllers agreed to Marine demands to add their units to a contingency operation that already had Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units assigned. In some cases these additions appeared to displace similar Army units. The result was a divided U.S. ground contingent with several incompatible capabilities, a situation that hampered operational flexibility. Army and Marine forces often required distinctive maintenance and other logistical support, which led to separate combat service support organizations for the same contingency operation. Dividing the ground component between two services posed another complication when duration of a contingency required rotation of units into and out of the theater. Limited commonality of unit equipment meant that only units from the same service could relieve units in a theater without bringing in their own materiel, sustainment, and command and control hardware. Differences in doctrine, communications, and other aspects of operations also hindered interoperability.[38] Of course, to many JCS and OSD observers, such problems underlined the need for greater commonality, or jointness.

Despite these reservations, the Army's team accepted Dynamic Commitment as a welcome addition to the overall analytical effort. The game opened the QDR process to extensive participation by services, unified commands, and players from defense agencies. Army players observed not only their input into each vignette, but also the impact of inputs from the other services and the unified commands. Likewise, the outcome of Dynamic Commitment 4 was welcome to the Army's leaders. The detailed breakdown of forces committed to the vignettes and the depth of post-game analysis far exceeded the limited depth of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review's analysis. Dynamic Commitment yielded a far more realistic picture of the diversity and intensity of threats that the United States would likely confront in the future.

Although they welcomed the opportunity to participate in the review's analyses, the Army's Quadrennial Defense Review team members objected to how OSD and the Joint Staff used these analyses in decisions involving future forces and programs. At the end of January 1997, the QDR's Force Assessment Panel shifted its approach from one that sought an analysis measuring programmed U.S. forces against expected future threats to one that would assess several "integrated options" that specified 10, 20, and 30 percent reductions in programmed

[38] Briefing Materials, QDR Executive Session, "A Risk Assessment of the POM Force Against the JSR World: J–8/SAGD Gaming Input to the Force Assessment Panel," 25 Apr 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

forces. The Army's leadership strongly disagreed with this approach. General Reimer had consistently argued that the Quadrennial Defense Review should develop a strategy and then apportion forces to meet that strategy's requirements. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review had promised to take such an approach but failed to do so. Nevertheless, as OSD assumed leadership of the QDR from the Joint Staff in February, it appeared to be pursuing once again a force-cutting exercise in the guise of a strategic review.[39]

Results

In March and early April 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review's panels briefed the Senior Steering Group on the results of their analyses. The QDR's Strategy Panel provided an essential framework for the other panels' studies. It adopted assessments from two recent Defense Department strategic reviews. The Joint Staff's *Joint Strategy Review* (*JSR*), a comprehensive strategic review undertaken in collaboration with OSD and the services, had been completed in November 1996. It contended that the United States would not have a "near-peer competitor" through 2010. Rather, the *JSR* postulated that the nation faced one or more major theater wars and a variety of small-scale contingencies. The strategic review also noted the likelihood of "asymmetrical" threats to U.S. interests by weaker actors, states, or nonstate groups. These adversaries would probably avoid U.S. strengths in conventional military power and resort to terrorism and other means to strike areas of weakness, including the U.S. civilian population and those of allies. Instead of the Bottom-Up Review's forecast of a world offering reduced risk to U.S. interests, the panel posited a more "multipolar" world through 2010, with the nation facing a diversity of potential and likely threats.[40]

The Joint Staff and OSD incorporated key points of the *JSR* into a draft defense strategy, which was circulated for comment and review in late March 1997. The proposed revision to strategy had three elements: shaping the international environment through forward presence and other forms of engagement, responding to aggression and other crises, and

[39] Memo, Gen Ronald H. Griffith, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 Mar 1997, sub: Response to QDR Force Assessment Briefing; and Information Paper (DAMO-FDF), 21 Mar 1997, sub: Accepting a QDR-Mandated $20K Cut in Army Active Component End Strength, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[40] Briefing Materials Extracted from DIA Briefing to QDR Senior Steering Group, "Future Threats and Challenges," 17 December 1996; Joint Staff, *Joint Strategy Review (JSR)* (Final Draft), 26 November 1996, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

preparing for an "uncertain future." It reaffirmed the Bottom-Up Review's requirement for forces adequate to "rapidly halt or defeat initial enemy advances in two theaters." The draft strategy also noted that, in the event of a major theater war, U.S. and allied forces would have to halt an enemy invasion as rapidly as possible, gain the initiative, and evict the enemy with a timely counterattack. If this concept for a major theater war buttressed Army arguments for maintaining substantial ground capabilities to prevail rapidly and with a minimum of casualties in such a conflict, at least one other aspect of the strategy was more worrisome. The strategy's authors rejected the necessity for sizing active U.S. forces to a level adequate to prosecute concurrently two simultaneous theater wars, peacetime engagement operations, and small-scale contingencies, arguing that such an approach was "neither necessary nor affordable." Thus the draft strategy accepted more risk than many Army QDR participants believed prudent, although it endorsed requirements for ground forces adequate to prevail in at least two concurrent major theater wars.[41]

Both the *JSR* and the new defense strategy obviously influenced the review's force assessment. As in the case of the Bottom-Up Review, the Two MTW Warfight Analysis was the primary analytical foundation for this force assessment study, although Dynamic Commitment and the other analyses contributed. The Force Assessment Panel measured Army forces against requirements for major theater wars and forward presence, as well as against peacetime operational and deployed personnel tempos. The analysis considered options for reducing Army active forces by three brigades and by six brigades. These options would substitute some of the fifteen Army National Guard enhanced readiness brigades for late-deploying active units. The proposal threatened to spark another intraservice conflict between the active Army and the Army National Guard. The tension grew when the QDR's Force Assessment Panel rejected, as requirements for determining Army National Guard force structure, both state humanitarian assistance missions and the strategic reserve mission that the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review had advocated. A second Army issue concerned whether the Quadrennial Defense Review could reduce Army theater-level combat service support forces by substituting host-nation support, primarily through contracts with local civilians to perform these functions. The Army's QDR team challenged both analyses, charging that the Army was the only service to undergo this level of scrutiny. The team noted that the Army's politi-

[41] Memo, Brig Gen Howard J. Von Kaenel (DAMO-SS) for Distribution, 19 Mar 1997, sub: Draft Defense Strategy, Historian's Background Files, CMH; McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997; Schrader, Lewis, and Brown, *QDR Analysis*, pp. 19–20.

cally powerful reserve components would fight any effort to reduce their combat service support and other forces, possibly precipitating an intense struggle if Army leaders acquiesced to any such cuts.[42]

In the end both the Force Assessment Panel and the QDR's Senior Steering Group decided against making major reductions in the active force structure of the Army, validating the existing ten divisions. One influence was the unique nature of the Korean theater of operations, with large indigenous ground forces located close to their wartime positions. Dynamic Commitment demonstrated that the Army's active force would be heavily committed before entering the first of two near-simultaneous major theater wars. The Army's QDR team had argued that at least seven Army divisions were essential to prosecute a successful and vigorous counterattack in a single major theater war. Nevertheless, the Force Assessment Panel rejected increasing active Army strength to reduce risk.[43]

The review's Force Assessment Panel considered but did not recommend substitution of enhanced readiness brigades for active Army units scheduled to deploy to the two, near-simultaneous, major theater wars. Noting that the assistant secretary of defense (reserve affairs) supported this position, the panel effectively left the issue open to further study. It also rejected the strategic need for existing Army National Guard force levels, virtually preordaining a conflict over missions between the active Army and the Army National Guard. The panel also waffled on the issue of substituting host-nation support for Army theater-level combat service support requirements, leaving that issue open to future debate as well.[44]

Although the Quadrennial Defense Review's force assessment based its recommendations for active force levels primarily on strategic requirements, it also considered unit and personnel deployment tempos. However, it deferred to the Readiness Panel deployment and readiness issues. The Readiness Panel focused on improving readiness throughout the armed forces, by adopting one or more of five approaches analyzed: (1) internal improvements to the current approaches of each service in managing its own unit readiness; (2) adopting across the department

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[42] Memo, Col John R. Gingrich (DAMO-SSW) for Chief, Ground Forces Subpanel, OSD/PA&E, JS/J8, ATTN: Col Clemence, 21 Feb 1997, sub: Input for Ground Forces Assessment Subpanel, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[43] Sweeney interv, 30 Jun 1997.

[44] Briefing Materials for SECDEF Review, "Ground Force Assessment"; "Campaign Analysis"; "Army Additional Assessment"; and "Army National Guard Issues"; all 25 Apr 1997; Memo, Maj(P) John J. Dolac, USA, Military Secretary, J–8, for Planners, 8 May 1997, sub: Coordination Draft, Force Assessment Panel Report, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

the Army's method of "fixed tiering" based on likely unit deployment dates; (3) adopting cyclical readiness of CONUS-based forces; (4) adopting the Navy's cyclical readiness/unit deployment model; and (5) adopting tiered readiness by component, with all reserve component units funded for lower readiness levels. Each approach had strengths and weaknesses.[45]

The Army's QDR team sought to preserve the Army's existing readiness system and avoid adopting tiered readiness in active Army units. The team had several advantages in arguing its position. First, when the Readiness Panel considered converting Army forward-deployed combat units in Europe to six-month unit deployment tours without dependents, it found that cost savings did not offset the disruptions in the training of rotating units. The Army's QDR team also noted that recent base closures in the United States had reduced infrastructure, especially family housing, below a level adequate for home-basing of units redeployed from Europe. Finally, the Army's Readiness Task Force quarterback was able to demonstrate to the review's Readiness Panel that, under the tiered-readiness proposal, the Army would be unable to train and deploy active units that had been reduced to a low readiness level in time to meet their deployment timelines in a major theater war. These delays in turn would adversely affect reserve component units scheduled to mobilize and train at the vacating active unit's installation. In sum, Army commitments were simply too numerous to support a tiered system that accepted lower readiness conditions in large numbers of regular units.[46]

If the Readiness Panel focused on near-term issues, the review's Modernization Panel focused on issues of long-term interest to the Defense Department and the Army. With the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and the Comanche helicopter as its only major hardware programs, the Army's modest modernization program seemed safe from significant cuts. Curtailing, or even canceling, one or both programs would hardly yield major immediate savings, as both were still in development. The Army's QDR team feared that OSD would instead try to reduce Army forces in

[45] Briefing Materials, Joint Staff (J–3), "QDR Readiness Panel," 1 Apr 1997, and Briefing Materials, Joint Staff (J–3), "JROC In-Progress Review: QDR Readiness Panel," 18 Mar 1997, both Historian's Background Files, CMH; Craine and Shumaker, "Navy's Response to the Quadrennial Defense Review," pp. 11–12.

[46] Briefing Materials, DAMO-ODR, "Tiered Readiness Assessment—In Progress Review," 5 Nov 1996; William A. West and Michael W. Collins, "Issues That Determine the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Strategy: Readiness," undated; and Dan Butler, "Mobilization Issues Associated with the 2 MRC Strategy," undated, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

order to fund the ambitious aviation programs of the other services. But the review's Modernization Panel subjected the other services' tactical air programs to a rigorous analysis. Although the panel did not advise cancellation of any of the other services' three major tactical air modernization programs or the Marine Corps' and Air Force's controversial V-22 "tilt rotor" transport, it recommended curtailed procurement in all four programs. Because the secretary of defense approved the Army's modernization program without major restructuring, the Army seemed to have met its limited QDR modernization objectives.[47]

While the Quadrennial Defense Review's main assessments focused on operational forces, its Infrastructure Panel attempted to analyze the complex network of base organizations and functions. The panel's review extended beyond installations to encompass all nondeployable Defense Department organizations, nontactical headquarters, and even department management processes, confronting issues that had thwarted early reform attempts. Despite a plethora of recommendations, the 1989–1992 Defense Management Review had fallen short of significantly overhauling the Defense Department. Similarly, the 1994–1995 Commission on Roles and Missions had focused about half of its efforts on infrastructure issues without effecting major organizational changes. Such changes were key not just to greater efficiency but to enhanced effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces. To succeed where earlier efforts had failed, the Quadrennial Defense Review's infrastructure reforms would have to reduce excess institutional capability and reorganize the Defense Department to consolidate truly duplicative functions.[48]

Facing a complex task, the Infrastructure Panel focused on finding cost savings for future defense budgets rather than pursuing overarching restructuring and reform. The panel rejected reexamining former Defense Management Review initiatives for major organizational consolidations and instead chose to follow a recommendation by the Commission on Roles and Missions to pursue a "revolution in business affairs." One key component of this "revolution" was to "outsource" and "privatize" a number of traditional support functions, including depot maintenance. The Defense Science Board buttressed the recommendation to

[47] Modernization Panel Briefing Materials for QDR Steering Group, "Ground Forces Task Force Briefing," 24 Mar 1997; QDR Briefing Materials for SECDEF Review, "Army Ground Forces and Rotary Wing Consolidated Task Force Briefing," 25 Apr 1995; and QDR Briefing Materials for SECDEF Review, "TACAIR Modernization," 29 Apr 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH; McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[48] Briefing Materials, QDR Infrastructure Panel, "Briefing to Dr. White (Deputy Secretary of Defense)," 28 Jan 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

outsource functions, arguing in November 1996 that, combined with other management reforms, outsourcing of logistical functions could save the Defense Department more than $30 billion a year by 2002. The QDR's Infrastructure Panel could hardly ignore recommendations that could yield savings of such a magnitude.[49]

The Army's QDR team viewed the Infrastructure Panel's activities with misgiving. Anxious that the panel sought greater efficiencies over enhanced effectiveness, the Army sought to ensure that the panel made no recommendations that would disrupt existing Army organizations and programs. Its Infrastructure Task Force endorsed the principle behind outsourcing and privatization but feared an OSD-led rush to outsource without careful analysis of alternatives. Consequently, Army leaders adopted a defensive position concerning infrastructure issues and sought to avoid damage rather than help the QDR's Infrastructure Panel implement major restructuring.[50]

Overwhelmed by the scope of its responsibilities and the lack of service support for panel initiatives, the Infrastructure Panel made only conservative recommendations for changes in existing organizations and programs. Although it noted a 32 percent reduction in military personnel over the past eight years and a reduction of only 21 percent in "domestic facilities," the Infrastructure Panel failed to demonstrate a correlation between the two issues. Despite this omission, the panel endorsed further base realignments and closures even as it largely ignored mobilization requirements and the extensive replacement costs for facilities hastily abandoned to obtain short-term budget savings. In response to service complaints that defense agencies were bloated and that they overpriced their services, the Infrastructure Panel recommended a follow-up study of the issue. But, to a number of critics, the panel's lack of real success in either reorganizing defense infrastructure or finding significant cost savings was disappointing.[51]

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[49] Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study on Achieving an Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Military Superiority: Higher Performance at Lower Costs* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1996), pp. ES-2, II-1 to II-24; Schrader, Lewis, and Brown, *QDR Analysis*, pp. 21–22.

[50] Garner interv, 9 May 1997, CMH; Briefing Materials, QDR Infrastructure Panel, "Briefing to JROC," 25 Feb 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[51] QDR Infrastructure Panel, "Draft OSD Level Final Report Summary," 4 Apr 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH; William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1987), pp. 53–57; Garner interv, 9 May 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

The remaining major QDR panel, Human Resources, also confronted an unwieldy series of discrete issues affecting both military and civilian manpower. As with the infrastructure review, the Army sought to avoid damage rather than to gain through the panel's efforts. During the panel's deliberations, Army representatives thus objected to any consolidation proposals advanced by JCS or OSD staffers.[52]

As a start, the Human Resources Panel examined a series of initiatives for Defense Management Review–type consolidations of selected personnel services, including morale, recreation, and welfare tasks. The military services, including the Army, objected to these initiatives and, in deliberations of the JROC, succeeded in sidelining most of them. As in the case of infrastructure issues, rather than pursue consolidations, the panel recommended outsourcing and privatizing several personnel functions. In the area of civilian personnel management, the Human Resources Panel favored establishing a centralized OSD civilian executive system to administer GS-13 through GS-15 managers, including their transfers among services, OSD, and the Joint Staff. The panel also proposed legislative action to transfer personnel management authority from the U.S. Code's Title 5 civil service regulations to its Title 10 national security provisions. If implemented, this recommendation would mean removing civilian employees in the Defense Department from civil service protection. Capitalizing on a Commission on Roles and Missions recommendation, the panel also endorsed a proposal to allow the Defense Department to establish its own civil service rules. As was the case with the major Infrastructure Panel recommendations, most Human Resources Panel recommendations required legislative approval. Consequently, the secretary of defense deferred decisions on most of them.[53]

The secretary of defense's decisions on the defense review's recommendations, disseminated in May, left most major Army interests unaffected. If the study did not reverse the Bottom-Up Review's reductions in Army force levels and instead directed further manpower reductions for the Army, neither did it recommend elimination of active Army units or curtailment of major modernization programs. But despite General Reimer's objections, the review emphasized additional resources for accelerated modernization rather than for further definition of the nation's strategic requirements and the forces to meet them.

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[52] Interv, Sherry with Maj Gen Arthur Dean, Director, Military Personnel Management, DCSPER, 28 Jul 1997, Pentagon, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[53] Briefing Materials, Human Resources Panel, "Civilian Personnel Task Force," 6 Mar 1997, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Dean interv, 28 Jul 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

The review's final report endorsed a proposal by several members of the Defense Science Board to increase Defense Department procurement funding to $60 billion in 2001. Reimer had argued that, although this modernization objective "has merit, it is only loosely linked to our defense strategy and has yet to be precisely defined." Nevertheless, the secretary of defense opted to fund enhanced modernization at the expense of service manpower. Directed to save manpower costs equivalent to 45,000 active military personnel, HQDA developed a plan to cut 15,000 active soldiers, 45,000 reserve component soldiers, and 33,700 civilians. Noting that cutting the reserve soldiers and civilians necessitated overcoming strong lobbying by affected parties, Reimer argued that he could not take cuts beyond 15,000 in the active force, should Congress balk at reducing the other two components.[54]

Despite misgivings about QDR manpower reductions, the Army's vice chief of staff and the assistant secretary of the Army (manpower and reserve affairs) chaired an "offsite conference" to address the secretary of defense's reductions in the Army's reserve components. Key HQDA officials, including the chief, Army Reserve, and the chief, National Guard Bureau, met from 2 to 4 June at Fort McNair, D.C., to develop a detailed implementation plan for the cuts. The Army's leadership intended this meeting to develop a five-year plan for implementing Army reserve component force reductions. Not surprisingly, the conference was contentious, with the reserve component leaders unable to agree to reductions beyond 3,000 in the Army Reserve and 17,000 in the Army National Guard. The Army's experience in the conference reaffirmed the difficulties of reducing the Army's reserve components without careful negotiation and without a willingness by the secretary of defense to assume the political consequences of forcing such cuts.[55]

Like the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review conflicted with and overshadowed the Program Objective Memorandum process. The Army developed its biennial POM and submitted it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

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[54] Ltr, Gen Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to Gen John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 Mar 1997; Memo, Lt Gen Eric K. Shinseki, Army Operations Deputy, for Director, Joint Staff, 27 Mar 1997, sub: Ground Force Assessment Analysis; and Author's notes, Army Quarterback meeting, 21 Apr 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH; Cohen, *Report of the QDR*, pp. 29, 59–60.

[55] Memo, Honorable Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army, for the Secretary of Defense, undated (Jun 1997), sub: Implementation Plan for Army Personnel Reductions-QDR; Briefing Materials, Strategic Synchronization Cell, "Quadrennial Defense Review Overview," 1 Jun 1997; and Briefing Materials, DCSOPS, "Total Army Force Overview," 1 Jun 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

expecting the customary rigorous review and modifications before OSD consolidated the Army's POM into its Future Years Defense Program. As had the Base Force study and the BUR, the QDR not only duplicated the normal program process, it reversed it. OSD and the Joint Staff, rather than the services, developed a framework of forces and programs to meet the requirements of the national military strategy. Instead of initiating this process, the Army and the other services merely participated in it. That Army leaders were able to defend their existing force structure for the time being obscured their decreasing influence over the service's destiny.

Chapter 8
Two Final Reviews, 1997–1998

Supplementing the QDR study were two separate reviews, one by a National Defense Panel (NDP) and another by a Task Force on Defense Reform. Like the Commission on Roles and Missions, the NDP was to provide the secretary of defense with an evaluation by national security experts from outside the government. Its charter was extremely broad, and its purpose was in large part to evaluate the work of the QDR and propose alternative courses of action. In contrast, the charge of the Task Force on Defense Reform was narrower. Composed primarily of defense experts associated with but not part of the Department of Defense, it had the task of recommending more specific reforms in the organization and management processes of the Pentagon, to include OSD itself as well as the JCS and the three military departments. Together the two advisory groups promised to provide the secretary of defense with a bit more flexibility regarding options for change even as they underlined those choices that garnered general agreement.

The National Defense Panel

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which mandated the Quadrennial Defense Review, Congress also directed the secretary of defense to establish the NDP. The statute directed the secretary of defense to appoint the panel's nine members no later than 1 December 1996. Overlapping the final stage of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the panel was to provide three products by 1 December 1997: an assessment of the QDR and its report; an "alternative force structure assessment"; and budget estimates to support the panel's force structure assessment. The NDP would also meet the Commission on Roles and Missions' recommendation that the quadrennial strategic review extend beyond the Defense Department to all executive agencies represented on the National Security Council (NSC).[1]

[1] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*, Public Law 201, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (23 Sep 1996), secs. 923–924; CORM, *Directions for Defense*, p. 4-9.

As directed in the authorizing legislation, the National Defense Panel provided an early assessment of the QDR in mid-May 1997. At that time the panel endorsed the general outlines of the review but criticized certain initial conclusions and key procedural aspects. The panel agreed that the QDR's manpower reductions would not compromise essential military capabilities. Echoing a major Army objection to QDR results, however, the NDP's assessment noted an "insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other." The panel further argued that the QDR's draft national military strategy addressed more and diverse challenges, yet with significantly reduced resources, than had the national military strategy four years earlier.[2]

Rather than recommending additional conventional forces, however, the panel favored replacing selected forces with those more tailored to small-scale contingencies, such as military police units. It also criticized the QDR for focusing on military capabilities during the Future Years Defense Program (1998–2003) rather than looking forward to 2010 and beyond. The panel touched additionally on the QDR's reluctance to confront issues of roles, missions, and functions but did not itself address the matter of excessive duplication across service capabilities, recommending only "further development of joint and combined operational concepts." Last, the panel joined the critics of the TACWAR theater-level campaign model and its impact on QDR analyses. Although preliminary, the panel's initial response offered insights into the directions its later assessment would take.[3]

Beginning its actual work in early 1997, the panel operated out of leased space in Arlington, Virginia. Over the course of its work, March through December, its nine members participated in forty-five meetings, averaging more than five a month. Selected by the secretary of defense, the panel included four retired four-star officers, one from each service; a former assistant secretary of defense; a former ambassador; two defense intellectuals; and, as chairman, an executive with a major defense contractor who was a veteran of McNamara's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The blend of backgrounds combined seasoned professional military judgment with civilian government, management, and academic perspectives on defense issues.[4]

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[2] Memo, Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, National Defense Panel, for the Secretary of Defense, 14 May 1997, sub: National Defense Panel Comments on the Report of the QDR, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Interv, Mark Sherry with Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, National Defense Panel, 8 Apr 1998, Fairfax County, Va.; Interv, Mark Sherry with Admiral David Jeremiah, U.S.

To do research, develop issues for decisions, and prepare its final report, the National Defense Panel relied on an executive director, a deputy director, and a staff of more than thirty. As in the case of the Commission on Roles and Missions, the services, OSD, and the Joint Staff provided most of the supporting manpower for the study's duration. Approximately a dozen contractors, focusing on research and analysis, rounded out the staff.[5]

By late spring the panel had developed a methodology. The study would undertake eight consecutive tasks: (1) identify national security objectives, (2) identify future environments and situations, (3) develop a strategy, (4) develop options for military capabilities, (5) derive "force elements" from the larger military capabilities, (6) develop force structures by applying military strategy to force elements, (7) develop support concepts and infrastructure, and (8) complete a budget assessment. The staff coordinated briefings by outside experts and conducted "seminars" for each task, or phase, and invited representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and service headquarters to participate in the discussions. Although many staff members preferred to examine issues related to forces and specific weapons programs, the panel chose to focus on broader national security issues that would require attention over the next two decades.[6]

The Army's assistant vice chief of staff continued to coordinate the Army's QDR-related efforts after the review itself ended in May and interest shifted to the National Defense Panel. He assigned day-to-day responsibility for NDP actions to his new Center for Land Warfare, which had replaced the Strategic Synchronization Cell in July 1997. By that time most cell personnel had transferred to other assignments during the summer. Their transfers meant that a Senior Executive Service analyst was left to run the center, a colonel to serve as deputy director, and eight to ten action officers to serve as staff. HQDA also detailed a colonel and a lieutenant colonel from the Army's Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate to serve full-time on the NDP's staff. Neither officer, however, had served with the Army's QDR team, and both approached their duties with a fresh perspective. In addition, action officers from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and other HQDA elements represented the Army at National Defense Panel seminars in

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Navy, Ret., National Defense Panel, 23 Jan 1998, Burke, Va.; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt, National Defense Panel, 23 Jan 1998, Washington, D.C., all Oral History Activity, CMH.

[5] Odeen interv, 29 Apr 1998, Oral History Activity, CMH.

[6] Briefing Materials, "National Defense Panel Tasks," undated (Summer 1997), Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv, Mark Sherry with James R. McDonough, NDP Staff, 20 Aug 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH.

their areas of expertise. But it was the Center for Land Warfare that sought to coordinate the Army's attempt to integrate its NDP support elements across HQDA.

The Army did not enter the National Defense Panel's deliberations with a detailed campaign plan. During the initial phases of the QDR, Army participants had anticipated having to appeal to the panel recommendations for reductions to Army forces. However, the subsequent lack of any such proposals in the final QDR report made the issue moot. In any case, although the Army's NDP participants remained engaged with the panel's staff in all perceived areas of Army interest, the panel itself remained closed to direct Army participation, and the direction it would take remained elusive.[7]

The overly ambitious scope of the National Defense Panel's mandate became evident by late summer. Its first major milestone was to develop a strategic concept valid through 2020. Panel staffers examined seven strategy options, ranging from a "Fortress America" isolationism to a "Primacy" option in which the United States would act as the world's "police chief." The options compared approximate military capabilities required for each strategy with those that the Quadrennial Defense Review had identified as essential to prosecute a major theater war. But disagreements soon arose among both panel and staff members concerning the QDR's recommended force levels.

Members of the National Defense Panel and its staff raised questions concerning the QDR's concept for prosecuting two, near-simultaneous, major theater wars. Several staff members recommended that the panel examine an MTW warfighting option that would permit a major restructuring of U.S. conventional forces. The "strategic halt" concept, as it came to be known, applied to the second regional contingency. The concept envisioned an air interdiction campaign to stop the advance of an aggressor's ground forces. Continuing air strikes would defeat the enemy by inflicting casualties until it could no longer continue offensive operations. In theory, such a successful air campaign would preclude the need for a ground counteroffensive, or at least an immediate one. This operational concept directly contradicted the QDR's hypotheses concerning a major theater war, existing U.S. and combined war plans, and agreements with allies. Army participants in the NDP process also realized that the strategic halt concept threatened to transfer resources from conventional ground forces to high-technology weapons. Although the panel ultimately rejected the concept, the debate underscored divisions within the national security community over priorities for future

[7] McManaway interv, 8 Apr 1997, CMH.

U.S. forces, as well as difficulties in developing a strategy for a future that extended beyond 2010.[8]

The NDP debate on strategy issues confirmed the difficulty of having the panel expand on the Quadrennial Defense Review's efforts and develop a strategy for 2010–2020. Lacking the trained analysts, models, and detailed databases essential for campaign analysis, the panel accepted the fact that the development of coherent national security and military strategies that far into the future was beyond its capabilities. So, rather than attempt to develop a concrete strategy for the far future, the panel recommended a "transformation strategy." Building on its staff's strategy review, it posited four possible futures, ranging from a "shaped stability," characterized by a high degree of international cooperation, to a world in "chronic crisis." Unable to predict which of the four scenarios was likely, the panel recommended that the nation adopt a "strategic" concept for transforming its defense establishment to maximize flexibility. Within that context, the panel believed that the Defense Department was expending too many resources trying to protect existing service structures and programs for the near term.[9]

Some implications of the transformation strategy troubled Army leaders. The panel's final report argued that the world "was in the early stages of a revolution in military affairs—a discontinuous change usually associated with technology but also representing social or economic changes that fundamentally alter the face of battle." This statement echoed the opinion of a working group of civilian experts commissioned by OSD's director of net assessment in the summer of 1997. These analysts had argued that a revolution in military affairs would "render obsolete or subordinate existing means for conducting war," a claim that Army leaders had already rejected. Reviewing the panel's recommendations, the Army's QDR team thus was concerned that a concept, which many still considered more an academic theory than a road map for transformation, could precipitate ill-conceived force reductions to fund a number of dubious high-technology programs.[10]

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[8] Briefing Materials, Army ODCSOPS, "NDP Strategy and Capabilities: Strategy Development (Task 3) Overview," 7 Aug 1997; NDP Draft Issue Paper, "Summary of Strategies," 13 Aug 1997; Gen James P. McCarthy, U.S. Air Force, Ret., "A Proposal for an Alternate Strategy," 19 Jun 1997, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[9] Odeen interv, 8 Apr 1998; and Interv, Mark Sherry with James R. McDonough, 3 Dec 1997, Washington, D.C., both Oral History Activity, CMH; National Defense Panel (NDP), *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Report of the National Defense Panel)* (Arlington, Va.: National Defense Panel, December 1997), pp. 5–11, 60–67.

[10] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, p. 7; Briefing Materials by OSD (Net Assessment),

The NDP's failure to recommend a cohesive strategy rendered it unable to provide an alternative force structure analysis. The panel offered more general recommendations for evolving and integrating military capabilities as part of its recommended "transformation strategy." It started on a lofty note. Expanding on an issue it raised in its assessment of the QDR, the panel argued for a stronger joint role in force development. But without suggesting a time frame, the panel also argued for a reduction in active force levels at some future date. Instead of maintaining forces that DoD considered adequate to prosecute two major theater wars, the panel recommended that Defense reduce these forces to a level adequate for one major theater war and several concurrent small-scale contingencies.[11]

Other panel recommendations also affected the Army. The group proposed the restructuring of "above-the-line," or division-sized, units into "smaller operational elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality." This concept embraced both "fixed brigade" division options that the Army's Training and Doctrine Command had studied since the late 1980s and more unconventional solutions.[12] Regarding the Army's reserve components, the panel proposed tighter integration of Army National Guard enhanced readiness brigades with active Army forces. It also proposed the conversion of some Guard strategic reserve forces from general-purpose combat units to units specifically organized for domestic emergencies, civil support, and service in small-scale contingencies.[13]

Like the QDR, the panel avoided direct recommendations concerning roles, missions, and functions. Its assertion that "competition among the services can assist in determining how best to exploit new capabilities, or how to solve emerging challenges," at first glance seemed ready to reverse the Defense Department's ponderous march toward unification. However, its ideas of "competition" did not mean a return to the type of interservice conflict that characterized the Defense Department during the decade and a half after 1945. The panel viewed such competition as useful when limited primarily to the realm of combat developments and

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"OSD/Net Assessment Summer Study 1997: Transformation Strategy for a Period of Revolutionary Change," undated (Summer 1997), Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[11] Odeen interv, 8 Apr 1998; McDonough interv, 3 Dec 1997, Oral History Activity, CMH; NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 23–24, 68–70.

[12] See Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 59–93, for detailed concepts for more ambitious tactical force redesigns.

[13] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 36–37, 46–47, 52–55; McDonough interv, 8 Dec 1997.

force modernization programs, carefully supervised by the upper DoD echelons. In this area it clearly favored more interservice solutions to future problems.[14]

To direct joint initiatives, the panel championed a new organization, a "Joint Forces Command." This unified command would assume the role of the U.S. Atlantic Command's since 1993 as "joint force provider" to other regional combatant commanders. The recommendation resembled in many respects a concept that Army Chief of Staff Reimer had espoused in March for enhancing joint force development. As the NDP perceived it, the Joint Forces Command would become involved in issues of force design and development. To better accomplish this role, the joint forces' commander would be encouraged to create a tactical "Joint Battle Command" headquarters in addition to the exercise of oversight over existing joint force development agencies, including the Joint Doctrine Center. If this new command could rationalize competition among service modernization programs, it could also integrate service doctrinal developments and weapons programs. In such a role, it could also serve as an executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[15]

The panel offered few other recommendations concerning defense infrastructure. In fact, it deliberately avoided recommendations in this area, deferring to the Task Force on Defense Reform, which the secretary of defense had commissioned at the end of the Quadrennial Defense Review to conduct a detailed review of defense organizations. At least one infrastructure issue, however, came under the NDP's consideration. The panel recommended consolidating the U.S. Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency into a Logistics Command. This proposal reinforced an earlier suggestion by the staff of the Commission on Roles and Missions and offered a framework for integrating support activities within the Defense Department.[16]

Finally, the panel recommended reviewing defense mobilization assets, including government-owned industrial facilities. Because of the post–Cold War drawdown and differing replacement dates for major

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[14] See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *Restructuring for a New Era: Framing the Roles and Missions Debate* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, April 1995), pp. 62–65; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles & Missions Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, August 1995), pp. 37–41, for earlier versions of this argument by a panel member.

[15] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 57–59, 68–70, 76; Interv, Mark Sherry with Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, National Defense Panel, 7 Apr 1998, Washington, D.C.; McDonough interv, 3 Dec 1997, both Oral History Activity, CMH.

[16] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 72–75.

weapons systems, projected force modernization programs followed cyclical patterns that threatened to force industry to react to a "feast-famine" cycle. The National Defense Panel's transition strategy emphasized research and development, but not necessarily serial production, of a wide variety of new weapons systems and "technology demonstrators." Among other drawbacks to such a modernization strategy, further reductions in the production of major weapons could threaten the viability of private contractors, the defense "industrial base." Furthermore, many new concepts and systems might not appeal to private contractors, necessitating development in either government arsenals or government-owned, contractor-operated facilities.[17]

Not unexpectedly, the panel also recommended moving toward more joint use of existing facilities of all types. Such a move could open the door to a more active OSD role in overseeing installations, involving OSD in dependent housing and other quality of life issues. The panel also linked infrastructure recommendations to the Quadrennial Defense Review's controversial proposal for new base realignment and closure actions. However, such proposals were based on a number of assumptions about private industry that were beyond OSD's ability to control.[18]

The National Defense Panel's composition, its comparatively short working time, and its focus on long-term planning through 2020 ensured that most of its recommendations would be of theoretical rather than immediate practical value. Several panel members, at least, believed that such a theoretical approach was desirable. They argued that the National Defense Panel's long-range focus and lack of responsibility for existing programs permitted it broad latitude for visionary thinking. They recommended launching a similar study panel in conjunction with a future quadrennial defense review, and they wanted its findings available before, rather than after, any future QDR. Such an existing conceptual base would be of advantage to QDR participants in developing short-term recommendations. The secretary of defense accepted the panel's recommendations and forwarded them to Congress. Although the secretary noted their overall value, he supported the Army's position that it was premature to reduce active forces from a level adequate to fight two major theater wars.[19]

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[17] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 72–77; Krepinevich interv, 8 Apr 1998.

[18] NDP, *Transforming Defense*, pp. 79–86.

[19] Odeen interv, 8 Apr 1998; Kimmitt interv, 23 Jan 1998; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Honorable William J. Lynn III, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), 19 Jun 1997, all Oral History Activity, CMH.

The Task Force on Defense Reform

While the National Defense Panel was devising its recommended transition strategy, the secretary of defense had another group developing options for reforming defense infrastructure. On 14 May 1997, Secretary Cohen established the Task Force on Defense Reform, composed of seven members. A "designated federal officer" from the Office of the OSD Comptroller coordinated support for the task force by a half-dozen staff personnel in the comptroller's office. The task force was to recommend options for reorganizing and modifying management processes in four main areas: (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, (3) defense agencies and field activities, and (4) "enterprise-wide business practices."[20]

Of the task force's seven members, four were defense contracting executives, two were management consultants, and one was the president of an information technology trade association. All had served on congressional staffs or in the Congressional Budget Office. Four had been political appointees within the Defense Department. All were sensitive to the highly political nature of issues involving defense infrastructure. With its members' extensive Washington backgrounds, the task force began work with little need for a "shake-down." From the outset the group strove to avoid burdening the secretary with yet another set of theoretical recommendations. Its membership sought to make recommendations that could be implemented in the short term and that offered practical solutions to immediate problems rather than to long-term, politically sensitive ones.[21]

Because of the task force's potential for recommending major institutional changes, Army leaders took a keen interest in its deliberations. Unlike the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel, however, the Task Force on Defense Reform conducted its study in relative isolation, with only restricted access by nonstudy group members.

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[20] Charter, Task Force on Defense Reform, 6 May 1997; Press Conference Opening Statement by Arnold Punaro, Chairman, Secretary of Defense Task Force on Defense Reform, 29 May 1997; and Talking Paper, Center for Land Warfare, Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, 5 Sep 1997, sub: Task Force on Defense Reform, all Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[21] Memo, Secretary of Defense for Secretaries of Military Departments et al., 11 Jun 1997, sub: Task Force on Defense Reform, Historian's Background Files, CMH; Interv, Sherry with Mr. Arnold Punaro, Chairman, Task Force on Defense Reform, 21 Jan 1998, McLean, Va., and Interv, Sherry with Honorable James R. Locher III, Task Force on Defense Reform, 7 Oct 1997, Pentagon, both Historian's Background Files, CMH.

No seminars or other forums were open to the services.[22] Army leaders thus again feared that the task force could easily make recommendations affecting Army interests without reference to service positions or needs.[23]

Between May and November 1997, the entire task force met at least twice a week, and individual members conducted interviews with OSD, Joint Staff, and service leaders. Although infrastructure reform had daunted the Defense Management Review, the Task Force on Defense Reform had at least one advantage. In October 1997 Congress mandated another reduction, of 25 percent, in management headquarters personnel by October 2002.[24] A cut of this magnitude would be difficult to reach solely through internal reductions to existing headquarters and portended major institutional consolidations. The commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, endorsed a major Defense Department reorganization that "eliminates, or at least reduces, redundant [duplicative] layers of hierarchal bureaucracy—organizations that filter or delay the exchange of information and decisions." Such an ambitious reorganization would require consolidation of a number of organizations, analogous to some of the 1989–1992 Defense Management Review proposals. In short, the congressional action suddenly positioned the task force to make some concrete recommendations concerning organizational consolidation.[25]

With a deadline of 1 November, the task force had to narrow its efforts somewhat, especially given that its members served only part-time and that only limited staff support was available. Thus the task force focused on OSD and the Joint Staff, rather than design a comprehensive departmental reorganization. Individual members worked on separate headquarters' functions, such as intelligence and criminal and security investigations, and developed recommendations debated by the entire task force. In October, the group gave Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre a series of briefings with a number of reorganization options, some of which Hamre selected for decision. After the secretary approved the items selected, Hamre published them on 10 November in a *Defense Reform Initiative Report*.[26]

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[22] Punaro interv, 21 Jan 1998; Locher interv, 7 Oct 1997.

[23] Comments by HQDA action officers at Army Quarterback meetings, Sep–Oct 1997.

[24] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998*, Public Law 85, 105th Cong., 1st sess. (18 Nov 1997), sec. 911.

[25] General John J. Sheehan, USMC, "Building the Right Military for the 21st Century," *Strategic Review* 25 (Summer 1997): 11–12. See also Robert Worth, "Unwieldy and Irrelevant: Why Is the Military Clinging to Undated and Ineffective Command Structures?" *Washington Monthly* 29 (October 1997): 26–30.

[26] Locher interv, 1 May 1998; Punaro interv, 31 Jan 1998; and Interv, Mark Sherry

John Hamre being sworn in as deputy secretary of defense

With this report, Hamre used the Task Force on Defense Reform's recommendations to launch what he termed the "Defense Reform Initiative." One key aspect of the report was establishment of a Defense Management Council consisting of the deputy secretary and the under secretaries of defense, the service under secretaries, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service vice chiefs of staff. Empowered primarily to ensure implementation of the secretary's defense reform decisions, it was also to review deferred initiatives of the Task Force on Defense Reform and consider other recommended reforms. Task force recommendations approved in the report included a 10 percent reduction in all Defense Department headquarters' elements by the end of 2003. The report also directed a 9 percent reduction in presidential appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[27]

As the Task Force on Defense Reform recommended, the Defense Reform Initiative focused its efforts primarily on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense-level agencies. In summary, the body

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with Honorable Kim Wincup, 19 Feb 1998, all in Oral History Activity, CMH; Honorable William S. Cohen, *Defense Reform Initiative Report* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997), pp. 15–18.

[27] Cohen, *Defense Reform Initiative Report*, pp. 15–20.

proposed that the secretary reorganize OSD and reduce its size, reversing several decades of incremental growth. The secretary approved a 33 percent reduction of OSD manpower that was intended to focus his immediate office on its "core functions" of policy and "strategic leadership" for the department. This emphasis meant divesting program management and other functions that the office had accumulated over time. Despite some misgivings that OSD might not retain sufficient resources to integrate service programs effectively, several task force members argued that streamlining operations would refocus efforts without compromising effectiveness.[28]

The Defense Reform Initiative also addressed issues concerning defense agencies. Defense Management Review initiatives had consolidated several functions, such as finance and accounting, into defense agencies early in the post–Cold War drawdown. However, turbulence caused by declining resources and by geographic moves resulting from base realignment and closure actions had complicated these efforts. Having opposed most of these consolidations, the Army and other services continued their opposition by complaining about the costs of defense agency operations and by suggesting the outsourcing of many of these functions. Members of the Task Force on Defense Reform proposed that DoD undertake a "revolution in business affairs," and recommended outsourcing, privatization, and competition in general as reform tools. Although the task force endorsed the goal of enhanced competition, it stopped short of proposing the disestablishment of specific organizations and the outsourcing of their functions. Finally, the Defense Reform Initiative endorsed another two rounds of base closures without addressing how to deal with mobilization needs. The end of the Cold War apparently made mobilization a minor, more manageable chore.[29]

Although more comprehensive than the preceding Bottom-Up Review, the QDR and the studies by the National Defense Panel and the Task Force on Defense Reform disappointed critics who sought more extensive reforms that would produce a cohesive and better focused Defense Department. None of these studies offered major suggestions for reducing duplications or changing service roles and functions, nor did the task force yield infrastructure reorganizations on the scale proposed during the earlier Defense Management Review and endorsed by the congressional authors of the Commission on Roles and Missions.

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[28] Cohen, *Defense Reform Initiative Report*, pp. 16–18; and Interv, Mark Sherry with Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, Task Force on Defense Reform, 10 Dec 1997; Punaro interv, 21 Jan 1998; and Wincup interv, 19 Feb 1998, all Oral History Activity, CMH.

[29] Cohen, *Defense Reform Initiative Report*, pp. 1–14, 27–31, 37–40; Punaro interv, 21 Jan 1998.

Although the National Defense Panel did offer some recommendations for long-term institutional change, perhaps its most important proposal for sparking greater military efficiency and effectiveness was creation of a Joint Forces Command. If adopted, this recommendation could finally yield an organization capable of building integrated joint forces. DoD could then reduce other headquarters, including HQDA, in proportion to the shift of responsibilities to the Joint Forces Command.

Army leaders perhaps could look on the entire exercise with some relief. With the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review as recent precedents, the endeavors of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense Panel, and the Task Force on Defense Reform had appeared to pose significant threats to Army interests. Many Army leaders and participants had feared that these studies would simply constitute a pretext for additional reductions of Army forces and budgets. Consequently, HQDA had established the Strategic Synchronization Cell and its successor, the Center for Land Warfare, to focus Army efforts during these studies. These organizations had helped Army leaders to conduct a successful campaign for Army interests, with timely, effective Army participation in each study. The openness of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel to service participation had helped preclude the type of inadequately informed decisions that critics argued characterized the Bottom-Up Review. Finally, the Task Force on Defense Reform had not really grappled with the major issues that might have affected Army matters. Still, without a visionary national military strategy and comprehensive joint doctrine for warfare that would provide a detailed road map for force developments, future reviews were inevitable. Rather than ending, the process was in many ways just beginning.

Chapter 9
Conclusion

The U.S. defense establishment underwent several major changes from 1987 to 1997, including several revisions of the defense and the national military strategies, structural overhaul within the Defense Department, and modifications of programs, budgets, and management processes. Taken as a whole, these changes marked the end of the Cold War Army and the nation's longest period of peacetime military mobilization. They also marked the advent of a new era. At the end of the decade, international developments and U.S. political processes were still defining the new national security environment in a period of transition best described as the "post–Cold War era."

The transition significantly affected the U.S. Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army—its "Command Post" expended considerable effort during those ten years in defense-reshaping endeavors. Declining budgets and changing strategy drove a series of DoD restructuring actions. The most significant of these changes not only forced deep reductions in Army forces, but also overshadowed all of HQDA's reorganization efforts. Consequently, the Army's headquarters increasingly found itself reacting to OSD and Joint Staff proposals on strategy, programs, and forces, rather than charting the Army's transition from a Cold War force. That transition would require a refocus away from the forward defense of key allies against Soviet expansion to a more mobile force designed to deploy rapidly to theaters around the world.

Goldwater-Nichols

The decade of reshaping began with an overhaul of the Defense Department's management, especially the processes that dictated the direction and pace of change. After four decades of periodic but half-hearted attempts to effectively unify the armed forces, the Goldwater-Nichols Act inaugurated a more sustained and vigorous effort. Generations of defense reformers had sought to create a consolidated department, with its military services integrated by an authoritative warfighting concept, joint doctrine, and complementary programs and capabilities. Despite their efforts, the Defense Department remained

"balkanized." Three overlapping organizational models still prevailed within the department: a cabinet department with organizational details prescribed by statute, a military organization with functional headquarters and staffs, and an organization managed through business-type processes. One of these processes, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), had become the department's overarching management tool. Not surprisingly, the three models were rarely compatible, compromising both effectiveness and efficiency in many disparate ways.

Rather than attempt a comprehensive "fix" for accumulated Defense Department failings, the Goldwater-Nichols Act settled for more limited goals. The act continued the trend of legislating specific corrections to egregious problems rather than undertaking the type of comprehensive reorganization that many reformers advocated (e.g., mandating consolidations of service support functions). The act also continued the trend of consolidating the secretary's authority over the entire Defense Department, steadily increasing the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to integrate service programs and functions, as well as the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over these areas. A succession of secretaries of defense and chairmen capitalized on these provisions during the subsequent decade to strengthen their control over the Army and the other services.

The Goldwater-Nichols provisions that expanded the authority of the chairman and the combatant commanders in program decisions began to affect decisions concerning resources. Most significantly, these provisions increased the emphasis on military effectiveness, as opposed to military efficiency, in the evaluation of competing programs. The chairman's new role in program decisions, in particular, brought a vitally needed military perspective to resource management processes at the top levels of the Defense Department. Prior to the chairman's expanded involvement in force structure and modernization issues through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Chairman's Program Assessment, OSD staffs dominated recommendations to the secretary concerning service programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had relied almost exclusively on cost-benefit analysis to derive its program recommendations. Many critics argued that such a reliance on economic factors, combined with a paucity of military officers in key OSD analytical positions, undermined the credibility of such recommendations. Goldwater-Nichols began a process that would alter the balance between military and civilian advice on resource issues even while it reduced the authority of the military services as institutions. The resulting combination of Joint Staff and

OSD efforts expanded the joint role in program and budget issues at the expense of the services.

The act also modified the Army headquarters' organization in a way that directly affected its internal functions. The transfer of selected functions from the Army Staff to the Army Secretariat complicated day-to-day operations. These changes also jeopardized the Army's responsiveness to Joint Staff initiatives and raised concerns over the ability of subcabinet-level political appointees to directly affect military requirements. Particularly problematic were the Goldwater-Nichols provisions that mandated the transfer from service staffs to service secretariats of oversight over research, development, acquisition, and information management functions. The act's authors labeled these functions as components of the "business" part of the service infrastructure that could be managed by political appointees. But many Army leaders obviously disagreed with this judgment. Those opposed argued that such functions contributed directly to fighting capabilities and to defining military requirements and thus should be regarded as military rather than business functions. The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions endorsed this latter argument, having recommended a major structural change through the elimination of most service assistant secretary positions. Under its proposals, supervision of these functional areas would either shift back to the service staffs or over to the Joint Staff.

Early Reshaping

Although the end of the Cold War and declining defense budgets were the catalysts, the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization set the parameters for HQDA's most significant challenge over the next decade, post–Cold War reshaping. By strengthening OSD and enhancing joint control over program and budget issues affecting the Army, the act continued the course of further unification, primarily through modifications to defense management processes. Secretary McNamara's PPBS had started this trend. HQDA participated in PPBS, which continued to integrate strategic plans, programs, and budgets. The act strengthened the chairman's authority to institute program recommendations and to undertake the Chairman's Program Assessment, thus expanding the Joint Staff's participation in military requirements and resource management processes. The Base Force study, the Bottom-Up Review, and the Quadrennial Defense Review broadened OSD and joint control over Army forces, programs, and budgets. To a large extent, the decisions resulting from these studies overrode decisions made in the PPBS processes, which were based generally on the Army's POM and budget submissions. In

the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review, OSD and the Joint Staff operated without HQDA participation.

Having attempted through the 1989 Antaeus study to plot the Army's course, HQDA quickly lost the initiative to Joint Staff and OSD efforts. After the 1990 Base Force study, the Army faced accelerating change. Although HQDA participated in the 1992 Chairman's Roles, Missions, and Functions Study and the 1996–1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, it simply reacted to OSD and Joint Staff initiatives that were made within the context of these assessments. Consequently, the Army's headquarters enjoyed limited influence over the outcome of Defense Department reshaping and developed a defensive mind-set.

Army leaders argued consistently during the post–Cold War reductions that the evolving national military strategy should be the cornerstone of defense reshaping. Rapid changes in the international arena, stemming from the Soviet collapse and increasing instability elsewhere in the world, had obviously made the existing Cold War national military strategy irrelevant. But the lack of an agreed-upon replacement strategy for President Bush's "New World Order" precluded long-term decisions on levels of forces, force mixes, modernization programs, basing, and strategic mobility programs.

Clearly, the Defense Department's strategy development processes lagged behind changes in the world. Intelligence agencies failed to predict major geopolitical changes, such as the Soviet military collapse, in time to alert strategists. Consequently, planners initially did little more than react to these changes. The Quadrennial Defense Review was the first major reshaping study in which an approved strategy preceded decisions on forces. In the other studies, the lack of strategic vision hindered development of reshaping options. Both Army and joint planners succumbed to strong pressures to simply reduce existing forces proportionally and incrementally rather than take more positive steps to redesign forces for the future.

During the Cold War, as in previous conflicts, the nation's armed forces had evolved in response to political and military requirements. Consequently, post–Cold War reshaping began with a force that did not precisely reflect the major, unforeseen changes in these areas. For example, superannuated legislative provisions undergirded some existing force levels and missions despite changes in requirements and technology that had overtaken any military rationale for such prescriptions. This situation, as well as past decisions to avoid issues concerning duplications of roles and functions, left a defense organization often hindered by stark duplications of capabilities across services and components. Yet a hard examination never took place of ground roles and

missions of Marine Corps and Army forces, nor of Army active duty and reserve components. Conversely, major shortfalls existed in forces critical for missions that fell between the services. For example, the Air Force and Navy consistently maintained airlift and sealift at levels below those that Army leaders believed prudent. The establishment of almost a separate department or service for the special operations forces solved some of these types of problems but, at the same time, posed others regarding the division of roles and missions. Post–Cold War reshaping studies still found it markedly difficult to confront this formidable legacy of unresolved institutional problems.

The first two major Defense Department reshaping studies, the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review, established a pattern for defense restructuring. Driven more by the quest for budget reductions than by strategic vision, both studies reduced forces without offering any real incentives or guidelines for restructuring Army and other service operational forces for a new strategic environment. The Bottom-Up Review, in particular, recommended that a higher priority be given to contingency operations yet failed to provide for additional ground forces earmarked for small-scale contingencies. Both studies called for more reductions in Army and Air Force units on a proportional basis, than they did for naval forces, which were designed specifically to combat what was by then a rapidly declining Soviet fleet. To justify these relatively high naval force levels, the Bottom-Up Review cited overseas "presence" requirements, which entailed political as much as military considerations.

Although it followed the force reduction trends of the earlier studies, the 1996–1997 Quadrennial Defense Review used a different study methodology. Contrary to what they had done in the Base Force study, the chairman and the secretary of defense invited service participation in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Representatives from HQDA participated directly in the QDR panels and through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Consequently, the Defense Department's leadership avoided most of the recriminations that accompanied the earlier study. Nonetheless, Congress and the secretary of defense accepted the Quadrennial Defense Review's recommendations to cut Army manpower. Like the previous reshaping studies, the QDR study did not offset these cuts with specific recommendations for innovative organizations and programs that would transform the armed forces to meet the challenges of the next century.

The Army and the Defense Department had at least two other opportunities to shape a more cohesive, effective, and efficient defense establishment. Two major studies of roles, missions, and functions in 1992 and 1994–1995 provided an opportunity to redress major problems

of duplication of functions across services. These studies also offered a forum to begin steps that would lead to a redesign of the armed forces for the future. Finally, the studies provided a vehicle to integrate the services' programs of force modernization. A general lack of support by the chairman, the secretary of defense, and the services, however, doomed the 1992 chairman's study to recommending marginal changes only. The 1994–1995 Commission on Roles and Missions demonstrated another difficulty in changing roles and functions. This group lacked sufficient technical expertise to develop specific proposals that would carry enough weight to overcome opposition within the Defense Department. Furthermore, after the 1994 election, political support for the CORM declined. Instead of advocating controversial proposals for restructuring the armed forces, the commission offered a series of concepts intended to continue the Defense Department on a path of evolutionary change. Like the QDR, neither study of roles, missions, and functions provided a comprehensive solution to duplication of functions, nor did either study provide a detailed road map to develop joint forces for the future.

The Army and the other services balked at attempting major changes in roles and functions at a time when they were experiencing significant turbulence resulting from force reductions and internal streamlining actions. After the Base Force study, Army leaders were justifiably wary of external realignment efforts that might also portend additional reductions in Army forces and programs. The roles and functions studies, however, offered a forum to adjudicate overlapping Army and Marine ground force capabilities, based on their military merits rather than on a cost-benefit analysis. Possession of a full spectrum of ground force capabilities—airborne, air assault, light infantry, mechanized, and special operations forces—offered the Army an appreciable advantage in such a review. Yet during the 1992 and 1994–1995 reviews, the Army's leadership sought to defend the status quo rather than demand that the studies develop an integrated vision of a future less plagued by interservice turf battles.

Accused of being focused on finding economic efficiencies rather than on improving institutional effectiveness, the 1989–1992 Defense Management Review drew widespread opposition from the Army and the other services. Nonetheless, discrete Defense Management Review initiatives offered opportunities for significant consolidations of departmental support functions. Consolidations would yield reductions in numbers of headquarters and standardization of supporting functions across the services. But in the face of widespread service opposition, the deputy secretary of defense adopted only a few of the DMR recommendations. This irresolution deferred major department restructuring even as it incurred

congressional displeasure. Indeed, failure of both the 1992 Chairman's Roles, Missions, and Functions Study and the Defense Management Review to reduce infrastructure commensurate with reductions in warfighting forces stirred Congress to mandate the 1994 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

Congress addressed directly what it considered superfluous headquarters. The 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed a 20 percent reduction in management headquarters throughout the Defense Department. The 1998 National Defense Authorization Act mandated a further 25 percent cut. The 1991 NDAA buttressed streamlining efforts of the Army and other departments. The further cut was also pivotal to the Defense Management Review's limited successes in the consolidation of finance and accounting agencies, commissaries, some supply functions, and selected information management functions. The 1998 NDAA directed annual cuts of 5 percent through 2003, which were implemented with some difficulty by the Army and other services but without resorting to the types of consolidation of service headquarters and support functions that various DMR studies had recommended.

These two acts forced military leaders to continue addressing structural reform, however painful. Army leaders themselves had attempted to streamline the service through Project Vanguard, the 1992 HQDA Transformation Study, and the 1995–1996 Force XXI Institutional Axis redesign. HQDA made only marginal changes, however. The Army thus maintained between fourteen and eighteen major commands during the decade following the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, unable to merge or eliminate service component commands supporting unified commanders without coordinated action by OSD, the Joint Staff, and the other services. Similarly, major commands such as the Army Materiel Command and the Military Traffic Management Command directly supported and required close integration with the other services, precluding their consolidation under a single Army major support command. Such a unilateral reorganization would have impaired operations by imposing an additional layer of bureaucracy between these functional headquarters and HQDA, the Joint Staff, OSD, and the other services. This limitation constrained the efforts of the 1995–1996 Force XXI Institutional Axis redesign to consolidate Army major commands.

The growing interdependence among OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services also inhibited efforts to streamline HQDA. Statutory restrictions precluded functional consolidations between the service secretariat and staff. The PPBS also impeded consolidations. As was the case with most Defense Department management processes, the Army participated in PPBS without "owning" the system. The Program Objective

Memorandum, OSD's Program Review, and the annual budget processes had caused HQDA to evolve into a broad, "horizontal" organization. Although cumbersome, this structure permitted wide participation by technical program proponents, including the surgeon general and the chief of engineers. Thus, unless carefully planned and executed, a streamlined headquarters would cost the Army more in disruptions to programs than it would save.

The Quadrennial Defense Review demonstrated the benefits to the Army of HQDA's participation in Defense Department management processes and reshaping studies, albeit at the cost of a significantly increased workload. After the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, HQDA expanded its participation in defense management processes through its membership in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Further demands on HQDA included the need to respond to defense-reshaping studies, including the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review, and to participate in the QDR, as well as in studies of roles, missions, and functions, and base realignment and closures. Army leaders had little choice but to participate fully in all such endeavors. Always their hope was to influence such processes before they led to possibly irreversible decisions adverse to the Army. In the absence of a coordinated Defense Department reorganization, the attendant increase in workload limited the Army's incentive to reduce its command post beyond the cuts already being made at congressional and OSD direction.

The four rounds of Base Realignment and Closure actions between 1989 and 1995 also had a significant impact on Army infrastructure. Basing their decisions primarily on service input, the BRAC commissions ignored deleterious effects of base closures on adjacent installations of other services. As the National Defense Panel implied, the commissions missed opportunities for advancing joint use of certain facilities or enhancing interdependence in geographic regions. Like most of the reshaping studies, the base realignment and closure process focused on divestiture of installations rather than serving to develop a Defense Department base and installation plan for the future, emphasizing joint basing solutions. Base closures undermined the Base Force study's purported goal of offsetting reductions in active forces by maintaining a strong reconstitution capability. The closures also diminished one of the Army's major political advantages with Congress—its presence in more states than any other service. Finally, the BRAC process underscored the degree to which budget cuts and political dynamics, as much as projected military requirements, determined the outcome of post–Cold War reshaping.

Base realignment and closure was an example of a reshaping process that largely averted comparisons across service lines. Such comparative

calculations, along with assessments of military capabilities, might have influenced reductions of the services' force structures in the Base Force study and Bottom-Up Review. In contrast to these earlier studies, the Quadrennial Defense Review sought to integrate "quality-of-life" issues in its determinations. The QDR did not, however, consider the quality of service installations as it made its force-reduction recommendations.

Toward a New Strategy

Throughout post–Cold War reshaping of the U.S. armed forces, both joint and Army planners consistently suffered from lags in developing approved strategies, essential for decisions concerning forces and programs. HQDA preceded the post–Cold War drawdown with its own reshaping studies. The 1988–1989 Antaeus study conducted its own strategy review, developed a plan for future force reductions, and endorsed the continued study of AirLand Battle-Future's concepts for tactical force redesign. The Louisiana Maneuvers further adapted and refined Antaeus and AirLand Battle-Future concepts for the Army of the future but without undertaking a major overhaul of Army operational forces. The studies offered concepts for a comprehensive redesign of Army fighting units to create a more flexible and agile force structure, resulting in more rapidly deployable forces to meet expected future needs such as small-scale contingencies. In addition to its operational benefits, a major tactical restructuring could also help the Army politically in the lingering Army and Marine contention over roles and functions. But the days when the Army could make such unilateral changes were long gone.

As Army participation in contingency operations rose sharply during the decade, the requirements of a new strategy continued to be elusive. Operation Desert Storm, which had been the model for major theater wars, required two Army corps. At the other end of the conflict spectrum, humanitarian assistance operations, from northern Iraq to Haiti, as well as other small-scale contingencies, such as the 1989 incursion into Panama, kept both active and reserve component forces deploying at a moderate to high operational tempo. Overlapping contingency operations often exacerbated the demand on selected units, such as military police and civil affairs units, which became overcommitted at times.

U.S. national military strategy adapted slowly to the increasing tempo and diversity of small-scale contingencies. Only after the Bottom-Up Review did the Defense Department address the likelihood of what it then termed "lesser regional contingencies." Yet the Bottom-Up Review and subsequent reshaping studies failed to support either

additional forces to prosecute small-scale contingencies concurrent with major contingencies, or forces specifically tailored to small-scale contingencies.

The nature and diversity of small-scale contingencies also argued for flexibility and a high degree of operational compatibility among U.S. forces. Although this trend underlined the growing importance of joint doctrine and other tools to facilitate interservice operations, it also affected Army doctrine, such as an increased emphasis on peacekeeping and stability operations. A number of critics, however, argued that the Army should reorganize its tactical forces into a "flexible division" design. Such an organization would capitalize on standardized doctrine, training, and tactics. A more flexible structure would be useful for conducting protracted operations that required several rotations of units, such as JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. It would also provide greater flexibility for reinforcing light forces with heavy forces, as in Somalia.

The contingency operations from 1987 through 1997 underscored the degree to which the world had changed since the Cold War. Yet the National Defense Panel argued that the U.S. military had not evolved into a balanced and integrated post–Cold War force. Through the Louisiana Maneuvers and Army XXI, HQDA developed concepts for tactical force modernization for the first decade of the new century. But neither OSD nor the Joint Staff was able to develop processes that ensured that interservice programs complemented one another during this period. Without greater and more stable direction from above, the progress that a single service could make toward transformation would be limited.

Process and Progress

Antaeus gave HQDA the ability to develop the Quicksilver I and Quicksilver II plans, which offered the Army initial momentum in reshaping itself. These initiatives were quickly overwhelmed, however, by OSD and Joint Staff actions and the general push for force reductions. The Base Force study, the Bottom-Up Review, and the Quadrennial Defense Review increasingly saw HQDA reacting to initiatives from higher authority rather than developing its own options. The Goldwater-Nichols reorganization set the stage for this shift in the balance of power within the Defense Department. Provisions that strengthened the chairman's role in program planning spawned the Base Force, as well as the roles, missions, and functions studies, and periodic reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The Army's headquarters either participated in these efforts or had to react to their recommendations. The resulting workload was in addition to that required for HQDA's

normal operations, which centered on participation in the PPBS processes. Yet the Army's headquarters had to undertake these efforts even as it suffered from declining strength.

By the end of the Quadrennial Defense Review, HQDA's role in Defense Department program and resource planning had become more clearly defined: it served primarily as a participant in a larger process. The Army's headquarters continued to submit an annual budget and submitted or updated a Program Objective Memorandum on a nearly annual basis. Other Defense Department studies and processes, however, such as the Base Force, superseded the PPBS processes. Indeed, the Quadrennial Defense Review had become a statutory requirement in 1999 and would become a regular event. This situation raises the question as to how long HQDA will continue to develop and submit a POM as part of the PPBS processes, rather than respond to a consolidated OSD/Joint Staff recommendation.

Toward a New Century

After the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Department of Defense, including HQDA, continued to evolve. Alterations in Defense Department management processes and statutory reductions in headquarters' manpower were the main catalysts for change. Structural and functional consolidations across HQDA, the Joint Staff, and OSD lagged behind the expectations of some critics. But new management tools, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and studies such as the Quadrennial Defense Review had a subtler yet still decisive outcome. Most important, they further subordinated service decision-making authority to that of OSD and the Joint Staff.

The need to react to OSD and Joint Staff reshaping studies kept the Army's headquarters busy and helped define its structure. The Quadrennial Defense Review evolved into a recurrent survey of national military strategy, forces, and programs. These periodic reviews, along with statutory reviews of roles, missions, and functions, overlapped with "routine" resource processes, primarily the PPBS. The pace of change made HQDA's biennial Program Objective Memorandum and OSD's Program Review annual affairs. The Army's annual budget process also had to react to changing guidance and requirements, causing an additional strain on HQDA's manpower resources. Despite the increase in workload, the Army's headquarters' strength declined more than 25 percent between 1987 and 1997. This decline in strength, as well as the continued turnover on the Army Staff of officers with the requisite expertise, undermined the ability of HQDA to operate at maximum effectiveness.

The Army headquarters' experience of more work to be done by fewer people pointed to the need for a comprehensive overhaul of the Defense Department, something which a number of critics cited. Often focusing on the need for a second "Goldwater-Nichols" reorganization, most of the critics' ideas centered on a comprehensive reorganization of OSD, the Joint Staff, and service headquarters, with a corresponding restructuring of management processes. The constant turbulence that the Army continues to experience in developing and revising its Program Objective Memorandum underscores the ongoing need for reform of the Defense Department's planning, programming, and budgeting processes. A number of studies have recommended ways to restructure the roles of OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services in the programming and budgeting processes. Although both the Commission on Roles and Missions and the National Defense Panel endorsed the need to overhaul these processes, the Defense Department had not undertaken any major revisions in these areas through 1997.

The mixed results of recent defense reshaping activities argue against a restructuring that would eliminate HQDA's participation in the Defense Department's planning and programming processes. At the end of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff still lacked the ability to undertake unilateral program decisions. In addition to consistent criticisms that the Base Force, the Bottom-Up Review, and the Quadrennial Defense Review were not sufficiently visionary, each study underscored the difficulties inherent in major force reviews. Neither OSD nor the Joint Staff then or now possess sufficient technical expertise or analytical capabilities to undertake detailed force design without some degree of service participation. This problem is most acute with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Almost four decades after McNamara, OSD still relies more on cost-benefit analysis than on measurements of military effectiveness for major force decisions. Both OSD and the Joint Staff have also had to rely on service input into their decision-making processes. Nonetheless, service input has often varied significantly in its level of objectivity, as demonstrated in the Dynamic Commitment exercises during the Quadrennial Defense Review. This problem has presented continuing challenges to the Defense Department's analytical capabilities to credibly assess service capabilities.

Yet structural changes recommended by the National Defense Panel augur for an increasingly joint role in force development. Under the NDP's scheme, the Joint Staff could develop future design rules and analytical tools adequate to design a force without active service involvement. Joint training exercises and warfighting experiments could provide a source of

data concerning tactical and weapons capabilities that would preclude the need for such information from HQDA and other service headquarters. A reorganization on the order of "Goldwater-Nichols II" might truncate HQDA's capability to exercise a significant role in reshaping the nation's forces into a more capable and integrated joint force for this century. Yet, if permitted, as a long-standing proponent of enhanced joint operations, the Army and its "Command Post" can continue to contribute to the Defense Department's force development efforts.

Another major consideration argues for HQDA's continued advocacy in Defense Department resource management processes. Despite structural and procedural changes that Goldwater-Nichols mandated, both OSD and the Joint Staff continued to base their decision making on political as well as military calculations. After nearly six decades of evolution toward jointness, the Defense Department still lacks an authoritative doctrine that delineates and integrates service responsibilities for joint warfighting. Similarly, inadequate progress in authoritatively defining service roles and functions has promoted a continuing, intense level of interservice competition over programs and forces. Such competition continues within the Defense Department and before Congress. As long as this degree of dynamic interplay remains a critical determinant in Defense Department resource management processes, the Army must maintain in the Pentagon a strong advocate for the soldier.

The Army's headquarters has continued to remain focused on programs that benefit the soldier, promote enhanced joint warfighting, and further institutional reform of the Defense Department. General Reimer's advocacy during the Quadrennial Defense Review of an outcome that best supported the national military strategy and enhanced joint operations exemplified this stance. At the same time, during the drawdown, the Army carefully avoided advocating reductions to other service programs to bolster marginal Army programs. Further Defense Department reductions may overwhelm this collegial approach and precipitate another round of intense interservice conflict. Preparation for such an outcome looms as yet another in a series of reshaping challenges.

Epilogue

After the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, Army leaders continued to confront many of the same issues that bedeviled them during the decade after Goldwater-Nichols. Perhaps their most unanticipated and vexing dilemma was how to support the dramatically expanding scope of contingency operations. Initially, the Army had committed a division-sized stabilization force in Bosnia in 1995 as part of NATO operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD. The force requirement declined to a brigade two years later, and the Army maintained this commitment by rotating active and reserve component units into Bosnia. With the conclusion of a NATO air campaign that ejected Serb forces from neighboring Kosovo in 1999, the Army had to provide another brigade-sized peacekeeping force to Kosovo as the U.S. contribution to Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. By 2000, the Army had run out of available active component combat forces and had begun mobilizing and deploying to Bosnia and Kosovo Army National Guard combat units, in addition to reserve component civil affairs, military police, and other combat support units.

Army force requirements increased dramatically as the United States launched a war on terrorism in response to the terrorist attacks on its homeland on 11 September 2001. The Defense Department responded to escalating homeland security responsibilities with Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which forced the Army to mobilize significant reserve component forces, including elements of all eight Army National Guard divisions, to protect military installations, airports, and other critical facilities in the United States. By the end of the year, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was also under way in Afghanistan. Army special operations forces spearheaded the U.S. effort, augmented by ground forces including elements of the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Although major operations ended in Afghanistan in the spring of 2002, the Army continued to maintain a ground force commitment in Afghanistan equivalent to an understrength division.

In March 2003, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which involved Army and Marine units, expanded Army force requirements. The 3d Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division undertook most of the initial ground operations. The 4th Infantry Division arrived at the end of ground operations in May and moved north of Baghdad, joining the other

divisions in occupation duties. Since May 2003, occupation duties and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq have required an average of at least three Army or Marine divisions. Reserve component combat brigades participated in the later phases of both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Their extensive use forced the Army to undertake an almost continuous effort to mobilize and train and deploy reserve component units to meet Army force requirements for the U.S. Central Command, as well as those for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. The frequency and intensity of U.S. participation in contingency operations raised significant questions concerning the adequacy of Army force levels to execute the requirements of the national strategy.

While Army forces were occupied in the war on terrorism, defense reshaping activities continued. The debate over the efficacy of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) continued unabated, with many reform advocates still arguing that the world was entering an era where revolutionary changes in military technology were rapidly making existing military hardware and organizations obsolescent. Army leaders remained concerned that this argument might persuade leaders in the Defense Department and Congress to fund the high-technology modernization programs advocated by RMA proponents at the expense of existing force levels and readiness. The debate over the RMA and defense transformation entered into the 2000 presidential campaign when candidate George W. Bush endorsed a platform calling for accelerated defense transformation.

Despite Army concerns over the direction of the RMA debate, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki had already embraced Army transformation as the key issue in his tour of duty. He sought to reestablish the Army's momentum for transforming itself, building on prior studies from the LAM era and Force XXI to change doctrine, organizations, and materiel of Army operational forces. Among his transformation goals, Shinseki wanted to develop a force more readily deployable than the Army's heavy forces and more lethal than its light forces. By mid-2000, he had approved the design for what were termed Interim Brigade Combat Teams, later redesignated as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. By the time he stepped down as chief of staff in June 2003, the Army had plans in place to field six of these brigade combat teams by the end of the decade.

Shinseki's longer-term goal for Army transformation was to begin fielding the Objective Force by the end of the decade. One major target for the Objective Force was to be able to deploy a brigade-sized Army unit anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five complete divisions within 30 days. To make this deployment

goal realistic, the Army would have to replace its existing fighting vehicles with lighter vehicles (designated the Future Combat System [FCS]) but without sacrificing the force's lethality. Design criteria for the Stryker combat teams included better modularity of subordinate units, integration of digitized tactical communications, and the reduction of the overall "logistical footprint" of the Objective Force.

Transformation extended to the institutional Army as well. Army Secretary Thomas E. White initiated a review of HQDA's organization and functions, establishing a Department of the Army Realignment Task Force on 25 June 2001 to conduct the study. Among other decisions, White accepted the task force's recommendation to implement one option that the 1995–1996 HQDA Redesign Functional Area Assessment had studied, but Army leaders had rejected. He opted to create an "Executive Office" of HQDA that consisted of the secretary of the Army, the under secretary, the chief of staff, and the vice chief of staff. His goal was to better integrate efforts of both the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff and to "eliminate the existence of two separate decision making channels, clearly delineate responsibilities within the Headquarters, streamline the flow of information, and speed decision making." At the same time, White strengthened the position of director of the Army Staff, delegating to that official the responsibility for coordinating and tasking actions across HQDA. Another major change in authority was to centralize management of Army installations by 1 October 2002 under a new field operating agency, the Installation Management Agency, which would report to the Army's assistant chief of staff for installation management.[1] The reorganization also affected the structure and functions of HQDA's all-important resource management efforts. HQDA's Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army had been converted into the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs in 2000, assuming many of the functions formerly executed in the Force Management Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The new reorganization converted the DCSPRO into the new Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, who also assumed oversight of the Army's Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate and the Center for Army Analysis.[2] These changes implemented a recommendation that had been made by a succession of reorganization study groups going

[1] "Executive Summary: Realignment of Headquarters, Department of the Army," 17 December 2001, Historian's Background Files, CMH.

[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders 3, "Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters," Department of the Army, 9 July 2002.

back to the 1988 Robust study, strengthening HQDA's focus on resource management issues.

When the George W. Bush administration took office in January 2001, preparations for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001) had already begun. In late 1999, Congress had directed that the secretary of defense conduct a review of strategy, forces, and programs every four years. The Joint Staff took the thirteen questions that Congress directed that QDR 2001 address and developed a list of "overarching issues" to enable the secretary of defense to report to Congress by the statutory deadline of 30 September 2001. The Joint Staff also established seven functional panels that would analyze options for forces and programs during the review itself. The Army participated in all of the panels as well as in the development of the overarching issues.[3]

After Donald H. Rumsfeld was confirmed as secretary of defense in January 2001, he decided to move QDR 2001 in a different direction than the Joint Staff had taken it. The new secretary established eight "study groups," composed of retired officers, other defense experts, and others outside the Defense Department, to advise him on such issues as transformation and strategic mobility. These groups met from March to early June, developing a series of recommendations without direct participation by either the Army, or in most cases, the Joint Staff.

While these groups were conducting their deliberations in closed sessions, OSD directed the Joint Staff to suspend most of the operations that the QDR panels had been undertaking. Instead, under the direction of the principal deputy under secretary of defense (policy), OSD began establishing several Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). For the most part, the IPTs analyzed issues similar to those that the Joint Staff's panels had undertaken, but the IPT efforts were clearly led by members of OSD. The IPTs started work in late April and had only really begun their major analyses by June. Among the most challenging tasks undertaken by the QDR was the "Forces IPT" work to shift analyses of forces from a "threat-based" approach, used since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, to one that was more "capabilities-based," such as that pursued by the 1990 Base Force study. One significant difficulty faced by the IPTs and the Joint Staff's panels was the absence, until the end of the review, of a new national security strategy, an approved defense strategy, or a national military strategy that articulated the Bush administration's vision and goals.

[3] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000*, Public Law 65, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (5 Oct 1999), sec. 901.

Because of the relatively late start of OSD's IPTs and the complexity of issues involved in the new administration's first QDR, Secretary Rumsfeld made no recommendations for major changes in existing defense programs in his 30 September 2001 report to Congress. The report did, however, articulate a new set of strategic priorities. It changed the elements of the department's strategic framework and defense policy goals. Instead of three elements—(1) shape the international environment, (2) respond to the full spectrum of crises, and (3) prepare now for an uncertain future—the new model had four elements: (1) assure allies and friends, (2) dissuade future military competition, (3) deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and (4) if deterrence fails, decisively defeat any adversary. The new "force-sizing construct" intended to implement these goals also had four elements: (1) defend the United States; (2) deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; (3) swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts and preserve for the president the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts, which might involve the possibility of regime change or occupation; and (4) conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.[4]

Despite the Defense Department's success in reorienting the nation's strategic focus to emphasize expanded homeland security requirements, the review stopped short of recommending major changes in forces and programs. One reason for this outcome was that the IPTs were unable to reach a consensus by the end of the summer on how to shape active and reserve component forces. Consequently, instead of making hasty decisions, Secretary Rumsfeld chose to continue studying these issues as part of the department's biennial *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)*.

Since QDR 2001, a series of studies directed by the *DPG* have led the Defense Department to pursue a course toward what has been termed "joint transformation." One of the studies associated with *DPG 2004–09* recommended specific enhancements to joint transformation planning. The secretary endorsed the study and approved DoD's Transformation Planning Guidance in mid-2003. At the same time, the JCS chairman weighed in on transformation issues by updating the regulation that dealt with "joint capabilities integration." The new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) modified joint resource planning by changing the manner by which the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed service programs. Since the early 1990s, the JROC has reviewed all major programs at certain milestones in their

[4] Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 2001), pp. 1–7, 17–23.

development to gauge the value of each against joint requirements. Yet the JCIDS portended a far more intensive process. One evident goal of JCIDS was that all new programs be "born joint," subjected to an extensive review by the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command to ensure that joint integration and interoperability were emphasized from the earliest stages of a program. As part of its review process, the Joint Staff compares service programs against existing and projected systems and capabilities in the other services to reduce the likelihood of duplications or gaps in capabilities in the future force. If the JCIDS process matures, as many critics of service supremacy in force modernization have argued is necessary, the rigorous joint concept development process and review will ensure that there will be fewer, if any, truly service programs.[5]

Secretary Rumsfeld pursued an assertive personal management of the Defense Department. He moved carefully and methodically toward consolidation of decision making at either his level or lower echelons of the joint chain of command. Perhaps more than any secretary of defense since Congress enacted Goldwater-Nichols, Rumsfeld capitalized on the act's legal provisions to drive change within the department. Rumsfeld employed the full authority of his office to reshape the department in contrast to what many critics have argued was a more phlegmatic approach taken by his immediate predecessors. If these criticisms stand the test of time, they underscore the degree to which joint direction of change within the Defense Department remains more dependent on the personality at the top than on institutional dynamics.

[5] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01c, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 24 Jun 2003.

Appendixes

Appendix A
Project Vanguard's Major Command Options

The Army's 1990 Project Vanguard Study Group developed the following four models, or options, for organizing the Army's major commands and elements of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), for the new strategic environment. These charts depict options for MACOMs and their respective relationships with HQDA.

Acronym Key

ARSTAF	Army Staff
ASA-CW	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)
ASA-FM	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management)
ASA-ILE	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)
ASA-MRA	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASA-RDA	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)
COE	Chief of Engineers
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
DISC 4	Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
MACOM	Major command
MDW	Military District of Washington
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment

Color Key

Service Secretariat level

ARSTAF level

MACOM level

Illustrative functions

Option A: Life Cycle Model



Recruiting
Training
Develop doctrine
Combat development
Religion
Health care
Legal
Criminal investigations

Installations
Buildings
Motor pools
Supply points
Medical facilities
Civil works

Research & development
Labs
Testing
Material acquisitions
Supply
Maintenance
Disposal
Traffic management

CONCEPT

- Derived from the Life Cycle Model taught at the U.S. Army Force Management School
- Eleven MACOMs functionally aligned.
- Staff and operations separate
- Active components, reserve components, and civilians are fully integrated.

Option B: Dual-Hat Model



CONCEPT

- Follows Corps of Engineers model
- ARSTAF principal dual-hatted as MACOM commander.
- Eliminates most field operating agencies
- Staff, operations, and base operations combined.
- Thirteen MACOMs functionally aligned.
- Active components, reserve components, and civilians are fully integrated.

*COE (Corps of Engineers) as a major command

Option C: "Fighting Force" Model



Trains
Maintains
Develops doctrine
Runs installations
Intell

Trains
Maintains
Develops doctrine
Runs installations
Intell

Trains
Maintains
Develops doctrine
Runs installations
Intell

People
- Recruits
- Trains
- Investigates
- Health care
- Develops patient admin

Places
- Acquires
- Runs installations
- Engr construction
- Civil works

Things
- Acquires equipment
- Supplies equipment
- Maintains
- Disposes
- Traffic management

CONCEPT

- Follows World War II model
- Mission-oriented MACOMs similar to U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy
- Staff and operations separate
- Mission and base operations combined.
- Seven MACOMs operationally aligned.
- Active components, reserve components, and civilians are fully integrated.

Option D: Vanguard Vision



CONCEPT

- Modified Life Cycle Model
- Nine MACOMs functionally aligned.
- Staff and operations separate
- Eliminates or reduces many field operating agencies
- Separates mission from base operations
- Active components, reserve components, and civilians are fully integrated.

Appendix B

The Road to the Quadrennial Defense Review

Study	*Time Frame*	*Proponent*
Defense Management Review	1989–1992	Office of the Secretary of Defense
Base Force	1989–1990	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Antaeus	1988–1990	Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Quicksilver	1990–1991	Army Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate
Vanguard	1990–1991	Army Vice Chief of Staff
Joint Chiefs Chairman's Roles and Missions	1992–1993	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Bottom-Up Review	1994	Office of the Secretary of Defense
Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM)	1994–1995	Congress/Office of the Secretary of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)	1996–1997	Congress/Office of the Secretary of Defense
National Defense Panel (NDP)	1997	Congress/Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Interviews

The author conducted interviews and taped conversations with the following individuals: Col. C. Kenneth Allard, National Defense University; Albert D. Brown, Force Integration and Management Division, Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-FDF); Robin Buckelew, Strategic Synchronization Cell; David S. C. Chu; Maj. Gen. Arthur Dean, Director, Military Personnel Management, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Blair Ewing, Task Force on Defense Reform; Lt. Col. Frank Finelli, U.S. Army, Quadrennial Defense Review Support Team (J–8); General John W. Foss, U.S. Army, Ret.; Col. William Foster, War Plans Division, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-SSW); Col. Stanley F. Gorenc, U.S. Air Force, Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division, J–8; Maj. Gen. John R. Greenway, Director, Project Vanguard; Col. Michael V. Harper, Chief of Staff, Army's Staff Group; Admiral David Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, Ret., National Defense Panel; Col. Michael G. Jones, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Redesign Working Group and Headquarters Redesign Working Group; Robert M. Kimmitt, National Defense Panel; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,

National Defense Panel; Lt. Gen. Richard D. Lawrence, U.S. Army, Ret.; Col. Jack LeCuyer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Initiatives Group; James R. Locher III, Task Force on Defense Reform; William Lynn III, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation); James R. McDonough, National Defense Panel staff; Col. William McManaway, Deputy Director, Strategic Synchronization Cell; Philip Odeen, Chairman, National Defense Panel; Arnold Punaro, Chairman, Task Force on Defense Reform; General Dennis J. Reimer, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, Ret.; Maj. Gen. Theodore G. Stroup, Jr.; Capt. Robert Sweeney, U.S. Navy, Warfighting Analysis Division, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J–8), Joint Staff; B. Anthony Turner, HQDA Redesign Working Group; Col. W. A. Whittle, Chief, Project Vanguard Concepts Team; Kim Wincup, Task Force on Defense Reform; and Dov S. Zakheim, Task Force on Defense Reform.

Other interviews used in this study are with the following individuals: Archie D. Barrett, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Harold Brown; Mark F. Cancian, Director, Infrastructure and Central Support Group, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) staff; Lt. Col. Peter G. Cassi, Army Roles and Missions Directorate; Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Christman, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-SS); Brig. Gen. John Costello; Maj. Gen. Jerome H. Granrud, Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-FD); Michael Leonard, Executive Director, CORM staff; Lt. Col. Timothy S. Muchmore, Strategic Synchronization Cell; Lt. Gen. William H. Reno, U.S. Army, Ret.; Col. Christopher A. Rockwell, Army Roles and Missions Directorate; Lt. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; General Maxwell Thurman; General Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army, Ret.; and Col. L. Patrick Wright, Deputy Director, Army Roles and Missions Directorate.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
ADO	Army Digitization Office
AMC	U.S. Army Materiel Command
AMRCO	Army Management Review Coordination Office
AOC	Army Operations Center
ARSTAF	Army Staff
ASD (SO/LIC)	Assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
AVCSA	Assistant vice chief of staff of the Army
AWE	Advanced Warfighting Experiment
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
BUR	Bottom-Up Review
CAA	U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CEM	Concepts Evaluation Model
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CINC	Commander in chief
CINCEUR	Commander in chief, Europe
CIS	Confederation of Independent States
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMH	U.S. Army Center of Military History
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CRC	Crisis Response Cell
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSEEA	Close Support End-to-End Analysis
CVBG	Carrier battle group
DA	Department of the Army
DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet

DAMO-FD	Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-FDF	Force Integration and Management Division, Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-FDX	Joint Studies and Analysis Division, Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-ODR	Force Readiness Division, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-SS	Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-SSW	War Plans Division, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAMO-ZM	Roles and Missions Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DAS	Director of the Army Staff
DAWMS	Deep-Attack Weapons Mix Study
DC	Dynamic Commitment
DCSOPS	Deputy chief of staff for operations and plans
DCSPER	Deputy chief of staff for personnel
DCSPRO	Deputy chief of staff for programs
DEPSECDEF	Deputy secretary of defense
DG	*Defense Guidance*
DMR	Defense Management Review
DMRD	Defense Management Report Decision
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DoD	Department of Defense
DPA&E	Director, program analysis and evaluation
DPG	*Defense Planning Guidance*
DPRB	Defense Planning and Resources Board
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
FCS	Future Combat System
FFRDC	Federally funded research and development center
FLIR	Forward-looking infrared receiver
FLOT	Forward line of own troops
FOA	Field operating agency

FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSB	Forward support battalion
FY	Fiscal year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GAO	U.S. General Accounting Office
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOSC	General Officer Steering Committee
HD-LD	High demand-low density
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HSC	U.S. Army Health Services Command
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IFOR	Implementation Force
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement
IPS	Illustrative Planning Scenario
IPT	Integrated Product Team
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JICM	Joint Integrated Contingency Model
JMNA	*Joint Military Net Assessment*
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSR	*Joint Strategy Review*
JTF	Joint Task Force
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
LAM	Louisiana Maneuvers
LHX/RAH–66	Light Helicopter Experimental
LMSR	Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off
LRC	Lesser regional contingency
MACOM	Major command
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MFP 11	Major Force Program 11
MHI	U.S. Army Military History Institute
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MRC	Major regional contingency
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study

MRS BURU	Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-Up Review (Update)
MTM/day	Million ton miles per day
MTOF	Mission task-organized forces
MTW	Major Theater War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDP	National Defense Panel
NEO	Noncombatant evacuation operation
NPR	National Performance Review
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
OOTW	Operations other than war
OPTEMPO	Operational tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PERSTEMPO	Personnel tempo
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POMCUS	Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDR 2001	2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
RMA	Revolution in military affairs
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SSA	Staff support agency
SSC	Small-scale contingency
SSG	Senior Steering Group
TACWAR	Tactical Warfare model
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowance

TOA	Total obligation authority
TO&E	Table of organization and equipment
TRAC	TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia II
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WORRM	Weapon Optimization and Resource Requirements Model

Index

Chart 1—Organization of the Department of Defense, July 1984



Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee (SASC), *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 16 October 1985, 99th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20.

Chart 3—Organization of the Department of the Army, October 1985



[a] Chief of Legislative Liaison and Chief of Public Affairs report directly to the Secretary of the Army and are responsive to the Chief of Staff.
[b] The Inspector General serves as the confidential representative of and reports to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff upon the morale, discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army.
[c] The Auditor General reports directly to the Chief of Staff with concurrent responsibility to the Secretary of the Army.
[d] The Comptroller of the Army is under the direction and supervision of and is directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management), with concurrent responsibility to the Chief of Staff.
[e] The Chief of Engineers reports through the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) to the Secretary of the Army on civil works matters.
[f] Commander, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, reports directly and concurrently to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on criminal investigation matters.

Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee (SASC), *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 16 October 1985, 99th Cong., 1st sess., p. 395.

Chart 5—Organization of the Department of the Army, September 1991



Major commands facing functional consolidation under Defense Management Review initiatives

[a] Reports directly to the Secretary of the Army and is responsive to the Chief of Staff

[b] Commander, USACE, reports through the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) to the Secretary of the Army on civil works matters.

[c] Reports directly and concurrently to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on criminal matters

[d] Reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment) on operational matters

Source: *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997), facing p. 184.

Chart 6—Organization of the Army Service Forces (ASF), 15 August 1944



* Under Army Service Forces for administrative and supply functions

Source: John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), p. 355.

Chart 9—Army Organization for Quadrennial Defense Review, March 1997



Note: Army task forces reflect the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff panels with which they interacted.

Source: AVCSA Briefing Materials.

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